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Global Energy and Climate Outlook 2017: How climate policies improve air quality - Global energy 
trends and ancillary benefits of the Paris Agreement 
This study shows that achieving the climate change mitigation target of staying below 2°C temperature rise is 
possible technically – thanks to an acceleration of decarbonisation trends, an increased electrification of final 
demand and large changes in the primary energy mix that include a phase out of coal and a reduction of oil and 
gas – and is consistent with economic growth. It yields co-benefits via improved air quality – including avoided 
deaths, reduction of respiratory diseases and agricultural productivity improvement – that largely offset the 
cost of climate change mitigation. These co-benefits arise without extra investment costs and are additional to 
the benefits of avoiding global warming and its impact on the economy. 
 
 i 
 
Table of contents  
 
Acknowledgements ................................................................................................ 1 
Executive summary ............................................................................................... 2 
1 Introduction .................................................................................................... 4 
2 Scenarios definition .......................................................................................... 6 
2.1 Socio-economic assumptions ....................................................................... 7 
2.2 Policies considered ....................................................................................10 
3 Global energy trends .......................................................................................13 
3.1 Energy sector ...........................................................................................13 
3.2 Energy markets .........................................................................................33 
4 Greenhouse gas emissions and climate ..............................................................54 
4.1 Global emissions and temperature change ....................................................54 
4.2 Regional dynamics .....................................................................................57 
4.3 Sectoral dynamics .....................................................................................58 
4.4 Drivers of GHG emissions ...........................................................................59 
4.5 Decarbonisation indicators ..........................................................................61 
4.6 GHG emissions mitigation options................................................................63 
5 Air pollutants emissions and concentrations .......................................................70 
5.1 Air pollutants emissions .............................................................................70 
5.2 Air pollutant concentrations ........................................................................81 
6 Economic assessment and climate – air quality policies synergies .........................84 
6.1 Energy system costs ..................................................................................84 
6.2 Greenhouse gas mitigation and macro-economic growth ................................87 
6.3 Benefits of improved air quality ...................................................................90 
6.4 Macro-economic impacts of avoided air pollution ...........................................95 
6.5 Combining GHG mitigation cost with air quality co-benefits .............................99 
6.6 The cost of inaction ................................................................................. 101 
References ........................................................................................................ 102 
List of abbreviations and definitions ...................................................................... 108 
List of Figures .................................................................................................... 113 
List of Tables ..................................................................................................... 117 
Annex 1 Description of the energy/GHG model POLES-JRC ...................................... 118 
Model ............................................................................................................. 118 
Countries and regions ...................................................................................... 120 
Data sources ................................................................................................... 123 
Annex 2 Description of the economic model JRC-GEM-E3 ......................................... 124 
 ii 
Annex 3 Description of the source-receptor model TM5-FASST ................................. 126 
Annex 4 Air pollution health impacts methodology .................................................. 130 
Annex 5 Detailed energy and climate policies ......................................................... 132 
 
 
1 
Acknowledgements
This study was prepared by the Economics of Climate Change, Energy and Transport unit 
of the Directorate Climate, Energy and Transport of the Joint Research Centre (JRC) of 
the European Commission. 
The colleagues and experts contributed to this report as follows: 
Alban Kitousa: Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 
Kimon Keramidasa: Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 
Toon Vandycka: Sections 1, 5 and 6 
Bert Saveyna: Sections 1 and 6 
Rita Van Dingenenb: Sections 5 and 6 
Joe Spadaroc: Sections 5 and 6 
Mike Hollandd: Sections 5 and 6 
a
b
c
Joint Research Centre (JRC) of the European Commission, Seville, Spain
Joint Research Centre (JRC) of the European Commission, Ispra, Italy
Basque Centre for Climate Change (BC3), Bilbao, Spain 
d  Ecometrics Research and Consulting (EMRC), Reading, U.K. 
The GECO energy and greenhouse gases emissions modelling benefited from the 
contributions of: 
 JRC: Jacques Després, Peter Russ, Andreas Schmitz
The report benefited from the comments, contributions and suggestions received in the 
various stages of the report. In particular, colleagues from: 
 JRC: Jacques Després, Ana Diaz, Emmanuela Peduzzi, Diana Rembges, Peter
Russ, Andreas Schmitz, Antonio Soria, Elisabetta Vignati, Tobias Wiesenthal
 Directorate-General for Climate Action (DG CLIMA): Quentin Dupriez, Miles Perry,
Fabien Ramos, Tom van Ierland
 Directorate-General for Energy (DG ENER): Joan Canton
 Directorate-General for Environment (DG ENV): Scott Brockett
 2 
Executive summary 
This report reveals the value of climate policy in lowering air pollution impacts. We show 
that ambitious climate action will decouple economic growth from fossil fuel combustion 
transforming the way energy is produced, reducing not only greenhouse gases but also 
leading to significantly fewer emissions of local air pollutants and consequently saving 
lives, avoiding sickness and increasing agricultural yields. 
Policy context  
The Paris Agreement puts forward the goal to limit global warming to well below 2°C 
above pre-industrial levels. In addition to being a major driver of climate change, energy 
combustion contributes significantly to air pollution, with severe impacts on human 
health, especially in fast-growing countries such as India and China. 
This report studies the implications of global climate policies for energy systems, the 
economy and the co-benefits in terms of air quality. Based on extensive datasets and a 
cutting-edge modelling toolbox, this interdisciplinary study aims at informing 
international climate change negotiations, is relevant for air quality policies and tackles 
multiple Sustainable Development Goals simultaneously (climate action – clean energy – 
good health).  
Key conclusions 
The study shows that mitigating climate change is possible technically, consistent with 
economic growth, and yields co-benefits via improved air quality that largely offset the 
cost of climate change mitigation. Co-benefits include avoided deaths, reduction of 
respiratory diseases and agricultural productivity improvement. 
These co-benefits arise without extra investment costs and are additional to the benefits 
of avoiding global warming and its impact on the economy. They take place in all regions, 
varying with the ambition level of climate policies and the initial energy mix, and are 
strongly linked to the reduction of fossil fuel use; they occur locally and in a shorter time 
frame, providing strong complementary incentives for policymakers to move ahead on 
ambitious climate action. 
The reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions is indeed driven by a shift of the 
energy system towards carbon-free energy sources, a large diffusion of renewables, 
especially in the power sector, and increased energy efficiency in buildings and transport. 
The total investment needs in energy supply would remain similar across scenarios, but 
the distribution reflects a new equilibrium: higher in the power sector to finance capital-
intensive technologies and lower for fossil fuels production. The new energy system emits 
less NOx, SO2 and particulate matter due to reduced fossil fuel combustion, of coal in 
particular. 
Although climate policy does not replace direct air pollution controls, exploiting the 
synergies between both clearly provides opportunities towards a more sustainable future 
for all. By considering such an approach, the report strengthens previous findings that 
limiting global warming is consistent with long-term robust healthy economic growth. 
Main findings 
Although the countries' pledges under the Paris Agreement (INDCs) initiate a break with 
historical GHG trends, reaching the below 2°C target demands a decorrelation of 
emissions from economic growth by an acceleration of decarbonisation trends from 2020 
onwards (energy intensity decrease 5.8% per year on average over 2015-2050 vs. -
1.7% per year in 1900-2010), an increased electrification of final demand (35% in 2050 
vs. 18% in 2015) and large changes in the primary energy mix (phase out of coal, 
reduction of oil and gas after 2030; fossil fuels 46% and low carbon including CCS 59% 
in 2050, vs. 81% and 19% in 2015, respectively). 
The Paris Agreement is estimated to avoid approximately 100,000 air pollution-related 
deaths annually by 2030 on a global level, of which more than half in China alone. 
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Reaching a GHG trajectory compatible with temperature increases well below 2°C could 
save roughly 1.5 million lives annually by 2050. In addition to avoided deaths, it also 
reduces the number of air pollution-related cases of illnesses such as asthma and 
bronchitis by 15-40% annually by 2050 and raises crop yields by 2.5-6.6%. 
Figure 1 ES1: GHG emissions, World, and average annual growth rates for GHG emissions 
intensity of the economy (left); global average temperature change (right) 
 
By 2030, global air quality co-benefits more than compensate the cost of climate change 
mitigation policies. This finding is particularly strong for highly polluted fast-growing low 
income countries relying on coal, and less so for regions with a strong economic 
dependence on fossil fuel exports (higher mitigation costs) or for countries whose 
mitigation policy relies heavily on land use measures (lower co-benefits). 
Figure 2 ES2: Comparison of mitigation cost and air quality co-benefits in 2030 
 
Related and future JRC work  
This report is the third issue of the GECO series, initiated by the JRC in collaboration with 
DG CLIMA in the run-up to the 2015 Paris climate conference. It participates to the JRC 
work in the context of the UNFCCC policy process and the IPCC assessment reports. 
Quick guide  
The report builds on climate policy scenario analysis of the Paris Agreement: Reference: 
serves as a benchmark and includes current climate and energy policies; INDCs: covers 
countries' pledges or Intended Nationally Determined Contributions Below 2°C: ambitious 
pathway with more than 75% probability of limiting global warming to 2°C. The evolution 
of the related energy mix leads to changes in local air pollution. The last section of the 
report provides the economic analysis of the climate policies and of their associated co-
benefits in terms of air quality improvement. 
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1 Introduction 
This report has been prepared as a JRC contribution to the upcoming milestones of the 
international process coordinated by the United Nations Framework convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC), following the 2015 Paris Agreement (1); in particular the 
facilitative dialogue to take stock of the global mitigation effort in 2018 (1), and the 
update of the commitments (INDCs and NDCs) to be put forward by countries in 2020. 
This report addresses a possible path towards a global low carbon economy while 
widening the scope of the greenhouse gas (GHG) mitigation policy analysis towards 
associated co-benefits on air pollution. In addition to being a major driver of climate 
change, energy combustion significantly contributes to air pollution, with severe impacts 
on human health, especially in fast-growing countries such as India and China. The latter 
is crucial at a time where the scientific community is calling for rapid and robust action 
on the climate change policy area that is sometimes perceived as displaying few short-
term political dividends.  
This report provides quantitative analyses of the impacts of global and regional climate 
and energy policy developments and assesses the economics of the mitigation policies 
taking into account the avoided costs thanks to associated air quality improvements. As 
such, this report illustrates the knock-on effects of the Paris Agreement on the levels of 
air pollution and analyses the interaction between two Sustainable Development Goals (2) 
– 'Climate Change' and 'Good Health and Well-being'. 
This analysis relies on a multidisciplinary modelling toolbox that combines engineering, 
atmospheric chemistry, economics and health research. An overview of the different 
steps in the analysis is presented in Figure 3. 
Figure 3: Overview of the modelling toolbox 
 
Note: For more information on the models used, see Annexes 1-4. 
                                           
(1) http://unfccc.int/paris_agreement/items/9485.php  
(2) http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/sustainable-development-goals/  
GHG emissions 
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The black arrows represent the steps to quantify the co-benefits on air quality, while the 
red arrow indicates the models involved in the estimation of the climate change 
mitigation policy cost. Model names are highlighted in blue on the right-hand side. 
The report is organised as follows:  
 a description of the energy and climate scenarios (Section 2); 
 an analysis of the evolution of the global energy system under various policy 
conditions, with some sectoral and regional focus (Section 3); 
 the resulting GHG emissions and global temperature rise (Section 4); 
 the impact of the climate and energy policies on emissions of air pollutants 
(Section 5); 
 the economic analysis, covering energy system costs, GHG mitigation policy costs 
as well as co-benefits from air pollution reduction, including health (Section 6). 
This report is complemented by detailed regional energy and GHG balances (see 
companion document, Keramidas and Kitous (2017a)).  
Caveats and evolution since GECO2016 
An important caveat of this analysis is that it does not consider the potential impacts of a 
changing climate (stronger when the climate mitigation policies are lower), either on the 
energy system or on the economic activity in general (agriculture, health, labour 
productivity, coastal infrastructures, migration). 
Another caveat is that GDP impact of energy and climate mitigation policies considered 
here are not fed back into the scenarios, neglecting potential second order effects. 
Various impacts of air pollution are considered, but the study is not exhaustive. In 
particular, the impacts of air pollution on buildings, acidification, eutrophication and 
ecosystems are not included. 
The present analytical framework includes some differences with GECO 2016: 
- The current analysis includes more recent historical data, as well as an update of 
climate and energy-related policies; 
- Energy subsidies are kept constant as ratios of international prices (versus kept 
constant in volume at the last historically observed subsidy level in the GECO2016 
scenarios). 
- In addition, the scenario compatible with a temperature rise below 2°C by 2100 
assumes earlier action (2018) than in GECO2016 (2020);  
- All countries participate fully by 2050 to the mitigation effort to go below 2°C (this is 
translated into the convergence of all countries' carbon values to a common value by 
2050); 
- Results and graphics displayed in this report on greenhouse gases now include 
emissions from land use, land use change and forestry, including emissions sinks (whilst 
certain GECO2016 results/graphics were net of LULUCF and/or sinks). 
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2 Scenarios definition 
This report explores three scenarios: 
 Reference scenario: It includes adopted energy and climate policies worldwide 
for 2020; thereafter, CO2 and other GHG emissions are driven by income growth, 
energy prices and expected technological development with no supplementary 
incentivizing for low-carbon technologies. 
Although the GECO2017 Reference scenario integrates national climate and 
energy policies, it is not a replication of official national scenarios. This also 
applies to the particular case of the EU28 (3). 
 INDC scenario: All the Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) 
put forward by countries are implemented in this scenario, including all conditional 
contributions. Countries where the Reference already leads to GHG emissions at 
or below their INDC pledge are assumed to stick to the Reference level. Nearly all 
INDC objectives are formulated for 2030; beyond 2030 it is assumed that the 
global GHG intensity of GDP decreases at the same rate as for 2020-2030. This is 
achieved through an increase of regional carbon values (including for countries 
that previously had no climate policies) and progressive convergence of carbon 
values at a speed that depends on the countries' per capita income. 
 Below 2°C scenario (B2°C): This scenario assumes a global GHG trajectory 
over 2010-2100 compatible with a likely chance (above 66%) of temperature rise 
staying below 2°C above pre-industrial levels. It assumes in particular further 
intensification of energy and climate policies already from 2018, captured in the 
modelling through increasing carbon value and other regulatory instruments, and 
a progressive convergence of the countries' carbon values after 2030 depending 
on their per capita income. 
The scenarios are produced with the same socio-economic assumptions and energy 
resources availability. Energy prices are the result of the interplay of energy supply and 
demand, and are thus scenario-dependent. Country- or region-level energy supply, 
trade, transformation and demand, as well as GHG emissions, are driven by income 
growth, energy prices and expected technological evolution, within the constraints 
defined by energy and climate policies. In sum, scenarios differ on the climate and 
energy policies that are included, with repercussions on the projections of the energy 
supply and demand system and GHG emissions.  
The scenarios are further described below, with additional detail provided in Annex 5. 
Annexes 1 to 4 describe the modelling framework. 
  
                                           
(3) Although  calibrated on the EU "Trends to 2050 – Reference scenario 2016" (EC, 2016), the GECO2017 
Reference results for EU28 should not be considered or used as an official European Commission projection 
of energy and GHG emissions for the European Union. 
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2.1 Socio-economic assumptions 
The three global scenarios considered share a common set of socio-economic 
assumptions: country-level population, GDP growth and economic activity at sectoral 
level represented by its value added. Key assumptions are summarized in Table 1. 
According to these assumptions, economic growth is sustained in all regions and the 
global average GDP per capita triples in the period 2010-2050. The strong growth in 
countries with low-income levels in 2010 would enable them to join middle-income levels 
by 2050. 
The macro-economic impacts of climate change mitigation are tackled in section 6.2. 
However, these impacts on economic activity are not fed back in the scenario 
assumptions. This approach eases the comparability of scenarios, while neglecting 
potential second-order effects. 
These projections do not consider the impacts of climate change on economic growth and 
energy system. 
Population 
Population estimates used in this study are from UN (2015) for all world countries and 
regions (medium fertility scenario), except for the EU which are taken from the 2015 
Ageing Report (EC, 2015). 
The world will see important changes in population distribution in the forthcoming 
decades: while population growth in the OECD countries slows down (decreasing to 15% 
of world population by 2050), the population in Africa has the highest growth rate by far, 
with its population more than doubling in 40 years. The population of Asia is expected to 
stabilize by 2050 at around 4.5 billion inhabitants, with India becoming the single most 
populated country. 
Economic activity (4) 
Non-OECD regions are expected to benefit from a higher economic growth rate than 
OECD regions over the forthcoming years up to 2050, in line with the 1990-2010 
developments and a foreseeable further shift of their economy towards services. The 
yearly growth rate in the OECD remains 1 percentage below the one of the world average 
throughout 2050. 
The structure of the economy evolves slowly over time in all regions, with the share of 
services gaining 5 percentage points to reach around 69% by 2050 (+4% to 78% in the 
OECD, but +13% to 65% in non-OECD countries), at the expense of industry (from 30% 
to 25%), while the share of agriculture remains roughly stable in the OECD and 
decreasing in non-OECD countries to 7%.  
                                           
(4) GDP figures in this report are given in constant USD of 2005, in purchasing power parity (PPP), unless 
indicated otherwise. 
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Table 1: Regional population, GDP and income per capita 
 
 
 
  Population (M) GDP (PPP, CAGR) Income (k$ PPP /cap) Income (CAGR) 
  1990 2010 2030 2050 '90-
'10 
'10-' 
30 
'30-' 
50 
1990 2010 2030 2050 '90-
'10 
'10-
30 
'30-
50 
EU28 476 503 519 525 1.8 1.2 1.5 20 28 34 45 1.5% 1.1% 1.4% 
Australia 17 22 28 33 3.2 2.8 2.2 24 34 46 61 1.9% 1.5% 1.4% 
Canada 28 34 40 44 2.4 1.9 1.9 27 35 43 58 1.3% 1.0% 1.5% 
Japan 122 127 120 107 0.9 0.7 0.9 27 31 38 51 0.7% 1.0% 1.5% 
Korea (Rep.) 43 49 53 51 5.1 2.8 1.1 11 27 44 57 4.4% 2.5% 1.3% 
Mexico 86 119 148 164 2.7 3.0 3.0 10 12 18 29 1.0% 1.8% 2.4% 
USA 253 310 356 389 2.5 2.0 1.6 33 44 56 71 1.5% 1.3% 1.2% 
Rest of OECD 82 107 129 141 3.2 3.0 2.1 12 17 25 35 1.8% 2.0% 1.6% 
OECD 1062 1233 1359 1423 2.2 1.7 1.6 23 30 39 51 1.4% 1.2% 1.4% 
Russia 148 143 139 129 0.4 1.6 0.7 13 14 20 25 0.5% 1.8% 1.1% 
Rest of CIS 128 134 146 149 0.4 4.5 3.2 6 6 14 26 0.2% 4.0% 3.1% 
China 1155 1342 1416 1349 10.1 6.0 2.7 1 7 21 38 9.2% 5.7% 3.0% 
India 871 1231 1528 1705 6.6 6.9 4.5 1 3 9 20 4.7% 5.7% 4.0% 
Indonesia 181 242 295 322 4.7 5.5 3.8 2 4 9 18 3.2% 4.4% 3.4% 
Rest of Asia 581 820 1035 1173 5.1 4.8 4.3 2 3 7 13 3.3% 3.6% 3.6% 
Argentina 33 41 49 55 4.2 2.8 2.4 7 13 19 28 3.0% 1.8% 1.8% 
Brazil 150 199 229 238 3.1 1.5 2.4 7 10 12 18 1.7% 0.8% 2.2% 
Rest of Latin America 165 224 275 305 3.6 4.0 3.7 5 7 13 24 2.0% 3.0% 3.2% 
North Africa 120 168 226 274 3.9 4.7 4.1 4 6 10 19 2.2% 3.2% 3.1% 
Sub-Saharan Afr. (excl. ZAF) 475 825 1393 2138 4.5 6.2 6.2 1 1 3 6 1.6% 3.4% 4.0% 
South Africa (ZAF) 37 52 60 66 2.7 2.6 2.8 8 9 13 21 0.9% 1.8% 2.4% 
Iran 56 74 89 92 4.5 3.1 3.4 6 11 17 32 3.0% 2.2% 3.2% 
Saudi Arabia 16 28 39 46 4.0 3.0 2.2 19 24 31 41 1.3% 1.3% 1.4% 
Rest of Middle-East 61 115 176 235 6.5 3.2 2.8 6 10 13 16 3.2% 1.0% 1.3% 
Non-OECD 4246 5697 7151 8328 5.0 5.0 3.5 3 5 11 19 3.4% 3.8% 2.7% 
World 5308 6930 8509 9750 3.2 3.4 2.8 7 10 15 24 1.9% 2.4% 2.1% 
 9 
The differences in growth rates across OECD and non-OECD regions comes short of 
bringing GDP per capita of non-OECD regions to OECD levels, even when expressed in 
PPP. In addition, by 2050 a clear distinction is projected in GDP per capita between the 
Least Developed Countries (LDCs (5)) and other non-OECD countries. 
The countries' level of income is differentiated as follows (6):  
- High income: North America remains the wealthiest region, followed by other 
high-income regions (Pacific OECD and EU). 
- Middle income: emerging economies which are already upper-middle income 
countries, like China (which reaches one of the highest non-OECD per capita level 
in 2050: 38 k$ PPP), Latin America (Brazil, Mexico) or Middle-East further 
increase their income levels. 
- Low income: for countries with currently lower-middle income or low-income 
levels, in which half the world population is located, GDP per capita remains 
comparatively lower than in other regions: i.e. developing Asia (13 k$ PPP per 
capita) and Sub-Saharan Africa (6 k$ PPP). 
Based on these differences, the INDC and B2°C scenarios distinguish the mitigation effort 
undertaken by countries according to their income per capita (see scenario definitions in 
section 2.2 below). 
  
                                           
(5)   LDCs, as defined by the UN, gather countries mostly from Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia 
(6) GDP and GDP per capita levels in the entire report are expressed in real US dollars of 2005 in purchasing 
power parity (PPP) terms, unless indicated otherwise. 
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2.2 Policies considered 
The full list of the policies considered for the GECO2017 Reference scenario, and their 
implementation are provided in Annex 5. 
These can also be downloaded from the GECO website: http://ec.europa.eu/jrc/geco. 
2.2.1 Reference scenario 
A number of energy and climate policies announced for the 2020 time horizon are taken 
into account in the Reference scenario. Policies are sourced from previous rounds of 
UNFCCC negotiations and submissions to the UNFCCC (notably the "Copenhagen Pledges" 
and periodic National Communications) or by more recent national policies that 
supersede them. 
Some of these policies include objectives for years beyond 2020 that were also 
considered in this scenario. Objectives announced in the INDCs but that do not yet have 
corresponding national policies (for 2025 and beyond) were considered only in the INDC 
scenario. 
For the EU, the GECO2017 Reference has been derived from the EU "Trends to 2050 – 
Reference scenario 2016" (EC, 2016), from which it follows the energy trajectory (and 
resulting CO2 emissions) at sector level up to 2050.  
2.2.2 INDC scenario 
The INDC scenario is built upon the Reference scenario. It is assumed that all INDCs 
announced are achieved, both unconditional and conditional contributions, regardless of 
the current status of national implementation measures. 
Countries where the Reference already leads to GHG emissions at or below their INDC 
are assumed to stick to Reference level emissions.  
For countries individually represented in the modelling, the INDC targets were taken 
directly. For regions modelled as a group of countries, the individual countries' INDCs 
have been aggregated. 
Some countries (notably non-OECD countries) have expressed their INDCs as percentage 
reductions compared to a Business-As-Usual (BAU) scenario. In certain cases, the 
GECO2016 Reference scenario was found to have lower emissions compared to the 
country's (or region's) announced BAU scenario or to its INDC target. This can be due to 
a number of factors (among which differences in the assumptions in economic growth, in 
the modelling frameworks, in energy prices, in energy consumption growth); however, 
the detailed explanation of these differences is beyond the scope of this report. In the 
cases where the INDC targets were reached or exceeded with the policies that were 
already present in the Reference scenario, no additional policies were implemented. 
The objectives are reached respecting the INDC perimeter: e.g. energy-only emissions, 
or all sectors excluding LULUCF (7), etc. Climate-related policies have been translated 
into single country-wide emissions reduction objectives and were modelled using carbon 
values that impacted all sectors of the economy, including agriculture and land use. 
Emissions reductions in each sector are achieved depending on the economic 
attractiveness of mitigation options across sectors and reductions at a sectoral level were 
calculated by the modelling. For LULUCF this has been done via marginal abatement cost 
curves for each country/region; as a result, while a country's total reduction objective 
might have been met, a LULUCF-specific GHG reduction objective might have been 
exceeded or might not have been met (8). 
                                           
(7) LULUCF: land use, land use change and forestry (deforestation, reforestation and afforestation, forest 
management, cropland management, grazing land management and revegetation) 
(8) Non-GHG LULUCF policies were not considered (e.g. forest area coverage). 
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Most countries' INDCs have been formulated for 2030, with some countries having 
targets for 2025 or 2035. Beyond the time horizon of the INDCs, the scenario was 
designed so as to represent a world where the level of policy ambition continues at a 
similar pace at the global level, with the world GHG intensity of GDP decreasing over 
2030-2050 at the same rate as for 2020-2030. This goes through an increase of regional 
carbon values (including for countries that previously had no climate policies) and 
progressive convergence at a speed that depends on the countries' per capita income. 
2.2.3 Below 2°C (B2°C) scenario 
The "below two degrees" (B2°C) scenario is built upon the Reference and the INDC 
scenarios.  
It is a global mitigation pathway in which immediate strengthening of climate action from 
2017 reduces emissions to levels consistent with a likely chance to meet the long-term 
goal of a temperature increase over pre-industrial levels below 2°C (section 4.1), while 
reflecting the need for a global transition towards a low-emission economic development 
pattern.  
Under this scenario, total, cumulative carbon emissions over 2011-2100 cumulate to 
1100 GtCO2. This budget is reached through a progressively increasing carbon value 
starting from 2017 and rising over time, acting on top of the policies considered in the 
Reference and INDC scenarios, and considering differentiation between regions to 
account for their different financial capacity and response flexibility (see Figure 60). 
2.2.4 Modelling of policies 
Energy taxation and subsidies 
In all scenarios, the components of energy taxation are held constant by default: VAT is 
held constant in percentage terms, and excise duties are held constant in volume 
(excluding the impact of the carbon value). Domestic prices thus evolve with the prices in 
the international markets and with climate-specific policies. 
Similarly, nationally implemented energy subsidies are kept constant as ratios of 
international prices. Subsidy is defined as the difference between the domestic fuel price 
and the level of the related reference price (when the latter is higher than the former). 
The reference price corresponds to the import price ( 9 ) (for importers) or the 
international market price at the closest market (for exporters). 
Reference scenario 
In the Reference scenario, policy targets, in terms of capacity deployment or GHG 
emissions, can be reached with or without policy intervention. First of all, the evolution of 
economic activity, energy prices, technology costs and substitution effects entail changes 
in the energy sector. For constraining objectives the following instruments can be 
introduced: fuel or emission standards for vehicles, capacity for nuclear, feed-in tariffs 
for renewable technologies in the power sector, or carbon values for GHG emissions 
targets among others. 
After 2020, feed-in tariff policies are phased out, and carbon values are kept constant 
over time and fuel efficiency is driven by price once fuel standards are reached. Energy 
market and GHG emissions are thus then driven by income growth with no 
supplementary incentivizing for low-carbon technologies. 
INDC scenario 
The INDC scenario goes beyond the Reference scenario, implementing more ambitious 
policies where relevant. In particular the support to technologies (extended to 2020 and 
                                           
(9) This corresponds to the international market price to which are added import taxes, transport and 
distribution duties and value-added taxes (differs with end-user price only on energy taxes or subsidies). 
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then progressively phased out by 2030) and the carbon values in the INDC scenario were 
set to be at least as high as in the Reference scenario. This was done in order to maintain 
the definition of a higher-ambition scenario for the INDC scenario, despite potential spill-
over effects and/or carbon leakage (through lower international energy prices). 
The world GHG intensity of GDP is assumed to decrease over 2030-2040 and 2040-2050 
at the same rate as for 2020-2030 (-3.3%/year). To respect this global constraint the 
countries' carbon values progressively converge towards a common worldwide carbon 
value at a speed that depends on their per capita income in 2030: three groups of 
countries are distinguished (10), with the first group converging in 2040 to the lead 
carbon value, the second group reaching 50% of this value in 2050 and the third group 
reaching 25% of this value in 2050.  
B2°C scenario 
In addition to INDC energy and climate policies, in this scenario countries are assumed to 
collectively engage into a higher policy ambition regarding climate protection. This is 
represented in modelling terms by assuming a set of carbon values starting in 2018 in all 
regions including countries with low incomes, and those with non-constraining GHG 
objectives or no GHG objective in the INDCs. The carbon values are prescribed at least as 
high as in the INDC scenario. 
To account for the different financial capacity across regions, the scenario also 
distinguishes the intensity of mitigation between regional groups based on their per 
capita income in 2030 (11). Middle- and low-income countries are assumed to converge to 
the common carbon value of high-income countries in 2030. Regions with very low 
income per capita are allowed a longer transition period and converge fully in 2050.  
Policy synergies (12) 
While most INDCs formulate GHG emission objectives, some of them mention policy 
instruments or programmes to reach these objectives. When explicitly put forward by the 
countries, these instruments and programmes (e.g. renewable energy support schemes 
or vehicle emissions standards) are represented in the modelling, and are completed 
where necessary by a carbon value applying to the economy to reach the country's GHG 
objective (13).  
                                           
(10) Distinguished based on their income per capita in 2030 (expressed in $2005 PPP): >30 k$/cap, 20-30 
k$/cap, <20 k$/cap; see also section 2.1. 
(11) Country groupings based on income per capita in 2030; similar country groupings to the INDC scenarios 
(footnote 10), with an additional fourth group for very low-income countries (<10 k$/cap). 
(12) An analysis of policies that jeopardize the low carbon objectives (e.g. favouring local fossil fuels) are 
beyond the scope of this report.  
(13) It is worth noting that applying sector-specific regulation can lower the required carbon value on the rest of 
the economy compared to a situation where only a carbon value would be applied, but also result in higher 
economic cost - see Jaccard (2016) for a discussion on the relative merits of economy-wide carbon value 
versus sectoral regulation. 
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3 Global energy trends 
This section gives an overview of the main characteristics of the energy sector for the 
various scenarios. The companion document of this report (Kitous and Keramidas, 2017) 
provides detailed energy and emissions balances. 
3.1 Energy sector 
3.1.1 Primary Energy 
Total primary energy demand is the sum of final energy demand and losses in energy 
transformation (including power generation). These are discussed in detail in 3.1.2 and 
3.1.3. 
3.1.1.1 Regional trends 
A growing world population alongside better living standards coming with increasing 
income per capita are expected to result in an increase of global demand for energy 
services in the coming decades. This trend will be partially moderated by a declining 
energy intensity of the economy due to the progressive shift towards (less energy-
intensive) services and the deployment of energy efficient technologies. In the Reference 
scenario, global primary energy demand ( 14) by 2050 would still more than double 
compared to the year 2000, exceeding 21 Gtoe (Figure 5). 
The INDC scenario would help to limit the growth of global primary energy demand, 
reducing it by some 10% compared to the Reference scenario. The evolution of the 
energy intensity is expected to decrease to a rate averaging -2.1%/year over 2015-2050, 
a pace slightly higher than the one experienced over the decade 1990-2000 (-
1.6%/year) and more than twice the one observed during 2000-2010 (-0.9%/year). As a 
consequence, by 2030, the world energy demand would merely grow by 24%, whereas 
its economy would grow by nearly 70% (both figures compared to the 2015 levels). 
Despite these improvements however, the primary energy demand would still increase 
globally from circa 14 Gtoe in 2015 to 17 Gtoe in 2030 (nearly twice the energy demand 
of 1990), and further to 19 Gtoe by 2050.  
It is only with the B2°C scenario, which triggers deeper and earlier changes in the energy 
system through accelerated fuel substitution and strengthened energy efficiency, that 
total energy demand would peak at around 16 Gtoe in 2030 and then stabilise over 
2030-2050 at a level about 15% higher than that of 2015. 
Figure 4 presents primary energy demand per world region. Asian countries in particular 
are projected to increase their share in the world energy demand, getting close to 50% 
by 2030 compared to 35% in 2015, fuelled by a growing population and a quickly 
expanding economy. Nevertheless, OECD countries would still account for 31% in 2030, 
compared to 38% in 2015, with their demand per capita significantly higher than in non-
OECD countries (see Table 2). 
                                           
(14) Primary energy demand is calculated using heat-equivalence for electricity from nuclear (efficiency of 33%) 
and geothermal (efficiency of 10%). 
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Figure 4: Primary energy demand per world region, INDC scenario 
 
On average, energy demand per capita increases over time in the Reference scenario, 
with differences in countries' energy demand per capita persisting by 2050. The 
implementation of climate policies decelerates the growth of energy demand per capita 
which even decreases in the long term in the B2°C scenario, while there is a progressive 
convergence between countries (Table 2): energy demand per capita in OECD countries 
keeps decreasing over time, while in non-OECD countries, by contrast, it would increase 
up to 2030 on average, before stabilising afterwards. Crucially, Brazil and India would 
show an increase in energy demand per capita up to 2050. However, non-OECD regions 
with currently low or subsidised domestic energy prices (mostly oil and gas exporters: 
e.g. CIS, Middle East) are expected to undergo a decrease in their energy per capita 
consumption compared to recent historical years, due to the high reduction potential of 
the economy's energy intensity. 
Table 2: Primary energy demand per capita and average annual growth 
ktoe per capita 1990 2010 2030 2050 '90-'10 '10-'30 '30-'50 
Reference World 
1.60 1.81 
1.99 2.12 
0.6% 
0.5% 0.3% 
INDC World 1.94 1.92 0.3% 0.0% 
B2°C World 1.82 1.58 0.0% -0.7% 
 OECD 4.28 4.41 3.90 3.49 0.2% -0.6% -0.6% 
 Non-OECD (excl. LDCs) 1.46 2.12 2.55 2.40 1.9% 0.9% -0.3% 
 LDCs 0.41 0.56 0.71 0.66 1.6% 1.2% -0.4% 
Note: LDCs (Least Developed Countries) refer here to regions where income is inferior to 5 k$/cap 
in 2030, i.e.: Rest of Central America, Egypt, Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa, India, Rest of South Asia, 
Indonesia, Vietnam, Rest of South-East Asia, Pacific Islands (see Annex 1 for regions' definition). 
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3.1.1.2 Energy mix 
The structure of primary energy demand by fuel is expected to evolve according to each 
fuel's relative competitiveness, taking into account that resource scarcity differs from 
region to region (Figure 5 and Figure 6), whereas policies adopted within each scenario 
and the growing role of new technologies also crucially determine the fuel mix evolution. 
Figure 5: World primary energy demand, INDC scenario 
 
 
Figure 6: World primary energy demand and energy mix in 2015-2030 
 
Renewables and nuclear are the only primary energy sources with an increasing 
contribution throughout 2050 in all scenarios, in particular in the B2°C scenario (Figure 
7). Depending on the climate policies, these carbon-free energy sources become – 
combined- larger than any of the three fossil fuels as early as 2030 (B2°C scenario) or by 
2050 (Reference). 
 Renewables expand in all three scenarios. For example, in the INDC scenario, 
they represent 26% of the total mix in 2050 vs. 14% in 2015, mainly through the 
increased contribution of two key primary renewable electricity technologies (wind 
and solar: "Other REN" in Figure 5) due to costs reduction and increased 
competitiveness. More ambitious climate policies reinforce this expansion, mainly 
at the expense of coal. 
 Nuclear energy supply is expected to increase in all scenarios leading to a 
marginally increasing share in the energy mix. In the B2°C scenario nuclear, 
doubles its growth rate to 4.2%/year and the share of nuclear in the energy mix 
triples to 17% in 2050 vs. 5% in 2015. 
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Fossil fuels overall would peak in the early 2030s with in the INDC scenario and earlier 
(2020) in the B2°C scenario. 
 The share of coal declines in all scenarios for reasons that can already be 
observed in the Reference scenario: phase-out of coal as a cooking fuel in the 
residential sector, increasing electrification of final energy demand, which 
displaces fossil fuels, and increasing cost competitiveness of renewables in the 
power sector. In addition, the extent of the reduction of coal demand strongly 
depends on the stringency of the climate policies: in the INDC scenario, by 2050 it 
drops to 21% of primary energy consumption, the lowest share it has had over 
the past forty years. In the INDC scenario, coal demand would be reduced 
significantly compared to the Reference scenario; it would enter a plateau and 
peak in the early 2020s. With stronger climate policies, coal demand would never 
recover from the peak observed in 2014 and would fall back to 1990 levels by 
2040, despite the deployment of CCS technologies. The INDC and B2°C scenarios 
differ in the rate of decrease of coal demand, averaging respectively -1.6%/yr and 
-5.1%/yr over 2020-2050. 
 Throughout all scenarios, the share of oil progressively declines, in line with a 
longer trend observed since the 1970s. In the INDC scenario, oil demand enters a 
plateau at 100 Mbl/d throughout the middle of the century. In the B2°C scenario, 
demand starts decreasing progressively from the late 2020s; by 2050 it would 
reach its 1990 levels. 
 The share of gas is expected to rise progressively in the Reference scenario. In 
the INDC scenario, gas demand would observe an increase, although at a 
decelerated rate compared to the 2000-2015 period. With stronger climate 
policies, the share of gas and its demand level would decrease after 2030, 
reaching about the same level as 2015 in 2050. 
 17 
Figure 7: World primary energy demand by fuel 
 
Figure 8 shows the impact of climate policies on the different fuels in 2030. The largest 
impact of INDC policies, compared to the Reference scenario, is the expected significant 
reduction in coal consumption (with the coal decrease in 2030 being larger than the total 
primary energy decrease), followed by higher contribution of renewables (see sections 
3.2.5, 3.2.7 and 3.2.8) and, to a lesser extent, nuclear (section 3.2.6). Noticeably, the oil 
and gas markets would be only marginally affected by the policies in the INDC scenario. 
Figure 8: World primary energy demand changes by fuel across scenarios, 2030 
 
The share of low-carbon energy in total primary energy consumed expands very fast in 
the B2°C scenario (Table 3). In the OECD countries it would exceed 50% as early as 
2040 and then would keep increasing to 65% by 2050, while in the non-OECD countries 
would follow laying just a few percentage points below over the 2030-2050 period. 
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Including international air and maritime bunkers, the world average would reach a 59% 
share of low carbon primary energy by 2050, as opposed to 19% in 2015. Large fossil 
fuel exporters have a slower uptake of these technologies, but they also see a fast 
increase beyond 2030. 
The B2°C scenario allows accelerating this pace, which would take place anyway albeit at 
slower pace in the INDC scenario (15 years delay) or even the Reference scenario (25 
years delay). 
Table 3: Low-carbon energy in primary energy, B2°C scenario, share 
 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 
EU28 18% 21% 25% 33% 39% 50% 69% 
Australia 6% 6% 5% 10% 17% 34% 54% 
Canada 25% 23% 27% 30% 48% 66% 78% 
Japan 16% 20% 19% 21% 31% 46% 61% 
Korea (Rep.) 18% 17% 19% 23% 37% 50% 61% 
Mexico 14% 13% 11% 11% 22% 44% 61% 
USA 14% 14% 17% 20% 37% 53% 64% 
Rest of OECD 19% 22% 25% 33% 39% 49% 67% 
OECD 17% 18% 20% 24% 36% 51% 65% 
Russia 6% 9% 9% 12% 27% 51% 65% 
Rest of CIS 5% 10% 11% 11% 17% 38% 57% 
China 25% 20% 12% 16% 28% 49% 64% 
India 46% 36% 28% 22% 26% 46% 65% 
Indonesia 45% 36% 31% 30% 30% 41% 57% 
Rest of Asia 54% 50% 46% 41% 45% 54% 65% 
Argentina 11% 11% 13% 17% 27% 53% 67% 
Brazil 46% 41% 46% 47% 55% 64% 74% 
Rest of Latin America 29% 24% 21% 23% 33% 49% 65% 
North Africa 5% 5% 4% 4% 6% 21% 41% 
Sub-Saharan Afr. (excl. SoA) 82% 81% 78% 69% 64% 61% 65% 
South Africa 12% 13% 10% 12% 22% 46% 63% 
Iran 1% 0% 1% 1% 5% 24% 46% 
Saudi Arabia 0% 0% 0% 1% 2% 14% 31% 
Rest of Middle-East 1% 1% 1% 1% 4% 20% 39% 
Non-OECD 22% 23% 18% 19% 27% 45% 60% 
World - B2°C 19% 19% 18% 20% 29% 45% 59% 
World - Reference 19% 19% 18% 20% 22% 23% 26% 
World - INDC 19% 19% 18% 20% 25% 31% 37% 
Notes: Low-carbon energy includes renewables (hydro, biomass, wind, solar, geothermal, ocean), 
nuclear, fossil fuels with carbon capture and sequestration. Biomass includes traditional biomass, 
which is high in certain regions (e.g. Asia, sub-Saharan Africa). EU28 includes both OECD and non-
OECD member states. World includes international bunkers. 
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3.1.2 Final energy demand 
3.1.2.1 Total 
With increasing population and rising living standards, final energy demand is expected 
to continue to grow up to 2050. However, ambitious climate policies triggering an 
enhanced energy efficiency effort would reverse this trend, resulting in a decrease 
beyond 2030. 
After a decade with a high annual growth (2000-2010, 2.4%/year) and a notable 
deceleration in recent years due to the global economic slowdown (2010-2015, 
1.4%/year), future energy efficiency improvements and a lower economic growth on 
average result in a decelerating growth of final energy demand in the future: 1.5-
1.6%/year in the second half of the current decade for all scenarios, decreasing 
progressively by 2050, to 0.5% and 0.4%/year respectively in the Reference and INDC 
scenarios.  
Total final energy demand (15) is projected to increase from 10 Gtoe to around 12 Gtoe in 
2050 in the INDC scenario, against about 13 Gtoe in the Reference scenario.  In the B2°C 
scenario, it peaks in 2025 and then stabilizes around 10 Gtoe (Figure 9).  
Figure 9: Final energy demand, World 
 
Note: Total, includes non-energy uses of energy fuels. 
In terms of the regional distribution of this final energy demand (Figure 10), the largest 
structural changes take place over the period 2010-2030, with a decrease of the shares 
of OECD countries and an increase for non-OECD countries, particularly China. Beyond 
2030 these shares are expected to stabilize, with a notable redistribution between non-
OECD countries: further demand increase is expected in Africa-Middle East whereas the 
shares of China and India decrease while Other Asia (Indonesia and Rest of Asia) 
increases. These trends are observed across all scenarios. 
                                           
(15) Excludes international aviation and maritime bunkers; includes non-energy uses. 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
1990 2010 2030 2050
G
to
e
 
Reference
INDC
B2°C
Non-energy uses
 20 
Figure 10: Final energy demand by world region, INDC scenario 
 
Final energy demand can be decomposed in demand by end-use, by economic activity 
sector and by fuel or energy carrier (Figure 11) (16). By 2030 heat uses represent the 
bulk of fuel consumption in the INDC scenario, distributed between industry, residential 
and services, and fuelled by fossil fuels and biomass. A large share of oil products still 
goes to mobility needs, where electricity remains a minor contributor.  
Figure 11: Diagram of global final energy flows of sectors-uses-fuels/carriers, INDC scenario, 
2030 (Total: 11.8 Mtoe) 
 
The decomposition of final energy demand by end-use is provided in Figure 12. Climate 
policies would reduce much heat uses in industry and buildings through increased energy 
efficiency via technology and fuel substitution and buildings insulation. They are followed 
by lower energy use in transport due to a decrease in mobility and substitution towards 
electricity-fuelled vehicles (which display much lower energy losses than the current oil-
fuelled internal combustion engine vehicles). While consumption for electric processes 
and appliances keeps increasing over time, the impact of climate policies on the 
electricity consumption remains limited (see section 3.1.2.4 for more detail). 
In addition, non-energy use of energy fuels (mainly oil and gas, for plastics, chemical 
feedstock materials and fertilizers) would increase slowly to 1.1 Gtoe in 2050 in the INDC 
scenario, compared to 0.8 Gtoe in 2015. 
                                           
(16) See the Glossary section for the definitions of sectors and end-uses. 
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Figure 12: World final energy demand by end-use 
 
Notes: Electricity demand is found in "Mobility", "Electrical processes" and "Heat uses". "Electrical 
processes" include electrical appliances. 
The sectoral distribution of energy demand (Figure 13) would remain fairly stable in the 
future and across all scenarios – at roughly 40% for industry (slightly increasing by 
2030) and 30% each for residential & services (slightly decreasing by 2030) and 
transport (slightly increasing over the whole period). 
However, different regions would follow a somewhat different pattern. In OECD countries 
the share of transport in total final energy would decrease, due to stabilizing mobility and 
improved efficiency of vehicles, while that of residential & services would increase, 
especially with the increasing role of electrical appliances. In non-OECD countries the 
industry share is decreasing from 2030 onwards, while the transport share increases 
steadily to almost a fourth of total demand by mid-century. 
Figure 13: World final energy demand by activity sector 
 
In terms of consumption per fuel/carrier (Figure 14), all scenarios show an acceleration 
of final energy demand electrification observed historically (electricity share in total final 
demand up to 30%-40% depending on the scenario, vs. 18% in 2015, see also Figure 18 
for detail by sector) and an increase of biomass consumption (around 10-15% of total 
across 2015-2050 and all scenarios). Coal reduces in volume as soon as climate policies 
are introduced, while on the contrary oil and gas demand tend to maintain their shares 
by 2030, even in a context of climate policies. Oil consumption would grow slowly due to 
its predominant role in transport, a sector characterised by growing demand for mobility, 
a fairly inelastic response to prices and low substitution possibilities especially for heavy 
vehicles and air transport (see section 3.1.2.3 on mobility); only in the B2°C context 
would it decrease after 2030. Natural gas benefits first from its relatively lower carbon 
content compared to coal in the power sector (and compared to oil in the industry sector) 
and thus acts as a transition energy vector; however, like oil, its consumption decreases 
with more stringent climate policies after 2030. 
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Figure 14: World final energy demand by fuel/carrier 
 
The following sections focus on energy demand for the end-uses for heat and for 
mobility, on electricity as a whole, and on the total share of renewables. 
3.1.2.2 Heat uses 
In the recent past, energy in the form of heat use was evenly shared between needs for 
space heating, water heating and cooking in residential, services and agriculture on one 
side, and process heat in industry on the other side. This distribution remains fairly 
unchanged in the three scenarios considered (Figure 15). 
Figure 15: Energy demand for heat uses per sector and per fuel/carrier, World 
 
Note: Distributed heat refers to both urban heat networks and low enthalpy heat traded by pipe in 
industry. 
Energy needs for heat uses are set to increase in the medium term regardless of climate 
policies (17). Energy efficiency and fuel substitution induced by climate policies would 
result to energy demand first plateauing and then decreasing in the long term, reaching 
about the same level as 2015 in 2050 in the INDC scenario. Fossil fuels, especially gas, 
would still make up about 60% of energy use in 2050; it is only with stronger climate 
policies that fossil fuels would be progressively phased down, down to about 40% in 
2050 in the B2°C scenario. 
  
                                           
(17) Increasing outdoor temperature due to climate change is not considered in this analysis, which is likely to 
play a role by reduction the need for space heating in buildings – see Ciscar et al. (2014) 
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3.1.2.3 Mobility 
Passenger mobility and freight transport both drive up the final energy demand of the 
transport sector. 
The demand for passenger mobility is foreseen to increase significantly over time, 
particularly in developing economies. As a world average, it would double over the 2015-
2050 period (INDC scenario). Road transport continues to represent the most important 
mode of transport throughout the projection period, with steady growth in both public 
modes of transport and in private cars (and represents the bulk energy demand 
increase). However, air transport is the sector experiencing the highest growth of 
mobility (+156% increase over 2015-2050 in the INDC scenario). 
For all transportation modes, passenger mobility increases over time; total passenger 
traffic increases at around 2.7%/year over 2015-2050 (INDC scenario, Figure 16). The 
increase in passenger mobility would slow down only with the implementation of more 
stringent climate policies, which would raise the cost of energy for transport.  
Figure 16: World average passenger mobility by mode of transport, INDC scenario 
 
Freight activity is also expected to grow significantly driven by increasing consumption 
and the corresponding growth in manufactured goods being transported; total goods 
traffic increases at around 2.1%/year over 2015-2050 (INDC scenario). The highest 
growth in freight is expected to occur in international maritime bunkers, while energy 
demand will still be mostly consumed in road freight transport. 
The decomposition of energy demand in transport by type can be seen in Figure 17. 
Although air transport is experiencing significant growth, transport energy demand 
overall is still dominated by road transport throughout 2050. Energy demand for road 
freight transport reaches and exceeds the total level of road passenger transport around 
2030, depicting a global situation in which trade tends to grow faster than population. 
Climate policies compatible with staying below 2°C would entail an important reduction in 
energy demand in transport, driven by a combination of reduced mobility, better 
logistics, improved technical efficiency and increased penetration of electricity in road 
transport (important because of the higher efficiency of electrical engines). Transport 
energy demand for maritime and light vehicles would fall back to 2015 levels. 
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Figure 17: Energy demand in transport 
 
Substitution by alternatives to oil in the transport sector has been historically low, with 
alternative fuels/carriers (usable in ICEs) having entered the market over the last decade 
to a limited extent, and with novel technologies requiring different drivetrains (e.g. 
electric vehicles) having started to be deployed more recently. Liquid biofuels, natural 
gas and electricity represented respectively 3%, 2% and 1% of total energy used in 
transport in 2015 globally. Despite the emergence of these alternatives, their role in the 
short-run still is expected to remain small: liquid biofuel production increased by just 2% 
worldwide over the past two years 2014-2016 (Enerdata, 2017) while oil demand has 
increased by 4% (IEA, 2017); world electric car sales, although increasing fast over the 
last years (sales have increased 15-fold over 2011-2016), made up only 0.8% of total 
car sales in 2016 at world level (EV-Volumes, 2017; OICA, 2017). Additionally, the 
evolution of mobility tends towards an increasing fuel demand, particularly in the large 
and inefficient categories18, which is only partially offset by the fuel efficiency standards 
implemented in different countries.  
It is considered that electric and hydrogen alternatives to liquids combustion are more 
suited for passenger road mobility than for goods road transport, and would not get any 
noticeable market share in air and sea transport. Although substitution is possible, it 
would be limited outside of passenger mobility due to the technical requirements for long 
range autonomy and to the weight of electric batteries. The techno-economic 
improvement of electrical batteries and the better coverage of the road network with 
recharging facilities, however, can help accelerating the penetration of electricity in 
transport. Hydrogen shows a limited development in all scenarios, hampered by the high 
cost of fuel cells. 
Thus, fuel substitution in the road transport sector is expected to be very gradual rather 
than disruptive, with alternative fuels/carriers gaining just about 0.5% of market share 
per year over the next decades in the INDC scenario. Oil still dominates but decreases: it 
would drop to 60% of total light vehicles energy consumption, substituted by electricity, 
gaseous fuels and biofuels, and to 85% in heavy vehicles energy consumption (Figure 
17).  
Moreover, significant advancements in fuel efficiency for oil use are expected (close to 
2%/year over 2015-2030 in the Reference scenario) due in particular to a better use of 
                                           
(18) Highest sale increase was in the following categories: SUV, Pickup, CUV - see: 
http://www.autoalliance.org/auto-marketplace/popular-vehicles  
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energy in vehicles with internal combustion engines (e.g. "hybrid" engines allowing a 
recovery of braking energy, automatic start/shutoff, …). 
Finally, energy demand for international bunkers (19) is expected to be an increasing 
contributor to future energy demand in transport, in all scenarios. Energy demand in 
bunkers reached 11% of total oil demand in 2015; it has grown faster than demand in 
road transport. It is expected to keep growing at a fast pace due to increasing 
international traffic of freight and passengers (both being strongly correlated to economic 
activity): a 42% increase in bunkers' energy consumption by 2030 compared to 2015 in 
the INDC scenario, and another 20% increase over 2030-2050, on the same trend as the 
historical doubling over 1990-2015). Oil would still dominate both air and maritime 
bunkers throughout 2050 in all scenarios. More in detail: 
 Maritime bunkers: Maritime freight traffic is expected to increase by 50% over 
the 2015-2030 period, with half of this due to traffic of containers and various 
industrial products, which are growing as per capita income increases and the 
world economy becomes more inter-connected over time. The rest of the increase 
in maritime freight traffic is due to the international trade of energy goods, which 
would be impacted by climate policies as the demand for fossil fuels decreases: 
traffic over 2015-2030 could grow by as much as 59% (Reference) or by as little 
as 30% (B2°C). Combined with fuel efficiency measures that could be adopted in 
existing and new ships, the total energy demand growth for bunkers in the B2°C 
scenario over 2015-2030 could be limited to 27% (vs. +48% in Reference). In the 
B2°C scenario, maritime bunkers energy demand peaks in the mid-2020s and 
decreases thereafter. 
 International air: Air traffic, both domestic and international, is expected to 
grow significantly in all scenarios; over 2015-2030 it grows by +81% (Reference), 
with climate policies limiting it to +63% (B2°C). With fuel efficiency measures, 
this brings the energy demand growth for international air to +44% for the 
Reference and +29% with the. By 2030 the contribution of alternative fuels in air 
transport is small (a few %). Traffic and energy demand are expected to 
significantly grow beyond 2030 in the Reference and the INDC scenarios, and 
stabilize progressively around 2050 in the B2°C scenario. 
3.1.2.4 Electricity 
Electricity demand is expected to increase in all scenarios along with economic activity 
and rising standards of living around the world. In addition, electricity offers also the 
widest set of technical opportunities to decarbonize and implement climate mitigation 
options.  
Electricity represented just 18% of global final energy demand in 2015, and would reach 
a share of 35% of final demand in 2050 in the B2°C scenario vs. less than 30% in both 
the Reference scenario and the INDC scenario (Figure 18).  
Roughly speaking, electricity demand would increase by about 6,000 TWh every ten 
years, starting from about 20,000 TWh in 2015 and more than doubling by 2050 in all 
scenarios. The sector experiencing the largest increase in electricity consumption in 
relative terms is the transport sector due to the emergence of electro-mobility starting 
from very low levels today; the other demand sectors would also double their demand by 
2050 with respect to 2015. In absolute terms, the rise in electricity demand is most 
pronounced in industry, followed by captive uses in residential & services (appliances, 
lighting, cooling). 
Total electricity demand is lower in the INDC and B2°C scenarios compared to the 
Reference scenario (4% lower for the INDC scenario in 2050, 9% for the B2°C scenario). 
                                           
(19) International bunkers include both international air transport and international maritime transport 
 26 
This is due to higher electricity prices in all final demand sectors combined with higher 
energy efficiency in residential & services. 
This is partially compensated by an increase in electricity demand in the (road) transport 
sector where electrical vehicles (both plug-in and fully electrical) develop faster with 
stronger climate policies (Figure 17).  
Figure 18: Electricity demand by sector (bars, left axis) and share in final demand (diamonds, 
right axis) 
 
3.1.2.5 Renewables 
Renewables are used in final energy demand either directly (solar thermal; geothermal 
heat pumps; direct biomass combustion) or as indirect inputs to energy carriers (wind, 
solar, hydro, biomass combustion in power generation; biomass inputs into liquid biofuels 
production). 
As a general trend, the share of renewable energy in gross final demand (20) is projected 
to increase over time in all scenarios (Figure 19, Table 4). This rising share materialises 
primarily through their rapid deployment in power generation: indeed, while renewables 
in power generation represented about a third of total renewable energy in 2015, this 
share would rise to above 50% by 2040 in all scenarios, and would be further pushed 
with more ambitious climate policies (63% in 2050 in the B2°C scenario). 
This happens in most of the world except where traditional biomass (21), a historically 
important energy source, is phased out in favour of more efficient and cleaner fuels, such 
as in India, South-East Asia or Sub-Saharan Africa.  
                                           
(20) Defined as the energy consumption of renewable origin as a share of gross final energy demand, including 
auto-consumption and transmission and distribution losses of the energy sector, and excluding non-energy 
uses of fuels. 
(21) Refers to direct burning of wood or manure for cooking and heating purposes in the residential sector. 
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Table 4: Share of renewables in gross final demand, 2030, INDC scenario 
 
2015 Total Biomass Hydro 
Wind 
+Solar 
Other 
EU28 16% 27% 15% 3% 8% 1% 
Australia 10% 19% 9% 2% 8% 0% 
Canada 26% 35% 12% 18% 9% 0% 
Japan 6% 15% 6% 3% 5% 0% 
Korea (Rep.) 10% 10% 6% 0% 5% 0% 
Mexico 9% 17% 9% 2% 4% 1% 
USA 9% 25% 13% 2% 6% 0% 
Rest of OECD 17% 28% 14% 5% 4% 3% 
OECD 12% 24% 12% 4% 6% 0% 
Russia 7% 9% 5% 4% 8% 0% 
Rest of CIS 6% 9% 4% 3% 0% 0% 
China 17% 21% 10% 6% 2% 0% 
India 33% 24% 17% 2% 6% 0% 
Indonesia 36% 30% 26% 1% 5% 1% 
Rest of Asia 27% 19% 15% 2% 3% 0% 
Argentina 10% 15% 7% 5% 1% 0% 
Brazil 44% 48% 26% 16% 3% 0% 
Rest of Latin America 29% 31% 16% 11% 7% 0% 
North Africa 5% 6% 2% 1% 4% 0% 
Sub-Saharan Africa (excl. ZAF) 79% 66% 62% 2% 3% 0% 
South Africa (ZAF) 15% 22% 15% 1% 1% 0% 
Iran 1% 2% 1% 1% 6% 0% 
Saudi Arabia 0% 1.77% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Rest of Middle-East 1% 3% 1% 0% 1% 0% 
Non-OECD 23% 27% 17% 5% 3% 2% 
World 19% 23% 14% 4% 4% 0% 
Notes: EU28 includes both OECD and non-OECD member states. The share in EU28 follows the 
definition of the Directive 2009/28/EC (EC, 2009). Includes traditional biomass. Gross final energy 
demand includes auto-consumption and transmission and distribution losses of the energy sector 
and excludes non-energy uses of fuels. 
Globally, in the INDC scenario the share of renewables grows at about 3-3.5 percentage 
points per decade, reaching 23% in 2030 and 31% in 2050 (vs. 19% in 2015); with 
stronger climate policies, the growth rate would be twice as high throughout the 2015-
2050 period, and the share of renewables would reach 26% in 2030 and 43% in 2050. 
Wind and solar contribute to the renewables share increase over time in all scenarios. 
The comparative advantage of these "pure" electrical renewables is reflected by the fact 
that it is only in the B2°C scenario that biomass becomes a significant contributor to that 
share increase over time.  
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Figure 19: Share of renewables in gross final demand, 2030  
 
Note: Includes traditional biomass. 
Many countries and regions are expected to experience a strong increase in the share of 
renewables between 2015 and 2030; this would be particularly pronounced in North 
America, EU-28, Australia or Turkey. 
In some countries with a very strongly growing total energy demand (India, Indonesia), 
renewables may expand at a slower pace than that of total energy demand, resulting in a 
share of renewables that may even decrease over time; a stabilisation of the share would 
occur only with ambitious climate policies and more energy efficiency. 
Strengthening climate policies towards the B2°C scenario result in an increase of the 
share of renewables in all regions (22). 
3.1.3  Power and other energy transformation 
3.1.3.1 Power generation 
Power generation increases in all three scenarios, as a result of increasing overall energy 
demand and the increase of electrification of demand (section 3.1.2.4); transport and 
distribution losses remain at around 8% of total power produced. 
It would rise at a global level from about 24,000 TWh in 2015 to about 50,000 TWh in 
2050 in the INDC scenario (5% higher and lower in the Reference and B2°C scenarios, 
respectively). 
In the Reference scenario, power production from all technologies is foreseen to increase 
over time; the same is true in the INDC scenario except for coal. In the B2°C scenario, 
the contribution of fossil fuels technologies decreases. Renewables are expected to 
expand in both volume and share across all scenarios. 
In 2030 the level of electricity production is still fairly similar across scenarios (Figure 20). 
However, the fuel shares do differ with the intensity of climate policies: power from coal 
contracts substantially while carbon-free power from nuclear, wind and solar expands, 
leaving the share of gas roughly unchanged. B2°C policies imply a further reduction of 
                                           
(22) For certain countries and regions, the share remains the same from INDC to B2°C scenarios, as the INDC 
policies are stringent and coherent with a pathway towards a below 2°C temperature increase. This is the 
case for EU28 and USA (see Figure 60 for carbon values used in the scenarios). 
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fossil fuels, to less than half of power production (44%) and a further expansion of wind 
(which reaches 14% of total production).  
Beyond 2030, with climate policies, fossil fuels decrease in both share and volume 
despite the expansion of CCS technologies (Figure 21). 
Figure 20: World power production and production mix in 2030 
 
Note: no CCS capacities have been installed by 2030 in any of the scenarios. 
Since the power sector is the one offering the widest and cheapest decarbonisation 
opportunities, the power production mix varies substantially across scenarios. 
Renewables and nuclear would rise to cover most of power production in 2050 with INDC 
policies (46% and 16%, respectively); conversely, the fossil fuels contribution to the 
power mix would drop from 66% in 2015 to 37% in 2050. In the B2°C scenario the 
renewables share would grow to 59% (8% of which being bioenergy with CCS - BECCS) 
and the fossil fuels share would contract to 19%, most of it associated with CCS (12%). 
Figure 21: World power production and production mix in the INDC scenario 
 
3.1.3.2 Power generation capacities 
Total installed power generation capacity is projected to increase at the pace observed 
since 2000, by around +2 – 2.5 TW every decade, from 6.3 TW globally in 2015 to about 
10 TW in 2030 and 15 TW in 2050 (a more than twofold increase vs. current capacity) in 
all three scenarios. Slightly different dynamics of electricity demand (see Figure 18) is 
compensated by contrasted average load factor stemming from differentiated 
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penetrations of wind and solar technologies (23). Renewables exceed 60% of the total 
installed capacity by 2050 in the INDC scenario and 70% in the B2°C scenario (vs. 26% 
in 2010 and 31% in 2015) (Figure 22). 
Figure 22: World installed power capacity (left axis) and technology mix (right axis) 
 
New installations would need to be deployed quickly, to cover for the new demand and to 
substitute for decommissioned power plants. While total new installations averaged 
below 200 GW/year over 1990-2010, this would rise to above 300 GW/year over 2010-
2030 and to 500 GW/year over 2030-2050 at global level in the INDC scenario, with a 
very different investment pattern across world regions (see Figure 24). 
In the Reference scenario, there would still be a non-negligible expansion of coal-based 
power in the future, gas and hydro would remain at their 1990-2010 paces and nuclear 
would undergo an increase to around 20 GW/year. Installation rates for wind and solar 
would each exceed 100 GW/year in 2030-2050 while coal and gas would follow with 
around 80 GW/year each. 
In the B2°C scenario, the dynamics would be very different: coal technologies without 
CCS would essentially stop being installed from 2025 and the market size of coal-fired 
facilities being reduced to barely 10 GW/year of coal with CCS. Wind and solar would 
each exceed 150 GW/year in 2030-2050, while total CCS technologies (combined across 
coal, gas and biomass) would exceed 60 GW/year. 
Overall, in terms of distribution of annual power capacity installations as a world average 
(Figure 23), there would be a shift from fossil-based capacities towards renewables. 
Renewables would exceed half the annual new installed capacities in all scenarios and 
future decades, starting from the current decade in the Reference (50%; it was 43% 
over the 2010-2015 period) and reaching a share of about three quarters in the 2030-
2050 decades in the B2°C scenario (77%). 
                                           
(23) Additionally, in the B2°C scenario the power mix quickly adapts to the needs for low-carbon electricity in 
2025-2040 and thus the load factor of non-CCS technologies is decreasing quickly; these are eventually 
decommissioned in the 2040-2060 decades at the end of their lifetime. 
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Figure 23: Technology shares of average new annual power capacity installations, World 
 
New installations grow following the increase of electricity demand and to substitute 
decommissioned plants, resulting in different profiles for regions across the world (Figure 
24). Over 80% of power capacity installations from 2010 to 2050 take place in non-OECD 
regions (Asia, part of Latin America, Africa, CIS), driven by the fast increase of electricity 
demand. The regional distribution changes little across scenarios. 
Figure 24: Distribution by region of average new annual installations, INDC scenario 
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3.1.3.3 Other energy transformation 
Centralized heat production, supplying heat to industry, residential and services, is 
expected to increase in all scenarios. Input to heat plants would continue representing 
around 2% of total energy demand throughout 2050. Depending on the stringency of 
climate policies, coal input is phased out more or less quickly, substituted by biomass 
input (Figure 25). 
Figure 25: Inputs in heat plants, World, INDC scenario 
 
Hydrogen production for energy uses is expected to remain limited, although it should 
increase to respond to demand from road vehicles and from stationary uses. By 2050, 
the contribution of hydrogen in total gaseous fuels consumption is relatively limited: less 
than 5% in the INDC scenario, up to 8% in the B2°C scenario. 
Hydrogen production would be dominated by processes using coal (coal gasification), gas 
(mostly gas steam reforming) and biomass (mostly biomass pyrolysis) in all scenarios, 
despite the relative loss of competitiveness of fossil fuel-based production technologies 
with climate policies (Figure 26). 
Figure 26: Hydrogen demand (left) and production inputs (right), World, INDC scenario 
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3.2 Energy markets 
3.2.1  International energy prices 
Overall, prices for internationally traded energy commodities follow an evolution 
reflecting the balance between demand and supply. Demand is determined by energy 
needs, technology costs and inter-fuel substitution, and supply is determined by 
production costs (capital and technology), transport costs and the evolution of reserves – 
with many of these factors being inter-dependent. 
In the short- to medium-term, oil and gas prices experience changes (Figure 27) due to 
an under-investment in supply in recent years (IEA, 2016a; also see section 3.2.2.2). 
In the long term, in the Reference and INDC scenarios, fossil fuel prices are on a broadly 
increasing trend, due to a growing demand and/or investment needs in supply. In the 
B2°C scenario, the decrease in demand of all fossil fuels results in stable or decreasing 
prices. 
Figure 27: International fossil fuel prices in the INDC scenario  
 
The world gas and oil markets are expected to be progressively decoupled, although 
possibly at a slower rate than what was experienced in the late 2000s to early 2010s due 
to high oil price levels reached during that period.  
The oil market dynamics do not differ much between the Reference and the INDC 
scenarios, but going to below 2°C would entail more structural changes in the 
transportation sector and a lower demand, leading to a relatively lower price in the long 
run (Figure 28). It must be kept in mind that an increasing part of oil production is 
expected to be energy-intensive and emits CO2. As a consequence a share of the 
production base will become more expensive with the pricing of CO2 emissions, shifting 
upwards the supply curve and thus limiting the downward impact on price of the new 
supply-demand equilibrium. 
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Figure 28: Impact of climate policies on the international fossil fuel prices 
 
Climate-protecting policies could also reduce the gas market price, even further than the 
oil price.  
Under moderate climate policies gas could be favoured with respect to other fossil fuels 
and its demand could comparatively increase (or decrease less); its prices would 
therefore be sustained. However, with more climate ambition, the substantial penetration 
of renewables in the power sector as well as the accelerated insulation in buildings, 
power generation and heating in buildings being the main sectors where gas is consumed, 
would further decrease gas demand and deflate gas prices. 
Additionally, the pricing of carbon emissions should affect less the structure of the 
production cost of gas compared to that of oil production. Indeed, gas production is and 
will remain less energy- and carbon-intensive than oil production; as a consequence, the 
cost of energy inputs, carbon value included, should increase less. In the B2°C scenario, 
gas prices by 2050 could be up to 60% lower than in a world without any climate policy. 
Coal demand is deeply impacted by climate policies, however coal prices less so. Prices 
follow production cost, which increase with investment needs in new production 
capacities, and higher transport costs.   
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3.2.2  Oil and liquids 
Demand for liquid fuels is met by crude oil supply, in conventional forms (including shale 
oil and tight oil, deep offshore fields, Arctic oil) or from new non-conventional (tar sands, 
extra-heavy oil, kerogen), as well as by synthetic liquid fuels converted from coal, gas, or 
biomass. 
3.2.2.1 Supply 
The main feature of future crude oil supply is the growing scarcity of conventional oil 
resources (crude, including tight oil) (24) in non-OPEC producers and the consequent 
long-term increasing market power of OPEC despite the increase of non-conventional oil 
production (Figure 29).  
An increase in oil demand is expected for the medium term (2020), spurred by the recent 
low oil price and a reinvigorated economic growth (section 3.2.2.2). The expected 
required increase in production is expected to take place in the Middle East (Saudi 
Arabia, Iraq, UAE), followed by the USA and Central Asian countries (Kazakhstan, 
Turkmenistan).  
In the longer term, oil supply is expected to remain at an undulating plateau at around 
100 Mbl/d; total liquids demand is only slightly increasing after 2020 throughout 2050, at 
around 105 Mbl/d (INDC scenario). In that period, most non-OPEC producers would see 
their conventional output decline, with only two regions, Middle East and Africa, 
increasing their production. The Reference scenario would be little different, with crude 
oil production only increasing to 110 Mbl/d over the three decades to 2050. 
Figure 29: Crude oil and liquids supply by source, World, INDC scenario 
 
The market undergoes a progressive substitution of conventional resources by expensive 
energy-intensive oil, representing together 11% of the total liquids supply in 2050 (vs. 
3% in 2015); the bulk of this non-conventional production is concentrated in Canadian 
tar sands and Venezuelan extra-heavy oil throughout the projection period. The large 
resources of US kerogen (25) are not expected to kick-in within the projected period.  
                                           
(24) Estimates from fossil fuel resources used in this report come from BGR (2015) and USGS (USGS 2013 and 
Schenk 2012). 
(25) Kerogen (shale oil) is contained in oil shale formations; not to be confused with (light) tight oil and oil 
shale, which is oil in low-permeability shales. 
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Production of expensive conventional oil from deep-water reservoirs is foreseen to 
expand in the medium term (Brazil, USA, Nigeria and Angola). Liquids from transformed 
fuels (biomass, coal, gas) would reach 5% of total liquids supply (vs. 2% in 2015).  
Within conventional crude oil, the ease with which OPEC countries can tap into their 
significant and relatively cheap resources counter-balances the decrease in production 
from non-OPEC countries. This results in a growing market share for OPEC over time 
(from 37% to 46-49% depending on the scenario), along with a growing role for Asia in 
terms of imports, which might lead to significant consequences in terms of trade rules 
and international relations. 
Cumulated production of crude oil rises from about 1.4 Tbl in 2015 to about twice that in 
2050, i.e. from 23% to 45% of total technically recoverable oil resources ( 26 ); for 
conventional oil these figures are 32% and 61%, respectively. These figures reflect 
increasing oil scarcity that takes into account demand-side adjustments such as fuel 
efficiency measures and fuel substitution in transport and industry. 
A more stringent climate policy (B2°C scenario) would affect negatively first the most 
CO2-intensive productions (extra heavy, tar and kerogen) and reduce the call on OPEC 
compared to the Reference scenario. In the longer term, the decrease in demand and in 
oil price also affects the more expensive non-OPEC and deep-offshore production. 
Cumulated production by 2050 would still reach 2.5 Tbl in this case (1.1 Tbl over 2015-
2050), or 43% of total resources. 
The market for all types of synthetic liquids – conversion of biomass, coal, or gas – grows 
over time in all scenarios (Figure 30). However, synthetic liquids would remain marginal 
contributors to total liquids supply even in the B2°C scenario. From 2.1% of world liquids 
demand in 2015 (essentially from biofuels), they contribute 5.2% in 2050 in the INDC 
scenario (6.5% in the B2°C scenario), still essentially from biofuels. See section 3.2.5 on 
biomass for more details. 
Figure 30: Biofuels and synthetic liquids production, World, INDC scenario 
 
3.2.2.2 Price and trade 
After a period of volatility in the coming decade due to short-term supply-demand 
dynamics observed in all scenarios (see box on short-term oil price), the oil price would 
resume a long-term rising trend, albeit at a much slower pace than the one experienced 
in the 2000s decade (Figure 31). 
                                           
(26) Technically recoverable oil resources (including already produced resources): 3.7 Tbl for conventional and 
environmentally-sensitive oil; 2.8 Tbl for non-conventional oil (see BGR 2015). 
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Figure 31: Oil prices in the GECO2017 scenarios, 1990-2050  
 
In the medium term, the demand increase induced from the present low oil prices would 
mean that significant investments will need to be made in production for it to grow. 
Growing extraction costs and additional investments needs would suggest a long-term oil 
price increasing trend. Conversely, in a world with ambitious climate policies, the 
decrease in oil demand (at about -1%/year after 2020 throughout 2050) would offset the 
effect of these cost-increasing tensions, resulting in a stable price 
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Short-term oil price 
Oil price projections presented in this report take into consideration the recent (2014-
early 2017) drop in prices and corresponding stock movements. 
In the short term, the fall of oil prices since late 2014 would trigger a resurgent oil 
demand growth worldwide that soon would encounter supply constraints. Oil demand is 
expected to increase over 2016-2020 by almost 5 Mbl/d, most of which taking place in 
non-OECD countries and bunkers, while OECD countries would have a stable or slightly 
decreasing demand over that period (Figure 32). 
The recent fall in oil prices have resulted in a reduction of the most expensive oil 
production; IEA (2017) expect total non-OPEC production to stabilize, except for the USA 
which should recover the 2015 production level after a decrease in 2016 (EIA, 2017). In 
addition, investment in exploration and production has decreased substantially since the 
peak year of 2014 (it was 42% lower in 2016; IEA, 2016a) while discoveries of new oil 
reserves over 2015-2016 reached their lowest level since the mid-50s (27). That being 
said, the extent of the drop in supply has been less than first expected by analysts due to 
decreasing costs of production, efficiency gains and restructuring, especially in US tight 
oil production (28). 
These two opposite trends would result in a need for additional oil production, from OPEC 
countries in particular, which might need to increase their production by 17% by 2020 
compared to 2015 (+8% for non-OPEC). Stock changes in 2016 were already 
significantly lower than in 2015 (+0.9 Mb/d versus +1.8 Mb/d) and are moving towards 
negative values (-0.5 Mb/d in 2Q2017 according to IEA, 2017) similar to those 
experienced during the 2010-2013 period. As a consequence the oil market should shift 
form a situation of abundant supply towards a tighter configuration, leading to possibly 
rising oil prices by 2020. In anticipation, investment in exploration and production is 
expected to rise again in 2017, although only by 3% (29) (and still 35% below the 2014 
level by 2019). 
Figure 32: Historic and projected oil demand vs. supply (left), projected new demand 2017-2020 
(right) 
 
Note: 2013-2017 data and 2018 estimates come from IEA (2017) and OPEC (2017); demand in 
2020 from this report's analysis.  
This supply bottleneck is likely to occur regardless the pace of implementation of climate 
policies, which are expected to have an effect on the international oil market only from 
2020-2025 onwards (Figure 29).  
                                           
(27) According to a survey by IHS quoted in the Financial Times (8th May 2016):  
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/1a6c6032-1521-11e6-9d98-00386a18e39d.html#axzz4BZJuRsWY  
(28) According to the IEA (2016a), "lower costs accounted for just less than two-thirds of the total fall in 
upstream investment between 2014 and 2016, with reduced activity levels covering the remainder".  
(29) According to a WoodMackenzie report (8th December 2016): 
http://www.woodmac.com/theedge/index.php/2016/12/08/global-upstream-investment-set-to-rise-in-
2017/  
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International oil trade (Figure 33) is set to increase in the future with growing (or 
plateauing) demand for oil: traded oil would increase by 5% and 20% compared to 2015 
in 2030 and 2050, respectively (INDC scenario), corresponding approximately to half of 
global oil production in all scenarios. Over time, China and India overtake EU28, US and 
Japan as the largest oil importers; by 2030 China and India combined would absorb 
nearly half of the oil traded globally (versus just a quarter in 2015). The largest 
exporters would continue to be the Persian Gulf region, Russia and Canada. 
Figure 33: Net oil trade in volume for EU-28, USA, China and India, Reference and B2°C scenarios 
(30) 
 
3.2.2.3 Demand 
Oil and liquids demand can be foreseen to increase in the future, possibly at a slower 
pace compared to the past two decades; in 2050 it is 18% higher than 2015 in the INDC 
scenario (Figure 34). This is the result of opposite trends in OECD and non-OECD 
countries with respect to transportation needs, efficiency in end-uses and fuel 
substitution opportunities. 
                                           
(30) Trade volumes in this report are given in real USD of 2015. 
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Figure 34: Oil and liquids demand by activity sector, World, INDC scenario 
 
Note: Contains both oil products and synthetic liquids (liquids from gas, coal and biomass). Other 
transformation & losses refer to auto-consumption in oil and gas production, oil and gas refineries, 
and losses in pipelines. 
The global transport sector is the main consumer of oil globally (57% in 2015, against 
45% in the early 90s), ahead of industry, residential & services and the power sector. It 
remains so in the future, and in all scenarios (63-66% in 2050 depending on the 
scenario). Road transport in particular represented 45% of global oil demand in 2015; it 
is expected to remain at about the same market share throughout 2050 in all scenarios, 
with demand in air transport and maritime bunkers covering most of the growth (see 
section 3.1.2.3 on mobility for more details). 
In terms of regional distribution of oil demand, significant shifts are expected in all 
scenarios. In 2012, oil demand (excluding international bunkers) was equally shared 
between OECD and non-OECD countries. This ratio may progressively change until by 
2050 non-OECD would cover three quarters of total demand. OECD demand, after 
reaching a peak in 2005, has decreased due to efficiency gains in transport and/or 
displacement by other fuels/carriers in industry and residential & services. This trend 
continues, with demand in the OECD dropping by 33% over 2015-2050. Non-OECD 
demand, on the contrary, would increase by 41% over the same period. Most of that 
increase in non-OECD countries is expected come from the transport sector (+73% over 
2015-2050), mainly driven by mobility demand in fast-growing Asian countries. Indeed, 
the number of private cars in non-OECD countries could experience a five-fold increase 
over the same period. 
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3.2.3  Gas 
3.2.3.1 Supply 
Gas supply grows at a sustained rate throughout 2035, and with a slower growth rate 
thereafter (Figure 35). The world market increases by 74% compared to 2015 in the 
INDC scenario (+91% for Reference); in the B2°C scenario, it peaks in the early 2030s 
and is at the same level as 2015 in 2050. 
In all scenarios and throughout 2050, gas production is still dominated by conventional 
gas. While Russia and the Caspian region are foreseen to continue to be major producers 
in the future and expand their supply while European and US output declines (despite the 
development of shale gas), it is the Middle East that could experience the most important 
increase in production and market share. This will also call for a substantial change in the 
transportation pattern of gas in the global market, relying more on liquefied natural gas 
(LNG) in the future. 
Conventional gas remains relatively abundant, with about 37% of accessible resources 
having been exploited by 2050 compared to 13% in 2015 (31) (INDC scenario). 
Figure 35: Gas supply by source, World, INDC scenario 
 
In all the scenarios addressed and throughout 2050, the contribution of shale gas to total 
world gas supply does not exceed the share observed in 2015 (12%); with expanding 
conventional production, this share even decreases over time. Due to production costs 
differing across regions and competition with other gas sources, the "shale gas 
revolution" would take off with difficulty in countries outside the USA, which still 
represents three quarters of world shale gas production by 2050 regardless of the 
climate policy in place. 
Gas produced in environmentally sensitive regions (deep-water and the Arctic) is 
foreseen to remain a marginal source, with Russia (Arctic), USA, Nigeria and to a smaller 
extent Brazil (deep-water) making up most of this kind of production. 
3.2.3.2 Price and trade 
Average world gas prices are expected to keep increasing unless strong climate policies 
are adopted (Figure 36), while retaining significant regional differences reflecting supply 
patterns and transport costs (Figure 37). With the development of international liquefied 
natural gas (LNG) trade, convergence across regional price signals gradually takes place. 
                                           
(31) Technically recoverable gas resources: 950 Tm3 for all types, including 650 Tm3 for conventional gas alone 
(see BGR, 2015). 
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Figure 36: Average world gas prices, all scenarios 
 
Indeed, LNG trade already covered about a third of international gas trade in 2015; this 
share is expected to exceed 50% by 2030 and would further grow to 60% by 2050. The 
LNG market is foreseen to reach 3,100 mcm/d in 2030, i.e. three times the volume 
compared to 2015, regardless of the scenario considered. Current LNG trade is 
dominated by exports towards Japan and Europe; in the future, China and other Asian 
economies would become significant destinations. Qatar in the medium term and Russia, 
Australia and Iran in the longer term could develop to be the largest exporters. 
Figure 37: International gas price, INDC scenario 
 
In particular, the convergence of prices results in a decreasing price for Asian market and 
an increasing price for the American market in the medium term. With oil price levels in 
the medium term similar to those observed in the 2007-2015 period, the indexation of 
gas prices to the oil price would decrease but still persist and would contribute in the gas 
prices rise.  
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Figure 38: Net gas trade in volume for EU-28, USA, China and Southeast Asia, Reference and 
B2°C scenarios  (32) 
 
The Asian market would increasingly be defined by imports from the rest of the world: by 
the 2030s the emerging Asian economies could absorb more than half the world's 
internationally traded gas (compared to 22% in 2015) and all Asian regions would 
become net importers (Figure 38). While Europe remains the main destination for 
Russian gas throughout 2050, Russia expands its exports to China and, as Russia's LNG 
export capacity progressively develops, to South-East Asia and South Asia. 
3.2.3.3 Demand 
Demand of gas is expected to keep growing in future decades, albeit at a decelerated 
growth rate in the INDC scenario (Figure 39). This is particularly motivated by additional 
demand in industry and the power sector, two sectors that would continue being 
responsible for about two thirds of total gas demand throughout 2050.  
Gas demand maintains an important role in the power sector in the B2°C scenario, due to 
its comparative advantage with coal and its role as a key technology to buffer 
intermittent renewable technologies, whose share is expected to grow substantially. 
However, demand in other sectors is projected to shrink, due to both energy efficiency 
and substitutions by carbon-neutral energy vectors. As a result, in the B2°C scenario 
total gas demand peaks in 2030 and then decreases to 2015 levels by 2050. 
                                           
(32) Trade volumes in this report are given in real USD of 2015. 
-50
0
50
100
150
200
1990 2015 2030 2050
b
n
$
 
EU28 
1990 2015 2030 2050
USA 
Reference
1990 2015 2030 2050
China 
B2°C
1990 2015 2030 2050
SE Asia 
 44 
Figure 39: Gas demand by activity sector, World, INDC scenario 
 
Note: Other transformation & losses refer to auto-consumption in oil and gas production, oil and 
gas refineries, and losses in pipelines. 
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3.2.4  Coal 
3.2.4.1 Supply 
World demand for solid fossil fuels stabilizes at the 2015 level (6.9 Gt) throughout the 
mid-2020s in the INDC scenario. Coal is the primary energy carrier that is most heavily 
impacted by climate policies: only in the Reference scenario coal production grows 
beyond 2020, reaching 8.9 Gt in 2050. Coal production in the INDC and B2°C scenarios 
peaks in or around 2020, then decreases at different rates (-2 to -5%/year), reaching 
4.3 Gt and barely 1.3 Gt in 2050, respectively (Figure 40). 
Figure 40: Coal supply by source, World, INDC scenario 
 
The regional distribution of coal production changes significantly over time (Figure 41). In 
the INDC scenario, USA, Europe and most importantly China production decreases over 
the 2015-2030 period. Beyond 2030, coal production decreases in essentially all regions 
of the world. 
Figure 41: Coal production by region, INDC scenario 
 
Out of total production, only a minor part is traded across borders – although the share 
of trade is increasing in all scenarios considered. It rises to 29% in 2030 and 41% in 
2050 (INDC scenario). Imports for emerging economies in Asia, especially India, are the 
driving force behind this growing importance of trade. 
Coal prices, which by 2015 were back to the level they were at before the price spikes of 
the late 2000s, should follow a moderate rising trend in all scenarios, driven by growing 
freight costs and, in the long term, by increasing mining costs (Figure 42). 
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Figure 42: Coal prices, 1990-2050 
 
3.2.4.2 Demand 
Coal demand is strongly related to the implementation of climate policies. With the INDC 
policies, coal demand first stabilises in the mid-2020s and then decreases so that, by 
2050, it is reduced by 37% compared to its 2015 level (vs. a 32% increase in the 
Reference scenario and an 82% decrease in the B2°C scenario) (Figure 43). 
The coal market remains mainly driven by demand from the power sector, followed by 
industry, despite air pollution concerns which would force the adoption of pollution 
mitigation technologies and the move of power generation and industrial activities far 
from urban centres (section 5.1).  
Most of the coal consumption remains steam coal: the demand for coking coal decreases 
as the demand for primary steel also decreases over time due to the increasing role of 
steel recycling (secondary steel), and its share in total coal demand would drop to 5% by 
2050 (vs. 8% in 2015).  
Demand in the residential sector and services is expected to shrink and would virtually 
disappear worldwide by 2050. 
Figure 43: Coal demand by activity sector, World, INDC scenario 
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Note: Other transformation & losses refer to auto-consumption in oil and gas production, and in 
coking coal plants. 
The coal demand decrease in the INDC scenario is mostly felt in China (Figure 44), where 
it is displaced by renewables, gas and nuclear. In this scenario, power generation from 
coal in China decreases from 70% in 2015 (world: 39%) to 46% in 2030 (world: 28%) 
and 13% in 2050 (world: 13%). 
Figure 44: Coal demand by region, INDC scenario 
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3.2.5 Biomass 
3.2.5.1 Supply 
Biomass use for energy is projected to increase in the future; as an alternative to fossil 
fuels for combustion or for the production of liquid fuels, its use would be further 
enhanced by climate policies. By 2050 its demand would increase by 65-140% compared 
to 2015 depending on the scenario. 
Most of biomass-for-energy supply would come from lignocellulosic resources (forestry 
residues and dedicated short rotation coppices for biomass-to-energy conversion); non- 
lignocellulosic resources (dedicated agricultural crops) made up 10% of total biomass 
supply in energy terms in 2015, and their share would remain limited and even decrease 
over time. 
Current biomass inputs to the energy system exceed 50 EJ/year (33); by 2050 they would 
increase to as much as 135 EJ/year in the B2°C scenario. This raises a number of 
questions on the impact on land-related issues, most notably food security, biodiversity 
conservation or water cycles. 
Figure 45 plots long-term biomass-to-energy potentials estimates ( 34 ) from a 
comparative study that provides various ranges of bio-energy potentials across biomass 
source types; estimates vary on a multitude of criteria such as social, political and 
economic factors but also the stringency of sustainability criteria. According to Creutzig 
et al. (2015) there is a moderate agreement in the literature for a potential of about 200 
EJ/year, which is higher than what is used by 2050 in the GECO scenarios, and a high 
level of agreement for 90 EJ/year, which is exceeded by 2050 in the case of the B2°C 
scenario.  
Figure 45: Biomass for energy vs. sustainable potential estimates (right) 
 
Note: Production levels of biomass from agricultural crops very similar across scenarios. Source for 
qualification of agreement of potential estimates in literature: Creutzig et al. (2015). 
The scenarios presented in this study were produced considering a maximum potential 
for bio-energy of 250 EJ/year in 2050 (using information from the GLOBIOM model, see 
IIASA, 2016), taking into account the future development of yields and an increasing 
cost of production as more of the potential is being used.  
                                           
(33) Biomass consumption in the energy sector in 2011 amounted to about 30% of total biomass production 
(food, industrial uses, energy) – see Morrison and Golden (2015) 
(34) Accessible potentials regardless of time horizon considered 
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Accordingly, the price for biomass increases over time as more of the resource is being 
used (Figure 46). 
Figure 46: Solid biomass price indicator 
 
As the use of biomass in the energy system increases it becomes a globally traded 
commodity. As of 2015, only 1.5% of biomass used on bioenergy was traded across 
borders; by 2050 this share grows to 16-19% in this analysis (35).  
In all scenarios, the use of traditional biomass in Africa, China and India is expected to 
reduce and be progressively replaced by "modern" biomass produced with more efficient 
exploitation methods and commercialized. 
Biomass production would grow in all regions (see Figure 47); the dominant exporters 
would particularly be in Latin America, followed by Southeast Asia and Sub-Saharan 
Africa. North America, Europe, Middle East, OECD Pacific and North Africa would be the 
most salient importing regions in 2050. These broad trends are mostly observed in all 
scenarios, with stronger climate policies increasing the volumes of trade across regions 
and with Middle East and India in particular becoming significant importers. 
Figure 47: Primary biomass-for-energy production by region (left) and share of the region's 
biomass-for-energy potential being used in 2050 in the B2°C scenario (right) 
 
3.2.5.2 Demand 
Most of biomass consumption is currently dedicated to combustion for heat uses (about 
80% in 2015), with approximately 10% being consumed in the form of liquid biofuels 
(first generation biofuels). 
                                           
(35) Concerns exist that the low energy density of biomass could limit the transport distance from farm gate to 
biomass power plant that is economical and thus limit global biomass transport (IRENA 2012). 
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In contrast, future demand growth should be driven by power production and second 
generation biofuels (Figure 48). In the ambitious climate policy scenario, the 
development of bioenergy with CCS (BECCS) would draw significant amounts of biomass: 
accounted for as technology providing negative CO2 emissions, it is perceived to play an 
important role in the mitigation effort (36). By 2050 biomass in power production reaches 
the same market share as biomass for heat, slightly above 40% of total biomass use in 
the energy sector. 
Figure 48: Primary bio-energy demand by use, share 
 
In 2011 the production of liquid fuels consumed 4% of all crops production (37) (Morrison 
and Golden, 2015), while its contribution in the world energy system has been small: in 
2015, biofuels were 1.6% of total liquids demand and 3.7% of liquids demand in road 
transport. 
Liquid biofuels demand is expected to grow in all scenarios, with the highest increase (a 
multiplication by 2.4 over 2015-2050) in the scenario with the highest oil price and the 
weakest climate policies: the Reference case (Figure 49). Ambitious climate policies do 
not appear as a key driver of liquid biofuels demand, as higher vehicle engine efficiency 
and substitution with other technologies (most notably electric vehicles) limit their 
development. By 2050 and depending on the scenario, biofuels would count for 10-11% 
of liquids demand in road transport as a world average, and 2-8% in world air transport. 
Figure 49: Liquid biofuels production, World, INDC scenario 
 
The share of first generation biofuels, which use primary biomass that is in competition 
with agriculture over land use, is expected to decrease over time with the development 
of second generation biofuels. 
                                           
(36) Use of biomass-for-energy without CCS is considered carbon-neutral when taking into account the carbon 
sequestration in the crop or timber grown to obtain that biomass. BECCS is considered carbon-negative. 
(37) In tonnage of all cereals, roots, fruits and vegetables; not including roundwood forestry. 
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3.2.6  Nuclear 
World nuclear supply is projected to grow in the coming decades, increasing by over 70% 
over 2015-2030 in the INDC scenario and continuing at this rate beyond 2030 (Figure 
50). 
This is mainly due to the expansion of nuclear power in non-OECD countries (mostly 
concentrated in China, India, South-East Asia, Central Asia and Russia). Non-OECD 
countries account for over half the nuclear production by 2050 (56% and 64% in the 
INDC and B2°C scenarios, respectively), compared to 23% in 2015. In OECD countries, 
the growth would be smaller and new installations mostly replace decommissioned plants. 
Figure 50: World nuclear power supply (left) and annual uranium consumption (right) 
 
Note: Developing Asia consists of China, India, Rest of South Asia and South East Asia. Uranium 
consumption includes natural uranium mining and consumption from other sources (depleted re-
use, used fuel recycling). 
Annual installations increase significantly in all scenarios throughout 2050. Compared to 
a period of few installations in the recent past (4 GW/year in 2000-2015), the power 
plants market grows to 10-30 GW/year in the 2015-2030 period and 20-50 GW/year in 
the 2030-2050 period (38), with climate policies expanding the market significantly. 
The total demand for nuclear uranium fuel correspondingly increases as well.  
  
                                           
(38) Refers to Light Water Reactors (LWR, Gen. III) reactors. Gen. IV reactors (fast breeders) or fusion 
reactions are considered not to be available on a commercial scale before the end of the period assessed in 
this report (2050). 
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3.2.7  Wind 
Wind power would reach 20% of total world power generation in 2050 in the INDC 
scenario, compared to 4% in 2015. The wind market is expected to grow over time in all 
cases, and benefits from the implementation of climate policies. Even though the growth 
rate progressively decreases over time it stays fairly high over the whole period.    
Average annual installations would more than double over the 2015-2030 period 
compared to 2000-2015 even in the Reference scenario (Figure 51). By 2030 climate 
policies clearly have an effect on the market development, with yearly installations 
reaching 100 GW in the B2°C scenario. Though comparatively smaller than onshore wind, 
the market for offshore wind would also more than double compared to its development 
over 2000-2015, with over 75% of offshore installations concentrated in the EU and 
China. 
After 2030 the effect of the climate policies is partially offset by the need for having 
flexible capacities in the power mix (hydro pumped storage, thermal backup power plants 
and/or other forms of electricity storage) to allow for a proper integration of wind. 
Figure 51: World average annual installations of wind energy by technology 
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3.2.8  Solar 
Solar energy undergoes an even higher growth in annual new installations than wind 
(Figure 52). Like for wind, its development is positively impacted by climate policies (and 
constrained by the need of flexibility to accommodate its integration in the grid). 
Solar power reaches about 10% of total world power generation in 2050 in the INDC 
scenario, compared to 1% in 2015. Low-temperature solar thermal, providing heating 
and water heating to residential & services, grows from providing 1% of their heat uses 
in 2015 to 11% in 2050 in the INDC scenario. 
Figure 52: World solar energy: power production (left axis) and thermal (right axis) 
 
The market for solar power technologies grows over time for all scenarios, with growth 
rates for PV technologies that continue increasing throughout 2030 and decelerate 
thereafter, while Concentrating Solar Power (CSP) technologies become a significant 
market only after 2030. 
Average annual installations for PV are multiplied five-fold over the 2015-2030 period 
compared to 2000-2015 even in the Reference scenario, then more than double again 
over the 2030-2050 period (Figure 53). In the INDC and B2°C scenarios, solar even 
exceeds wind after 2030 in becoming the largest market of additional installed capacities, 
i.e. the power technologies with the largest average annual sales worldwide, with nearly 
or over 200 GW/year, respectively (in the Reference scenario average annual sales of 
wind and solar technologies are roughly similar). 
Figure 53: World average annual installations of solar power technologies 
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4 Greenhouse gas emissions and climate 
Greenhouse gases (GHG) emissions and their impacts on climate for the scenarios 
analysed are discussed in this section, including emissions from the energy sector and 
from land use. 
GHG emissions from the different gases are aggregated into CO2-equivalent values, using 
the 100-year global warming potentials of the IPCC Second Assessment Report (39). 
4.1 Global emissions and temperature change 
Total GHG emissions (40) continue to increase from their 2015 level of 47.6 GtCO2e/yr 
over the coming decade (INDC) or even beyond (Reference) unless ambitious climate 
policies are implemented urgently and worldwide (B2°C) (Figure 54). The implementation 
of the policies in the INDC scenario has a worldwide aggregated effect for total GHG 
emissions to peak in the 2020-2030 decade and start decreasing afterwards, if the effort 
(expressed in improvement of emission intensity of the GDP) is pursued beyond 2030. 
Without these policies and with only the policies in the Reference scenario, no peak in 
emissions would be foreseen by 2050. 
INDC policies bring about a global peak in emissions as early as 2025 at 51 GtCO2e/yr, 
i.e. 7% above 2015 levels. Quick and decisive action to fully close the gap towards a 2°C 
world would require a significant further emissions reduction: the peak in the B2°C 
scenario is accelerated to the end of the current decade (2020), at 49 GtCO2e/yr, i.e. just 
3% higher than in 2015. 
While with current policies (Reference) emissions continue to increase throughout 2050 
and beyond, although at a decelerating pace, they decrease in the INDC and B2°C 
scenarios with -0.5%/year and -3.4%/year on average over 2020-2050, respectively. 
By 2030 the gap between scenarios widens significantly, with emissions ranging from 58 
GtCO2e/yr (Reference) to 51 and 41 GtCO2e/yr (INDC and B2°C, respectively). In 2050 
the situation is radically different across scenarios: emissions in the Reference scenario 
would grow to 67 GtCO2e/yr (twice the emissions in 1990) while emissions in the B2°C 
scenario would decrease to 17 GtCO2e/yr (about half the emissions in 1990), with the 
INDC scenario in-between at 43 GtCO2e/yr (29% higher than 1990). 
                                           
(39)  See Table 4 of the Technical Summary of IPCC (1996). 
(40) This includes net CO2 removals from LULUCF activities (sinks).  The uncertainty on the historical estimates 
of sinks is significant (estimated at 3 GtCO2/yr in 2010). Nevertheless, this report covers emissions 
projections that include sinks from afforestation and forest management as mitigation options. Projected 
CH4 and N2O agriculture emissions and CO2 land-use emissions are derived from the GLOBIOM model 
(Global Biosphere Management Model) which has been linked to the POLES-JRC model and historical GHG 
data – for more information on the GLOBIOM model see IIASA (2016) and Havlík P. et al. (2014). 
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Figure 54: Greenhouse gases emissions, World, and average annual growth rates for GHG 
emissions intensity of the economy 
 
Note: Total GHG emissions, including removals (LULUCF sinks, CCS). Temperature increases refer 
to 2100 expected temperatures compared to pre-industrial levels. 
The profile of the global average temperature change is dependent on annual emissions 
of all GHG (especially species with short lifetimes but strong warming potential, such as 
CH4, N2O and F-gases) as well as their cumulated volumes over the long term (especially 
for CO2, which has a long lifetime). In order to build scenarios with a stabilized long-term 
global temperature, emission trends before as well as after 2050 are important. Thus, 
the scenarios presented in this report were developed throughout 2100, with emissions 
reductions continuing to take place in a cost-efficient manner, and they are characterized 
with regards to the temperature change reached at the end of the century. 
In addition, certain non-GHG air pollutants have a cooling effect on the temperature, 
especially nitrate and sulphate as well as carbonaceous compounds (particulate matter 
components); some others (black carbon, another particulate matter component) warm 
the atmosphere (41).  
The long-term global temperature increase resulting from the greenhouse gases and air 
pollutants emissions for each of the scenarios is presented in Figure 55. These scenarios 
correspond to end-of-century temperature increases compared to pre-industrial levels  
close to 4°C (Reference, on an upwards trend beyond 2100), 3°C (INDC, on an upwards 
trend beyond 2100) and below 2°C (B2°C, stabilizing or even slightly decreasing by 
2100) with 50% probability.  
In the B2°C scenario the temperature stabilizes around 2050 and stays at levels below 
+2°C compared to pre-industrial levels by 2100 with a probability of 75%; the 
temperature change would be limited to +1.7°C with a probability of 50%.  
In the other two scenarios, temperatures increase throughout the century. The Reference 
scenario results in a temperature increase by 2100 between 3.5°C and 4.5°C ([25%-
75%] confidence interval) while a prolonged INDC scenario would result in a  
temperature increase between 2.5°C and 3.2°C  ([25%-75%] confidence interval).   
                                           
(41) Pollutants emissions used in these temperature projections use the "PROG" pollutants emissions profiles 
presented in section 5.1. 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
G
tC
O
2e
/y
r 
B2°C
INDC
Reference
History
-3.3%/yr 
-6.9%/yr 
-2.1%/yr 
GHG/GDP 1990-2015: -1.7%/yr 
-4.3%/yr ~3
.5
-4
.5
 °C 
~ 2
.5
-3
.2
 °C < 2
 °C 
 56 
Figure 55: Global average temperature change 
 
Note: the graph shows the probability of exceeding a temperature increase; dark shading denotes 
the 25%/75% percentile region and light shading the 17%/83% percentile region, the line in the 
middle represents the median. Probability distribution is from www.live.magicc.org (Meinshausen 
et al., 2011) using outputs form GECO: GHGs (all sources), aerosols and air pollutants (see section 
5.1). 
In order to extend the mitigation effort beyond the "below 2°C" limit to the "1.5°C" limit, 
global emissions would have to decrease even further and the mitigation options would 
have to be more massively and more quickly adopted. The scientific literature for 
scenarios with a high probability of keeping global warming below 1.5°C by 2100 is still 
scarce, with figures on cumulated CO2 emissions over 2011-2100 ranging from 200 to 
550 GtCO2 (
42). Taking into account the fact that cumulative emissions over 2011-2015 
were already of approximately 180 GtCO2, this leaves very little room for net emissions 
to take place for the rest of the century. 
Cumulated over 2011-2100, total GHG emissions in the Reference the INDC scenarios 
get close to 6000 GtCO2e and 4000, respectively, versus less than 2000 GtCO2e for the  
B2°C scenario. They are the result of net GHG emissions (fossil fuel combustion, 
industrial processes, agriculture, waste) and CO2 removal (CDR: carbon dioxide removal) 
in the form of LULUCF net sinks and CCS. The contribution of each of these sources is 
illustrated in Figure 56, showing the important role of coal phase-out, non-CO2 
abatement and CCS deployment as important options to achieve the goal of temperature 
increase of below 2°C. In particular, technologies like Biomass Energy with Carbon 
Capture and Storage (BECCS) that would allow CO2 removals through using biomass 
energy (BE) – assumed to be carbon neutral – combined with carbon capture and storage 
(CCS) would be key in limiting temperature change to below 2°C or 1.5°C. 
                                           
(42) See Rogelj et al 2015, IPCC 2014 (AR5 Synthesis Report Table 2.2) 
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Figure 56: Cumulated GHG emissions from 2011 and emissions sources 
 
Note: "CO2 other" includes industrial process emissions, waste emissions and fugitive emissions. 
"CO2 combustion" includes the emissions that are abated by CCS. 
4.2 Regional dynamics 
As regions will develop their economies, implement INDC policies and adopt low-carbon 
technologies, the regional distribution of GHG emissions is foreseen to change over time 
(Figure 57). The growing role of Asia can clearly be seen: this region should represent 
about 50% of global GHG emissions from 2030 onwards, led in particular by China until 
2030 when it sees its emissions peaking. Africa and Middle-East would also experience a 
continuous increase, representing about 20% of the total by mid-century. North America, 
Europe and Pacific, which still represent about 30% of the total in 2015, fall to 14%, 
followed by CIS (6%) and Latin America (4%), both with slightly decreasing shares, by 
2050. International air and maritime bunkers rise to 6% by 2050. 
With the stronger climate policies of the B2°C scenario, all regions would drastically 
reduce their emissions over time from early on, depending on the differentiated 
participation to the global mitigation effort considered in the scenario design, with only 
India, among the major economies, delaying its peak in emissions to late in the 2020-
2030 decade. The regional distribution of emissions would be similar to the INDC 
scenario, with some interplay across regions due to the cost-efficiency of a concerted 
global mitigation effort. 
Figure 57: Regional GHG emissions, INDC scenario 
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Table 5: GHG emissions peak information per region 
Region INDC B2°C 
 Peak level 
(GtCO2e) 
Peak 
year 
GDP/cap at 
peak (k$) 
Peak 
level 
(GtCO2e) 
Peak 
year 
GDP/cap at 
peak (k$) 
North America 6.9 2007 44 (same as INDC) 
Latin America 4.8 2004 8 (same as INDC 
Europe 5.1 before 
1990 
20 (same as INDC) 
CIS 4.4 before 
1990 
8 (same as INDC) 
Africa-Middle East n/a (beyond 2050) 6.8 2021 5 
Pacific OECD 2.4 2013 31 (same as INDC) 
China 14.6 2026 18 13.5 2021 14 
India n/a (beyond 2050) 4.0 2029 9 
Other Asia n/a (beyond 2050) 5.3 2020 5 
World 51 2025 14 49 2020 12 
Note: GDP in $2005 PPP. GDP/cap at peak year is independent from mitigation policy cost (see 
section 2.1 on the economic assumptions and section 6 for the analysis of policy cost and co-
benefits).  
Information on different regions' emissions peak year is presented in Table 5, displaying 
how a global effort to limit temperature change to below 2°C can be distributed across 
regions. Peak years and levels are the result of each region's economic development and 
climate policies, taking into account a differentiated pace of mitigation effort (as 
explained in section 2.2).  
For a given ambition level, the overall economic effort to curb GHG emissions down 
crucially depends not only on the economic structure of the different countries, but also 
on the different policy mixes adopted to maximize the opportunities offered (enhancing 
technology deployment, removal of distortionary taxes, etc) and minimize the negatives 
aspects (more expensive provision of energy services, etc). Therefore, while countries 
and regions undertake mitigation and see their emissions decline, their economy would 
still continue to grow (e.g. EU). The macro-economic impacts of climate mitigation are 
explored in sections 6.2-6.4. 
4.3 Sectoral dynamics 
In the INDC scenario, sectoral contributions to total emissions change little by 2030, 
compared to 2015 (Figure 58). Historically the power sector is the largest emitting sector 
and, at the same time, the one with largest technological flexibility. It would remain the 
dominant sector in emissions, ahead of industry and transport, followed by other energy 
supply (primary supply, other transformation), agriculture, residential & services and 
waste. The Land Use, Land-use Change and Forestry (LULUCF) sector becomes carbon-
neutral around 2030 at the world level, with significant differences in how this sector 
contributes to emissions balances across countries. 
With further decarbonisation beyond 2030 particularly in power generation, emissions 
from transport surpass those from the power sector; they are followed, by order of 
importance, by industry, other energy supply, agriculture, residential & services and 
waste. In the Reference scenario the share of power sector emissions would actually 
increase. 
The sectoral distribution in the B2°C scenario would shift significantly after 2030. In 
terms of early action by 2020, the non-power energy supply sector would be very 
responsive to the policies put in place, especially given the relatively higher abatement 
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potential in non-CO2 gases (e.g. reduction of fugitive emissions and flaring in the 
production of fossil fuels). In addition, the LULUCF sector would become carbon-neutral 
early in the 2020-2030 decade. Next, the power sector would react also strongly to the 
policies put in place and could reach full decarbonisation at the world level by 2050, with 
its emissions starting to decline starting from 2020 and even becoming negative by 2050 
(thanks to the combined use of biomass and CCS). This would leave the bulk of the 
remaining emissions after 2030 to sectors more difficult to decarbonise: transport, 
industry and agriculture. 
Figure 58: World GHG emissions in the INDC scenario by sector and by greenhouse gas 
 
4.4 Drivers of GHG emissions 
The GHG intensity of the economy is expected to decrease steadily over time in all 
scenarios: as the economy grows threefold over 2015-2050 (and GDP/capita more than 
doubles) and even in the Reference scenario the emissions would increase by 40% at 
most.  
In the INDC scenario the GHG intensity of the economy is reduced by a factor of 3 over 
2015-2050, resulting in decreasing emissions per capita as a world average (-28%). GHG 
intensity thus decreases at around 3.3%/year over the next three decades (Figure 54), 
an acceleration (near doubling) compared to the recent past (-1.7%/year over 1990-
2015) (43). Going to the B2°C scenario would lead to a significant further acceleration of 
emission intensity improvement: -5.8%/year, more than three times the rate observed 
since 1990. 
The decomposition of world GHG emissions into components related to energy intensity 
of the economy and the carbon content of energy (44) is presented in Figure 59.  
The energy intensity of the economy, a measure of energy efficiency, decreases over 
time in all scenarios (cut by half over 2015-2050 in the INDC scenario). The GHG content 
of the energy mix, a measure of decarbonisation of the economy, also decreases and, 
more significantly, shows stronger change across scenarios. It decreases only marginally 
in the Reference scenario: -11% over 2015-2050, showing an increasing competitiveness 
of renewables even in the absence of ambitious climate policies, but a level far from 
allowing a decoupling of emissions and economic growth. The decrease is much stronger 
in the INDC and B2°C scenarios: it is one third and two thirds lower in 2050 compared to 
                                           
(43) Emission intensity improvement was relatively lower in 2000-2010 due to the important role of coal in 
some emerging economies. 
(44) Decomposition of the emissions into the following four explanatory variables: the GHG content of energy 
use, the energy intensity of GDP (expressed in real US dollars of 2005), the GDP per capita, and the 
population: GHG = [GHG / Energy] * [Energy / GDP] * [GDP / Pop] * [Pop] 
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2015, respectively, making decarbonisation of the energy sector the main means for GHG 
emissions mitigation. 
This transformation can only take place with an accelerated fuel and technology shift 
towards GHG-neutral options. It must be noted that this section does not consider the 
impact of policies on income and economic activity: an assessment of the macro-
economic impacts is carried out in section 6.2. 
Figure 59: Decomposition of world GHG emissions 
 
The main mechanisms leading to these emissions trajectories are thus GHG mitigation 
policies, technological change and market dynamics. 
The Reference emissions are mainly the result of technological change and market 
dynamics, with little or no effect attributable to GHG mitigation policies. Several regions 
of the world implement their 2020 policies without the need of a carbon value, including 
countries like China and India. While it can reach from 10 $/tCO2 in Canada to 20 $/tCO2 
in EU (ETS sectors only) and Australia, the average world carbon value (45) is thus very 
low, only of 2 $/tCO2 in 2020 and 2030. 
Figure 60: Carbon values by 2030 in the INDC (left) and B2°C scenarios (right) 
 
Note: EU price refers to the ETS sector's price until 2020, then to the average price over all sectors 
(ETS and non-ETS) for 2025 and 2030. World average is all countries' carbon prices averaged over 
their GHG emissions. 
The INDC emissions are a balanced result of both technological change (and resulting 
market forces) and GHG mitigation policies. While some countries did put forward non-
                                           
(45) Refer to carbon prices of individual countries averaged over countries' GHG emissions (unless stated so). 
Carbon values expressed in this section are in real US dollars of 2015. 
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constraining INDC policies (e.g. India, Turkey, most of Middle East, Russia, Argentina, 
Indonesia), above 70% of emissions around the world ( 46 ) would be subject to a 
constraint, leading to an average "implicit" world carbon value of 25 $/tCO2 in 2030. 
Carbon values in 2030 (Figure 60) range from around 5 $/tCO2 in Brazil to 65 $/tCO2 in 
the EU (averaged over the entire economy, ETS and non-ETS sectors).  
The B2°C scenario emissions are strongly driven by climate policies, which are 
implemented very quickly and across all sectors of the economy and with a clear signal 
that they will be strengthening in the future. The average "implicit" world carbon value 
would reach 62 $/tCO2 in 2030, with all countries subject to a carbon value from 2020 
and most countries converging to 65 $/tCO2 in 2030; countries with very low income (
47) 
(e.g. India, South-East Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa) are allowed to converge later and thus 
reach in 2030 a lower level (43 $/tCO2). 
4.5 Decarbonisation indicators 
Depending on the current energy mix and economic structure, the endowment of 
renewable energy resources, as well as the financing capacity and expected economic 
growth, world countries develop their own pathway and behave differently in their 
pattern to reduce GHG emissions. Table 6 reports GHG emissions growth per decade. 
While OECD countries have been undergoing a stabilization of GHG emissions over the 
last years, most non-OECD countries have experienced a fast increase (48). However, the 
average world emissions growth in 2010-2020 is half that of 2000-2010 or lower: OECD 
countries stabilize their emissions while non-OECD countries reduce substantially their 
growth. 
In the B2°C scenario, during the 2020-2030 decade most countries have their emissions 
already declining, except countries with low income, which have a large gap to cover to 
satisfy their population's energy needs and have a low financing capacity for a transition 
to a low-carbon economy. From 2030 onwards the yearly decline is steep, with both 
OECD and non-OECD reaching or exceeding -4%/year over 2040-2050. These emission 
reduction rates are consistent with scenarios described by the IPCC (AR5 WGIII, IPCC 
2014). 
Table 6: Annual average GHG emissions growth 
 
%/year '90-'00 '00-'10 '10-'20 '20-30 '30-'40 '40-50 
Reference World 
0.8% 2.5% 
1.3% 1.3% 1.0% 0.4% 
INDC World 1.2% 0.3% -0.4% -0.7% 
B2°C World 1.0% -1.0% -3.0% -4.6% 
 OECD 0.9% -0.1% -1.0% -2.3% -3.3% -5.4% 
 Non-OECD (excl. LDCs) 0.0% 5.0% 1.5% -1.2% -3.8% -4.7% 
 LDCs 2.7% 3.1% 3.2% 1.0% -1.8% -4.8% 
Note: EU28 is distributed among OECD and non-OECD regions. LDCs: Least Developed Countries. 
While the Reference scenario maintains large regional differences in emissions per capita 
throughout the entire period, the B2°C scenario assumed to be adopted worldwide leads 
to more convergence across countries (Table 7). World average emissions reach 2.1 
tCO2e per capita in 2050 (median at 2.2 tCO2e per capita), i.e. at around the same level 
as least developed countries in 2015. For instance, emissions per capita in China and 
Southeast Asia would be reduced by a factor of 2.5 over 2015-2050. 
                                           
(46)  Refers to the share of these countries' emissions in the world total in 2015. 
(47)  Countries with income per capita in 2030 lower than 10 k$ PPP. 
(48) The small 1990-2000 emissions increase rate is heavily influenced by the sharp reduction in the countries 
of the Commonwealth of Independent States following the breakup of the Soviet Union. 
 62 
Table 7: GHG emissions per capita 
 
tCO2e/cap 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 
Reference World 
5.9 5.5 6.3 
6.3 6.6 6.8 6.6 
INDC World 6.3 5.9 5.3 4.6 
B2°C World 6.2 5.1 3.5 2.1 
 OECD 13.5 13.6 12.5 10.6 8.1 5.6 3.2 
 Non-OECD (excl. LDCs) 6.0 5.4 8.2 8.9 7.6 5.1 3.1 
 LDCs 1.6 1.7 2.0 2.3 2.2 1.6 0.9 
Note: EU28 is distributed among OECD and non-OECD regions. LDCs: Least Developed Countries. 
A dynamic, cross-regional plot of the emissions intensity of GDP in the B2°C scenario 
shows a global convergence of world regions across time (Figure 61). The emissions 
intensity becomes lower than 200 tCO2e/M$ for all countries in 2050, i.e. at the level of 
some of the best-performing economies of 2015 (Japan, EU). World average GHG 
intensity (excluding LULUCF emissions) would be nearly halved between 2015 and 2030 
(from around 520 to 260 tCO2e/M$), and more than halved again between 2030 and 
2050 to reach around 80 tCO2e/M$. 
Figure 61: GHG emissions intensity of GDP, B2°C scenario 
 
Note: Figures exclude LULUCF emissions; GDP in PPP. Individual countries with ISO3 codes; for 
regions see section on regional definitions. EU28 includes both OECD and non-OECD member 
states. 
The evolution of the GHG emissions intensity with income is visualized in Figure 62, 
showing the decarbonisation path depending on the country and its economic and 
demographic structure.  
OECD countries would primarily reduce their emissions per capita (they move to the 
"left" from INDC to B2°C scenario) while non-OECD countries tend to decrease their 
emissions intensity of GDP (they first move "downwards"). By 2050, the drastic 
reductions in the B2°C scenario would find all countries fitting in a box defined by low 
emissions per capita and emissions intensity (left-down green box in the 2030 B2°C 
graph). 
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Figure 62: GHG emissions intensity vs. GDP per capita for major economies 
 
Note: Bubble size gives total emissions. 1990 y-axis: China: 5.1 tCO2e/k$, Russia: 3.4 tCO2e/k$. 
GDP in $2005 PPP. 
Overall, it can be observed that all countries and regions would have to converge to low 
levels of emissions, of emissions per capita, and of emissions intensity of their economy. 
This would necessarily imply a shift of their energy mix towards low-emission sources; 
across all countries and regions, investments in the energy sector determine the 
transition from the Reference scenario to the INDC scenario and then to the B2°C 
scenario. However, there is no uniform pattern: countries would follow very diverse 
pathways towards that goal with their own set of policies and national circumstances, 
relying on different mitigation options and experiencing different paces of emissions 
reductions. 
4.6 GHG emissions mitigation options 
By comparing the Reference, INDC and B2°C scenarios, it is possible to identify the 
contribution of individual efficiency and technological options by sector to the total 
reduction in emissions over time. The following section provides an overview of these 
contributions by 2030 and 2050. 
By 2030 the worldwide reduction in emissions achieved in the B2°C scenario is 16.2 
GtCO2e compared to the Reference scenario; announced INDC policies would achieve 
40% of this by 2030 (Figure 63, Table 8).  
With more ambitious emissions reductions taking place after 2030, these figures are 
different when comparing the mitigation effort over the entire period of 2015-2050: the 
B2°C scenario is 49 GtCO2e lower than the Reference scenario in 2050; while the INDC 
scenario represents 44% of the cumulative mitigation effort required to reach the B2°C 
trajectory. 
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4.6.1 GHG emissions reductions by sector of activity 
The power sector and LULUCF would be able to carry out 28% and 23% of the cumulated 
mitigation effort achieved in the B2°C scenario by 2030, respectively. The remaining 
contributions would come from the other energy sector ( 49) (18%), agriculture and 
industry (10% each), residential & services (5%), waste (4%) and transport (2%).  
Other energy supply proves particularly flexible, with reductions quickly taking place in 
fugitive CH4 emissions in coal, oil and gas production and gas transport when the climate 
policies are put in place. The industry sector also includes reductions from HFCs, which 
are subject to the Kigali Agreement of the Montreal Protocol (a policy implemented in 
both the INDC and B2°C scenarios (50)). 
Figure 63: Sectoral emissions mitigation from the Reference to the B2°C scenarios, World 
 
Beyond 2030, the power sector would largely contribute to the mitigation effort as well 
(39% of the cumulated effort, see Table 8), but the role of LULUCF would be reduced 
(15%). The other sectors of the economy will also have to do their share: industry (13%; 
a third of which is due to HFC-related policies), the "other energy" sector49 (12%), 
agriculture (8%), residential & services (6%), transport (5%) and waste (4%). 
INDC policies would initiate reductions in most sectors, except in transport which appears 
more difficult to decarbonise due to the growing needs for mobility and its low elasticity 
to energy price and carbon value. 
                                           
(49) The "other energy" sector includes the fuel extraction industry, fuel transport and fuel refining activities. 
(50) F-gas policy is implemented in the Reference for the EU (as it is an adopted policy). 
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Table 8: Sectoral emissions mitigation from the Reference to B2°C scenarios (annual and 
cumulated) and share (of cumulated) achieved in the INDC scenario 
GtCO2e 2030 2050 
  Ref./B2°C 
mitigation 
in 2030 
% of cum. 
mitigation 
(2015-30) 
of which 
achieved 
in INDC 
Ref./B2°C 
mitigation 
in 2050 
% of cum. 
mitigation 
(2015-50) 
of which 
achieved 
in INDC 
Total 16.2 100% 38% 48.9 100% 47% 
Power 5.2 28% 46% 21.1 39% 46% 
Industry 1.8 10% 46% 6.6 13% 45% 
Transport 0.5 2% 3% 3.1 5% 18% 
Resid. & services 0.9 5% 40% 3.0 6% 40% 
Other energy 2.0 18% 33% 5.2 12% 49% 
Waste (non-CO2) 0.5 4% 40% 1.9 4% 43% 
Agri. (non-CO2) 1.5 10% 39% 3.4 8% 47% 
LULUCF 3.7 23% 32% 4.6 15% 64% 
Regarding the role of technological options to reach the B2°C scenario (Table 9): 
 Renewable energy sources are the largest contributor (18-24% in 2030 and 
2050) thanks to their important role in the power sector (42%) and in residential 
& services (biomass ensuring around a third of total reductions). 
 Energy demand reduction and efficiency gains play undoubtedly a key role in 
all sectors, representing 16-18% of total mitigation both in 2030 and in 2050 
compared to the Reference case, respectively; it is the main option in the 
transport sector (where the additional development of alternative fuel/engines 
beyond what is taking place in the Reference scenario is mostly limited to light 
vehicles).  
 The contribution of fossil fuel switch to less carbon-intensive fuels or carriers like 
gas or electricity varies across sectors and time, in the range 4%-20% (the latter 
applying to transport, with hybrid and full electric vehicles notably). 
 Non-CO2 emissions mitigation across in industry and energy is a relatively low-
hanging fruit by 2030; in the longer term non-CO2 from agriculture is also a 
significant contributor to mitigation. 
 LULUCF is a key sector for emissions reductions prior to 2030 (23%), its 
mitigation potential is more limited beyond (9% of total mitigation in 2050). 
 Given the technology assumptions made for CCS in this report, it does not 
develop much by 2030, while it becomes a key option in the longer run, with 
about a quarter of the emission reductions of the power sector in 2050. Total CCS 
in power generation and in industry is then about equivalent to the total 
reductions from residential & services and the transport sector. 
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Table 9: Emissions mitigation options from the Reference to the B2°C scenarios, World 
2030 Total Power 
Industry 
& Energy 
Resid. & 
Services 
Transport 
Waste & 
Agri. & 
LULUCF 
Total (GtCO2e) 16.2 5.2 3.9 0.9 0.5 5.8 
of which: 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Energy efficiency & reduced 
demand 
16% 15% 27% 43% 87%  
Renewables 18% 42% 11% 33% 4%  
Fuel switch (fossil, elec., H2) 7% 17% 4% 10% 8%  
CCS 2% 0% 8% 
  
 
Nuclear 8% 26% 
   
 
Industrial process CO2 0%  1%    
LULUCF CO2 23%     65% 
Non-CO2 (all sectors) 25% 
 
49% 14% 1% 35% 
2050 Total Power 
Industry 
& Energy 
Resid. & 
Services 
Transport 
Waste & 
Agri. & 
LULUCF 
Total (GtCO2e) 48.9 21.1 11.8 3.0 3.1 9.9 
of which: 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Energy efficiency & reduced 
demand 
18% 3% 38% 46% 79%  
Renewables 24% 42% 16% 37% 0%  
Fuel switch (fossil, elec., H2) 7% 8% 6% 9% 20%  
CCS 13% 26% 9% 
  
 
Nuclear 9% 21% 
   
 
Industrial process CO2 0%  2%    
LULUCF CO2 9%     47% 
Non-CO2 (all sectors) 18% 
 
29% 8% 1% 53% 
Note: "Fuel switch" refers either to shifts from high-carbon content fossil fuels towards lower-
carbon content fossil fuels (generally from coal to gas) or to shifts from fossil fuels to other energy 
carriers (electricity, hydrogen). "Renewables" refers to either all forms of renewables (in power 
generation), to liquid biofuels (in transport) or to solid biomass (in other sectors). "Industry & 
Energy" refers to the manufacturing industry, construction, mining and the energy transformation 
industry excluding the power sector (fuel extraction, refining, transport). 
The mix of mitigation options pursued by each country depends on their local 
circumstances: mitigation potential, cost, renewable resources (Table 10). In OECD 
countries on average, more reductions are achieved in energy efficiency in buildings and 
transport, reflecting these sectors' mitigation potential (more energy needs for space 
heating in the OECD; large car fleet to be renewed). By contrast, in non-OECD countries, 
while the power sector is also the largest contributor, buildings and transport have a 
lower mitigation potential (12% total mitigation in 2050, vs. 20% for OECD regions) and 
agriculture, waste and LULUCF contribute as much as energy and industry (22-24%). 
Most of LULUCF reductions are achieved in non-OECD countries (Sub-Saharan Africa, 
South America). 
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Table 10: Emissions mitigation by option and by sector from the Reference to the B2°C scenarios 
2050 World OECD Non-OECD 
Total (GtCO2e) 48.9 9.4 39.5 
By option: 100% 100% 100%  
Energy efficiency & reduced demand 18% 23% 17% 
Renewables 24% 26% 24% 
Fuel switch (fossil, elec., H2) 7% 8% 6% 
CCS 13% 14% 13% 
Nuclear 9% 10% 9% 
Industrial process CO2 0% 0% 0% 
LULUCF CO2 9% 4% 11% 
Non-CO2 (all sectors) 18% 15% 19% 
By sector: 100% 100% 100%  
Power 43% 46% 43% 
Industry & Energy 24% 23% 24% 
Buildings 6% 8% 6% 
Transport 6% 12% 5% 
Waste & Agri. & LULUCF 20% 11% 22% 
4.6.2 GHG emissions reductions in the power sector 
The power sector is crucial to achieve substantial GHG mitigation (see section 4.6.1 
above for an overall view of mitigation options): 
 it offers a very wide technological options portfolio and can accommodate at 
affordable cost decarbonisation for traditional technologies; 
 in particular, it can integrate many renewable energy technologies. 
All regions are expected to diversify their power mix towards low-emission sources as a 
growing diversity of renewable energy sources gets exploited, according to each region's 
domestic potential and market conditions.  
By 2030, the power sector alone would account for about a third of the mitigation 
entailed by the INDC policies, and also around a third of the reduction needed towards 
the B2°C scenario (Table 8). 
Mitigation options within the power sector are presented in Figure 64 and Table 11. 
Figure 64: Contribution of mitigation options in the power sector from the Reference to the B2°C 
scenario, World 
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Note: "Other Ren." consists in hydro, geothermal and ocean power. 
Whilst renewables undergo a significant expansion in the Reference scenario, they 
expand even further in the INDC and B2°C scenarios. With INDC policies, renewables 
contribute to nearly half (46%) of the cumulative reductions from the power sector by 
2050, followed by nuclear (25%) and switch from coal and oil to gas (13%), well ahead 
of CCS (11%, and taking place beyond 2030 only). Further decarbonisation towards the 
B2°C scenario is particularly achieved by more renewables (especially biomass) and CCS. 
Energy efficiency, triggered by ambitious climate policies, leads to a slightly lower 
electricity demand compared to the Reference case thanks to a further electrification of 
demand. 
Table 11: Mitigation options in the power sector from the Reference to B2°C scenarios (annual and 
cumulated) and share (of cumulated) achieved in the INDC scenario 
GtCO2e 2030 2050 
  Ref./B2°C 
mitigation 
in 2030 
% of cum. 
mitigation 
(2015-30) 
of which 
achieved in 
INDC 
Ref./B2°C 
mitigation 
in 2050 
% of cum. 
mitigation 
(2015-50) 
of which 
achieved in 
INDC 
Total 5.2 100% 47% 21.1 100% 48% 
Prod. change 0.8 15% 41% 0.7 3% 68% 
CCS 0.0 0% 0% 5.4 26% 20% 
Fossil fuel switch 0.9 17% 49% 1.8 8% 72% 
Nuclear 1.4 26% 47% 4.4 21% 58% 
Biomass 0.3 6% 41% 3.4 16% 35% 
Wind 1.1 22% 51% 2.5 12% 76% 
Solar 0.4 7% 51% 2.2 10% 55% 
Other Ren. 0.4 7% 42% 0.8 4% 45% 
Non-CO2 0.0 0% 37% 0.0 0% 93% 
Note: "Other Ren." consists in hydro, geothermal and ocean power. 
4.6.3 GHG emissions reductions by gas 
The technology options considered determine the relative shares of the different GHGs 
within each emission reduction scenario. 
Implementing the INDC policies in a cost-effective manner across all greenhouse gases, 
by applying the carbon value on a single comparable metrics (CO2-equivalent) (
51), would 
result in different emissions reductions profiles across gases (Figure 65). While total 
emissions in the INDC scenario would roughly reach the same level by 2050 as in 2010, 
CO2 from combustion and N2O from agriculture would still be above 2010 levels, while 
CH4 and N2O from energy and industry would be below (-20%); global LULUCF would 
switch from being a net CO2 emitter today to behaving as a net CO2 sink from 2030. 
The B2°C scenario consistently requires emissions reductions in all sectors and sources, 
including international aviation and shipping, and very significant reductions in the levels 
of CO2 emissions. The contributions to total reductions from the various gases would 
develop according to different dynamic profiles over time: the reductions of CO2 
emissions from energy and industry take place progressively (about the same level as 
2010 in 2030 to 56% below in 2050); non-CO2 gases in energy and industry tend to 
react faster while emissions in agriculture have less mitigation potential (especially N2O). 
The behaviour of fluorinated gases emissions is noticeable: without additional climate 
policies, in the Reference scenario they would exhibit a substantial growth in industrial 
                                           
(51) Using the 100 years global warming potential from the IPCC Second Assessment Report (IPCC 1996). 
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sectors. The Kigali amendment of the Montreal Protocol on HFC emissions is assumed to 
be implemented in the INDC and B2°C scenarios (52); this results in a stabilization of F-
gases as a whole by 2030 and then a significant drop (-79% in INDC compared to 
+120% in Reference in 2050, versus 2010). 
CO2 emissions from LULUCF would also significantly drop, from a net emissions source in 
recent years (about 1 GtCO2 in 2010), to a net sink beginning from 2030 in the INDC 
scenario (early 2020s in the B2°C scenario), stabilizing at about -3 GtCO2. 
Figure 65: Evolution of GHG emissions by gas compared to 2010 
 
Note: F-gases in Reference in 2050 at +120%. Total includes CO2 LULUCF; CO2 LULUCF are not 
displayed separately. 
                                           
(52) As well as in the EU in the Reference scenario. 
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5 Air pollutants emissions and concentrations 
Most emissions of major air pollutants are driven by human activity and actually 
originate, to a large extent, from the same source as GHG emissions: energy fuel 
combustion. Actual emissions depend on the type of activity, the fuel type and the 
technology used, which can evolve with air quality policies and standards. 
Pollutant emissions are commonly mitigated by targeted air quality control policies (so-
called end-of-pipe or technical measures) but also result of changes in the energy 
system. By reducing energy fuel consumption, energy and climate policies can bring 
about significant co-benefits on the emissions of pollutants. 
In this section the potential co-benefits of the air quality and climate protecting policies 
are analysed at a global level. 
5.1 Air pollutants emissions 
5.1.1 Air pollution control policies and climate protecting policies 
The ancillary co-benefit of climate policies on air quality depends on the levels of air 
pollution or the stringency of controls already in place. They can be significant and bring 
about pollutant emissions reductions that would be comparable to end-of-pipe measures 
in the absence of climate policies. Importantly, benefits on air quality follow 
instantaneously upon mitigation (53) and are mostly felt in the regions close to where 
measures are being implemented (depending on the pollutant species, the pollutant 
source and health exposure pathway). 
As an additional interaction with climate policies, certain air pollutants have an effect on 
the temperature; the combined effect of greenhouse gases and air pollutants on 
temperature change is presented in section 4.1, using the "PROG" pollutants emissions 
profiles (see below the definition of the air pollution cases investigated). 
Emissions coverage 
Some pollutants emissions come from fires that may, at least to a large extent, be of 
anthropogenic origin (agricultural waste burning, forest fires, peat fires) and natural 
sources (dust, sea salt, volcanoes). 
Table 12 shows the contribution of fires and fossil fuels; their contribution can be 
significant depending on the pollutant.  
Table 12: Global pollutants emissions in 2010 and contributions from fires and fossil fuels (Mt) 
 
Total 
of which 
fires 
% fires  
Total excl. 
fires 
of which 
fossil fuels 
% fossil 
fuels 
SO2 94 3 3%  92 74 81% 
NOx 132 16 12%  116 102 88% 
PM2.5 98 57 58%  41 20 50% 
CO 993 453 46%  541 195 36% 
VOC 140 28 20%  113 40 36% 
NH3 61 7 11%  54 1 2% 
Note: non-fire natural sources (dust, sea salt, volcanoes) are not included. 
In the rest of this section, pollutants emissions from fires and natural sources are not 
considered as they are not influenced by the mitigation options considered; their effect is 
taken into account in section 6. 
                                           
(53) Health benefits from changes in air quality accrue several years after mitigation (see Section 6.3). 
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Definition of the air pollution cases investigated 
Over time, an increasing number of countries around the world are expected to adopt 
more stringent air quality standards; for example, China is implementing transport 
emission standards (54) equivalent to Euro 6/VI currently in place in Europe (55). Thus, 
emissions of pollutants are expected to grow less than their underlying fuel use or 
economic activity levels, and might even decrease. Pollutant emissions are also affected 
by adopted or planned climate policies that target GHG emissions and type of fossil fuel 
use. 
The air quality policies and pollution control cases are characterized in GECO2017 by 
different evolution of the emission intensity factors (the ratio between the emission levels 
and the relevant emission driver). The cases are: 
- FROZ: The frozen case with high pollution levels. It keeps the last available 
observed emission intensity factors constant over time ("frozen" policies and 
technological diffusion at 2010 values). 
- PROG: a progressive "middle-of-the-road" trajectory of emission intensity factors, 
between FROZ and the maximum technically feasible reduction case (MTFR). In 
particular, certain specific policies for the medium term were included: the China 
objectives for 2020 (56) and the EU objectives for 2030 (57). The methodology by 
country group for this case is represented in Table 13. 
- MTFR: The maximum technically feasible reductions are achieved through the full 
use of the best available technologies in a future year (58). This pollution control 
case has been used to calibrate the PROG case. 
Each of these sets of air quality assumptions (which act on air pollutants emissions) can 
be combined with climate policies (which act on the energy system and greenhouse gas 
emissions) to obtain complete scenarios. 
                                           
(54) China started to introduce the China 6/VI standards in 2017 and with full implementation on new cars in 
2020. 
(55) Europe applies the Euro 6 for light vehicles (since 2016) and Euro VI for heavy vehicles (since 2015), see: 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/air/transport/road.htm  
(56)  China 13th Five-Year Plan 
(57) EU Clean Air Package (Directive 2016/2284/EU), see: 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/air/pollutants/ceilings.htm 
(58) The evolution of emission intensity factors by country group and across time is similar to the method in 
Rao et al. (2016). 
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Table 13: Evolution of pollutant emission intensity factors 
Scenario 
Region income 
group 
2030 2050 
FROZ All 2010 emission factor 2010 emission factor 
PROG High Current legislation 75% of 2030 best 
feasible emission 
factor 
 Medium + Current legislation 75% of 2030 best 
feasible emission 
factor 
 Medium - Current legislation Convergence to 
group's best emission 
factor 
 Low Current legislation Convergence to 
group's best emission 
factor 
Note: Current legislation refers to policies adopted in 2015, except EU: 2016 (EU: Directive 
2016/2284/EU, China: China 13th Five-Year Plan; Rest of world: see IIASA (2017). Income groups 
defined following World Bank methodology for 2015 per capita income (59): low (<1 k$/cap); 
medium- (1-4 k$/cap); medium+ (4-12 k$/cap); high (>12 k$/cap). 
For instance, Figure 66 illustrates the potential of co-benefits with different combinations 
of air quality and climate control policies as defined in Table 13, in this case for SO2 
emissions, for which the co-benefits are most notable. The pollutant emissions profile 
with climate action and no targeted effort on air quality (B2°C-FROZ) is similar to that of 
no climate action combined with air quality policies (Reference-PROG) from 2030 
onwards. The lowest SO2 levels are reached when climate action and air quality policies 
are combined (B2°C-PROG). 
Figure 66: World SO2 emissions under different policy assumptions 
 
Table 14 presents the contribution of climate policies to air quality for all pollutants 
considered, comparing the level of pollutant emissions under different air quality control 
policies and climate policies combinations. 
                                           
(59) https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519  
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Table 14: Contribution of climate policies to air pollutants emissions, World (Mt) 
a) 2030 
 
2015 Ref.-FROZ B2°C-FROZ B2°C-PROG 
% achieved 
by climate 
policies 
SO2 85 100 76 58 59% 
NOx 118 149 127 94 39% 
PM2.5 46 53 47 44 62% 
VOC 117 155 150 133 24% 
CO 566 634 599 497 26% 
NH3 * 58 68 55 55 100% 
b) 2050 
 
2015 Ref.-FROZ B2°C-FROZ B2°C-PROG 
% achieved 
by climate 
policies 
SO2 85 114 46 24 76% 
NOx 117 172 104 59 60% 
PM2.5 43 53 42 24 38% 
VOC 117 200 177 121 30% 
CO 560 633 493 278 39% 
NH3 58 78 45 36 77% 
Note: Fires and other natural sources are not included. "Ref." and "B2°C" refer to climate policies; 
"FROZ" and "PROG" refer to air pollution control policies. "% achieved by climate policies" refer to 
the distance from Ref.-FROZ to B2°C-FROZ compared to the distance from Ref.-FROZ to B2°C-
PROG. 
*: No pollution control effort by 2030 for NH3 in the PROG cases. 
In the remainder of this section, the projected air pollutant emissions are calculated 
under different climate policies assuming a "progressive" air quality control policy context 
(PROG). Temperature change projections (section 4.1) used the same assumptions. 
The economic assessment in the following chapter (sections 6.3, 6.4 and 0) use a 
"frozen" air quality control policy context (FROZ), thus focusing on the co-benefits of 
climate policies on air quality and not on air quality policies' costs. 
Emission trends 
In the context of INDC climate policies complemented by a moderate diffusion of air 
quality policies, sulphur dioxide (SO2) emissions are expected to decrease significantly, 
nitrogen oxides (NOx), particulate matter (PM2.5) and carbon monoxide (CO) are expected 
to decrease more moderately, while ammonia (NH3) emissions would continue growing 
moderately until 2030 and then decrease and volatile organic compound (VOC) emissions 
would grow until 2030 and then stabilize (Figure 67). 
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Figure 67: Evolution of pollutants emissions, World, INDC scenario (PROG air quality) 
 
Note: Excludes emissions from fires and natural PM. 
The sectoral decompositions of the pollutant emissions as well as the co-benefits of the 
climate policies (see section 4) are explored below. 
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5.1.2 SO2 emissions 
In OECD countries, SO2 emissions, one of the main causes of acid rain, have been the 
subject of strict policies since the 1970s and 1980s; as a consequence, emissions have 
decreased significantly since the 1990s. In non-OECD countries, strong economic growth 
has led to a sharp rise in SO2 emissions which has resulted in the development of air 
quality policies in many countries over the past decade. Strong air quality control policies 
in Asia have succeeded in decreasing emissions. In China, SO2 emissions in 2015 were 
28% lower than in the peak year of 2006 (60). This drop is expected to continue as more 
stringent air quality policies are implemented and flue gas desulfurization is applied to 
more and more existing and future coal- and oil-fired power plants, which are the main 
emission sources, in China and elsewhere (61). 
In this context, global SO2 emissions in the INDC scenario are expected to drop by about 
20% and 60% compared to 2010 by 2030 and 2050, respectively (Figure 68). 
Figure 68: Volumes and sources of SO2 emissions of progressive air quality policies (PROG), 
World, for three climate scenarios (left), and contributions to reductions compared to the Reference 
scenario in 2050 (right) 
 
Note: Other includes solvents, agriculture, waste. Fires are not included. 
The co-benefits of climate policies compatible with remaining below a 2°C temperature 
rise on SO2 emissions are large: SO2 emissions halve in 2050 compared to Reference 
climate policies, essentially thanks to decreased coal use in power generation, industry 
and households. SO2 emissions related to an increased use of biomass are relatively 
small and easily offset by other SO2 reductions (2 Mt additional for a net total decrease of 
25 Mt from the Reference scenario to the B2°C scenario). 
  
                                           
(60) Sources: reports on the State of the Environment in China (MEP 2015) and China Statistical Yearbooks 
(NBSC 2016). 
(61) The removed SO2 can then be used in the sulphuric acid production industry, e.g. as an input in fertilizer 
and other chemicals production. 
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5.1.3 NOx emissions 
NOx emissions have been subject to numerous regulations due to their direct health 
effects (particularly with road traffic exposure in dense urban centres), its role in ground-
level ozone chemistry, as well as cause of acid rain. The spread of catalytic converters to 
treat road vehicles exhaust gases since the 1980s, notably, has helped reduce these 
emissions. Nevertheless, half of current NOx emissions still come from oil combustion in 
road transport vehicles and international marine bunkers. 
The introduction of stricter vehicle emissions regulations (all scenarios) should result in a 
decrease of total NOx emissions worldwide compared to its maximum level of the years 
around 2010, despite increasing mobility needs particularly in emerging economies. With 
the announced INDC climate policies, global NOx emissions would drop by an additional 
10% and 30% compared to 2010 by 2030 and 2050, respectively (Figure 69). 
Figure 69: Volumes and sources of NOx emissions of progressive air quality policies (PROG), 
World, for three climate scenarios (left), and contributions to reductions compared to the Reference 
scenario in 2050 (right) 
 
Note: Other includes solvents, agriculture, waste. Fires are not included. 
NOx emissions would decrease significantly with ambitious climate policies, due to a 
further decrease of coal use (power plants) and of oil use especially in road transport 
(internal combustion engine efficiency, electric vehicles) and maritime (see section 
3.1.2.3). A shift towards large-scale biomass power generation in the B2°C scenario 
would result in a relatively small additional amount of NOx emissions from biomass, 
similar to what would happen with SO2 emissions. NOx emissions could decrease up to 
50% compared to the 2010 level by 2050 with policies aiming at staying below a 2°C 
temperature increase alone. 
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5.1.4 PM2.5 emissions 
Fine particulate matter (PM) emissions have significant health impacts; as such, they are 
the subject of increasingly stringent air quality control policies, for example with fuel 
quality standards for road transport fuels. Certain PMs also have a climate impact (black 
carbon), even though they are short-lived species. This study focuses on PM2.5, for which 
the long-term health and mortality effects are more significant (62). 
With certain PM2.5 emissions excluded (such as natural sources and fires), combustion of 
energy fuels (in particular biomass use in households, oil use in road transport and coal 
use in power generation and industry) as well as industrial processes are then the most 
important sources for PM emissions. 
Given the fuel substitutions taking place in the energy sector with the implementation of 
INDC climate policies along with the adoption of pollution control technologies and the 
progressive phasing out of heavily polluting traditional biomass use in households, the 
emissions of PM2.5 would increase at a slow rate until 2030 (slightly higher than the 2010 
level) and decrease thereafter, to about 30% lower than the 2010 level in 2050 (Figure 
70). 
Figure 70: Volumes and sources of PM2.5 emissions of progressive air quality policies (PROG), 
World, for three climate scenarios (left), and contributions to reductions compared to the Reference 
scenario in 2050 (right) 
 
Note: Other includes solvents, waste, industrial processes. Fires are not included.  
Changes in the energy mix induced by more ambitious climate policies bring about large 
co-benefits on PM2.5 emissions reduction, with lower coal, gas and oil consumption. 
Regarding biomass, its consumption would increase in particular as a power sector input 
(where PM pollution control technologies are more easily implemented). At the same 
time, however, biomass use in households would decrease globally (due to the combined 
effect of reduced use of traditional biomass and increased thermal efficiency), even 
though it could increase locally. As a consequence of this trade-off, global PM2.5 
emissions from biomass use do not increase in the B2°C scenario. Across all fuels, 
staying below 2°C would entail a peaking of PM2.5 emissions in 2020 and decrease 
thereafter to -40% in 2050 vs. 2010. 
  
                                           
(62) For instance, the World Health Organization estimates the impacts on mortality up to 20 times higher for 
PM2.5 as compared to PM10 (WHO, 2013). 
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5.1.5 CO emissions 
Carbon monoxide (CO) is a short-lived chemical that can be a health hazard in indoor 
pollution and plays a role in road traffic pollution in urban areas. Emissions from fires 
excluded, combustion of biomass (households) and oil (road transport) as well as 
industrial processes are the most important CO emissions sources. 
CO emissions would plateau and then decrease from current levels, given fuel 
substitutions in the energy mix induced by the INDC policies, the phase-out of heavily 
polluting traditional biomass in households and the deployment of pollution control 
technologies. By 2050, they would be 40% lower than the 2010 level (Figure 71). 
Figure 71: Volumes and sources of CO emissions of progressive air quality policies (PROG), World, 
for three climate scenarios (left), and contributions to reductions compared to the Reference 
scenario in 2050  (right) 
 
Note: Other includes coal, gas, solvents, agriculture, waste. Fires are not included. Coal makes up 
most of the "other" reductions. 
Ambitious climate policies reduce further CO emissions. Total CO emissions from biomass 
decrease overall as a result of the phase-out of traditional biomass use in households and 
despite biomass being used more associated to technologies with more controlled 
combustion (in the power sector, in industry and in households). Engaging in policies 
compatible with staying below 2°C would lead CO emissions to reduce by 50% between 
2010 and 2050. 
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5.1.6 VOC emissions 
Certain species of VOCs (Volatile Organic Compounds) have significant health impacts 
and are strongly regulated (indoor exposure via paints, cleaning products and other 
chemicals). The future evolution of VOC emissions is strongly linked to industrial 
processes and solvents production, as VOC emissions from oil and biomass would 
decrease over time in all scenarios. Emissions from solvents are assumed this analysis to 
be driven in by the evolution of chemical industry value added, and would come to 
represent half of VOC emissions by 2050, compared to about a 20% today. 
As a consequence, total VOC emissions would continue growing at a slow rate, reaching a 
peak in 2030. 2050 emissions would be between 10% and 20% higher than 2010 
emissions, depending on climate policies (Figure 72). 
Figure 72: Volumes and sources of VOC emissions of progressive air quality policies (PROG), 
World, for three climate scenarios (left), and contributions to reductions compared to the Reference 
scenario in 2050  (right) 
 
Note: Other includes coal, gas, agriculture, waste, industrial processes. Fires are not included. 
Industrial processes make up most of the "other" reductions. 
Climate policies would have a certain impact due to the decrease of oil use, but the bulk 
of VOC emissions (not related to energy use) would remain. 
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5.1.7 NH3 emissions 
NH3 emissions are responsible for water eutrophication and soil acidification. They 
originate almost entirely from the agriculture sector (from animal waste treatment and 
from the use of nitrogen-based fertilizers) but with some contribution also from road 
transport (as a result of steam reforming and/or reaction with NOx at the vehicles' 
catalysts, especially in gasoline). Their evolution is thus mainly driven by food production 
and climate mitigation measures in the agriculture sector. 
In an INDC context NH3 emissions would peak in 2030, with an increase by 10% above 
2010 levels, before decreasing in 2050, to about 10% below 2010 emissions (Figure 73). 
Agriculture emissions would still constitute the bulk (about 80%) of NH3 emissions 
throughout the time period of the projections. 
Figure 73: Volumes and sources of NH3 emissions of progressive air quality policies (PROG), 
World, for three climate scenarios (left), and contributions to reductions compared to the Reference 
scenario in 2050 
 
Note: Other includes coal, gas, oil, biomass, solvents, industrial processes. Fires are not included. 
Coal and oil make up most of the "other" reductions. Waste refers to solid waste and wastewater; 
animal waste management and agricultural waste burning are accounted for in agriculture. 
With changes in the agriculture sector triggered by ambitious climate policies ( 63 ) 
compatible with staying below 2°C, NH3 emissions would be further reduced, peaking as 
early as in 2020 and reaching a level in 2050 that would be about 30% below the 2010 
level. 
  
                                           
(63) Derived from the GLOBIOM model; see footnote 40 and IIASA (2016) and Havlík P. et al. (2014). 
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5.2 Air pollutant concentrations 
The emissions of air pollutants described in the previous section are transported with 
atmospheric convection and dispersion and are involved in chemical reactions in the 
atmosphere, resulting in atmospheric concentrations of particulate matter and ozone. 
The Reference concentrations (64) are shown in Figure 74. 
Figure 74: Concentrations of PM2.5 (left) and ozone (right) in the Reference climate policy and 
frozen air pollution controls policy 
 
Primary PM2.5 includes emissions of black carbon and organic matter, but also natural 
sources such as sea salt and dust contribute to particulate matter concentrations. 
Emissions from these natural sources are kept fixed across scenarios to restrict 
improvement in air quality to climate policies. In addition, secondary particulate matter 
forms via chemical reactions of SO2, NOx, NH3, and VOCs, the so-called precursor gases. 
The composition of particulate matter can differ across time and space, and so can the 
toxicity and corresponding health impacts. In this report, we assume the same toxicity 
across all components of PM, and constant toxicity over time and space. 
Tropospheric or ground-level ozone forms when VOC, CO, NOx, react in the presence of 
sunlight. Ground-level ozone forms through photochemical reactions and should not be 
confused with stratospheric ozone, commonly known as the ozone layer absorbing 
ultraviolet (UV) radiation from the sun. 
Mapping the air pollutant emissions to concentrations of particulate matter with diameter 
smaller than 2.5 μm (PM2.5) and ozone was done taking into account transportation and 
chemical reactions in the atmosphere (65). The resulting reductions in concentration of 
PM2.5 and ozone due to climate policies are shown in Figure 75 for both the INDC 
scenario and the B2°C scenario. 
                                           
(64) under "FROZ" air pollution controls. 
(65) done by using the TM5-FASST model, which is described in more detail in Annex 3. 
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Figure 75: Reductions in PM2.5 (left) and ozone (right) concentrations compared to Reference 
(under Frozen air quality policy) in key regions as a consequence of climate policies 
a) as a consequence of INDC climate policies 
 
b) as a consequence of B2°C climate policies 
 
INDC policies result in only a moderate reduction of PM2.5 and ozone concentrations 
across world countries and only after 2020 (most notably a 8% reduction in PM2.5 
concentrations in China in 2030, among others driven by the effect of climate policies on 
coal use). The small changes in India are due to the lack of ambitious climate action in 
the INDC scenario. 
Co-benefits are larger with ambitious climate policies (B2°C), with a near-three-fold 
higher effect in concentration reductions in many countries by 2030 and increasing 
further beyond. In this case, PM2.5 concentrations nearly halve and ozone concentrations 
decrease by nearly a quarter in India and China in 2050 compared to a Reference with no 
new climate, energy or air pollution policies. In high-income regions such as the EU and 
the USA, the B2°C climate action brings annual average concentrations of PM2.5 in line 
with the WHO (2005) guideline of 10 μgm-3 in 2050. 
The improvements in air quality are mapped in Figure 76. 
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Figure 76: Global improvement in air quality due to climate change policies in the INDC scenario 
in 2030 (A,B) and B2°C in 2050 (C,D), for PM2.5 (μgm
-3) and ozone (ppbV) 
 
 
These improvements in air quality can have substantial benefits for human health, which 
are assessed in the section 6.3. 
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6 Economic assessment and climate – air quality policies 
synergies 
This section looks into the economic aspects of climate change mitigation and air quality 
co-benefits. The first section quantifies the investments related to the transition in the 
energy system. Next, the macroeconomic costs of climate change mitigation policies are 
discussed. Section 6.3 addresses the benefits of reduced air pollution in terms of avoided 
premature deaths, reduced illness and agricultural productivity, while Section 6.4 
presents the corresponding macroeconomic view. A direct comparison of climate change 
mitigation costs with air quality co-benefits is presented in Section 0. Finally, an 
important complementary line of research on the impacts of changing climatic conditions 
is discussed. 
6.1 Energy system costs 
6.1.1 Investment in energy supply 
The total investments ( 66 ) required in the energy sector for supply and energy 
transformation (fossil fuel production, power, hydrogen, biofuels) would reach 30 trillion 
dollars (tn$) over 2010-2030 (1.5 tn$/year on average) and 43 tn$ over 2030-2050 (2.2 
tn$/year on average) (INDC scenario), compare 
d to 19 tn$ invested over 1990-2010 (0.9 tn$/year on average), see Figure 77. Energy 
supply and transformation investments would still represent about 7% of total 
investment levels of the economy throughout the projection period (that share was about 
7-8% over 1990-2015) (67). 
Figure 77: Average annual world investment in energy supply and transformation 
 
The expected investment needs in the energy sector are increasing over time to sustain 
growing energy needs, most notably in non-OECD regions, as well as a shift towards 
capital-intensive production means in the power sector and more expensive fossil fuel 
production. 
Figure 78 shows the distribution of these investments by supply and transformation 
sector. Over the 2010-2030 period total investment costs are similar across scenarios, 
with slightly higher totals as more stringent climate policies are applied (30-31 tn$ 
depending on the scenario). With stronger climate policies, the share of the power sector 
in total energy investments increases (and that in fossil fuels decreases): this reflects the 
transition towards a low-carbon energy system, with a stronger electrification of the final 
energy mix and a more capital-intensive power production cost structure.  
                                           
(66)  Investment volumes in this report are given in real USD of 2015, non-levelized. 
(67) Historical figures are gross capital formation from World Bank (2017); projections used the GEM-E3 model 
(see Annex 2). 
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Beyond 2030 there is greater difference between scenarios, driven by a reduced energy 
demand that lowers the needs in supply and transformation when ambitious climate 
policies are in place. Investments range 40-44 tn$ over the 2030-2050 period, i.e. an 
11% difference between Reference and B2°C scenarios. The shift away from fossil fuels 
to the power sector accelerates after 2030.  
Figure 78: World investment in energy supply and transformation, shares 
 
Note: BTL: biomass-to-liquids, H2: hydrogen, CTL: coal-to-liquids, GTL: gas-to-liquids. 
These investments refer to the energy supply and transformation sectors. They do not, 
however, represent the total investments in the energy sector since they do not include 
investments in transmission infrastructures nor in the energy demand sector to improve 
the efficiency of consuming equipment (in transport, industry and buildings) and to 
improve insulation in buildings. In particular, additional investments in more energy 
efficient building envelopes over 2015-2050 could reach 19 tn$ globally in the scenarios 
with climate policies, rising in importance over time and amounting to around half the 
total investment needs in the power sector or around a third of the total investment 
needs in energy supply and transformation by 2050 (68). 
Investment in the power sector 
Global investments in new power capacities are projected to rise in all scenarios, as the 
global electrification trend is expected to occur in all three scenarios (Figure 79). 
Investments during the 2010-2020 decade are already expected to be 50% higher than 
those made in 2000-2010. Climate policies favour technologies with higher capital costs 
and lower operating (fuel) costs; as a result, investments are higher in the INDC and 
B2°C scenarios. Cumulated total investments over 2015-2050 are 10% and 25% higher 
than in the Reference scenario, respectively. Over the 2015-2030 period, investments 
are expected to range from 8.6 to 10.5 tn$. As a result, investments in power production 
are a larger share of total investments in energy supply with stronger climate policies. 
                                           
(68) These figures are comparable to IEA figures for investments over 2015-2040 in buildings (10 tn$) 
compared to power generation (15 tn$, excluding T&D) (IEA, 2015). Note that the situation in the EU 
would be different, as the EU exhibits higher demand-side investments due to higher building insulation 
needs because of its colder climate, as well as less power sector investment needs due to a more 
moderately increasing power demand (EC, 2016). 
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Figure 79: World investments in power generation capacities 
 
In all scenarios, the deployment of renewables increases over time, and this trend would 
be further enhanced in the framework of ambitious GHG mitigation policies: most 
investments go to solar and wind, followed by nuclear and CCS technologies (coupled 
with coal, gas or biomass), as shown in Figure 80.  
On the other hand, while coal would attract for some time the largest investments 
without climate policies (followed by wind and solar), it would almost disappear from the 
investment landscape in the B2°C scenario, despite the deployment of CCS.  
Figure 80: World investments in power generation capacities per technology 
 
6.1.2 Energy trade costs 
World energy trade would intensify in the future in all scenarios, with regional differences 
in the structure of exporters and importers over time and across scenarios (Figure 81). 
Changes in energy demand and energy efficiency with ambitious climate policies would 
limit this growth: the value of total international energy trade in the 2040-50 decade 
compared to the 2010-20 decade could be multiplied by a factor of as much 3.5 in the 
Reference scenario, and only grow by 20% in the B2°C scenario. Lowering the domestic 
consumption in relative terms and relying more on local renewable energy resources 
would contribute to mitigate the external energy bill and improve indicators on security 
of supply. 
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Figure 81: Total net energy trade as a percentage of GDP, Reference and B2°C scenarios (69) 
 
Note: Includes trade of oil, gas, coal and solid and liquid biomass. 
Energy trade entails a financial burden to energy importing countries that amounts to a 
significant percentage of those countries' economies. Importing countries would 
experience different trends in their energy import bill as the result of their own domestic 
demand and international prices. Ambitious climate policies significantly contribute in 
limiting energy import expenditure. The EU's import bill would remain over the period on 
average at about 2% of the region's GDP, as observed since 1990 (70), or progress 
towards zero in the B2°C scenario. In the Reference scenario, the USA would move 
towards becoming a net energy exporter (mostly due to gas and coal exports). China 
would experience a strong growth in energy import expenditure by 2030, in volume and 
as a share of its GDP, but it would be able to reverse that trend over the long term with 
ambitious climate policies. 
6.2 Greenhouse gas mitigation and macro-economic growth  
This section presents an estimate of the macroeconomic cost of the climate change 
mitigation policies in line with Section 4 with the JRC-GEM-E3 model. Here, climate 
policies are implemented via a stylized cap-and-trade system, with emission permits 
grandfathered in all sectors (71). Government budget deficits relative to GDP are kept at 
the levels of the Reference through lump sum transfers to households. 
The policies in the INDC scenario are consistent with robust economic growth, and only 
marginally affect annual GDP growth rates for several regions between 2020-2030 (Table 
15). On a global level, GDP growth remains roughly stable compared to the Reference 
levels with annual growth rates at approximately 2.75% in the INDC scenario for the 
2020-2030 period. 
The results for the B2°C scenario indicate that more ambitious GHG emission reductions 
typically require stronger economic efforts to transition to a low-carbon system. 
Importantly, lower-income countries such as India and China continue to experience 
sustained economic growth comparable to Reference projections, even in the B2°C 
scenario. 
  
                                           
(69)  Trade volumes are in real USD of 2015; shares of GDP were calculated with volumes using GDP MER. 
(70) The cost of energy imports, and most notable of oil imports, depend on the oil price and can fluctuate 
significantly in the short term: for instance while oil imports represented close to 1.5% of EU GDP over 
1990-2015 on average, it ranged from 0.5% in 1998 to 2.8% in 2011. 
(71) Except the European power sector where the permits are auctioned, following the legislation in place. 
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Table 15: Annual GDP growth rates (%) under different climate policy scenarios 
  2020-2030 
  Reference INDC B2°C 
World 2.77 2.75 2.73 
World (PPP) 3.54 3.52 3.49 
EU28 1.36 1.36 1.35 
USA 1.94 1.92 1.92 
CHN 4.96 4.91 4.86 
IND 6.60 6.60 6.55 
RUS 2.05 2.05 1.90 
BRA 2.66 2.66 2.63 
CAN 1.99 1.99 1.98 
JPN 0.91 0.91 0.89 
AUS 2.63 2.63 2.62 
NAM 3.97 3.96 3.87 
UBM 3.33 3.34 2.38 
RET 2.65 2.65 2.62 
ROW 4.18 4.16 4.11 
Note: Growth rate of GDP expressed in MER ($2005) unless indicated otherwise. NAM: North Africa 
and Middle East; UBM: Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova; RET: Rest of Europe (EFTA, Balkans, 
Turkey); ROW: Rest of the world. See Table 20 in Annex 2 for the definition of acronyms. The GDP 
growth rates of the Reference are based on exogenous projections as explained in Section 2.1. 
Interpreting the costs of mitigation 
Importantly, the results presented here do not include the (avoided) impacts of changing 
climate conditions such as sea level rise or heat-related mortality (see section 6.6) or 
associated co-benefits (see section 6.3 for an analysis of co-benefits on avoided air 
pollution), but rather focus on the cost side of greenhouse gas abatement alone. The 
approach adopted here uses the Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model JRC-GEM-
E3 (see Annex 2), an economy-wide sectoral model with global coverage. This type of 
models is based on the assumption of long-term full rationality of optimising agents: 
welfare-maximising households and profit-maximising firms in each region. 
Consequently, this modelling set-up per definition implies that imposing restrictions on 
the economic system (e.g. a limit on greenhouse gases) leads to negative economic 
impacts if not compensated for by improvements in other market imperfections (e.g. 
externalities, spill-overs, and incomplete information) or lowering economic distortions 
(e.g. taxes and subsidies). Therefore, CGE models are widely used to assess the cost side 
of climate and energy policies, and are useful tools to compare results across scenarios 
and regions. Section 6.6 provides an overview of research on the impacts of climate 
change and discusses the costs of inaction, which are not covered in this section. The 
macroeconomic costs of mitigation via land use, land use change and forestry is not 
covered here. 
Studying a time horizon longer than 30 years comes with substantial uncertainty from 
various sources in addition to inherent political uncertainty – which are not just limited to 
the CGE methodology. A first category relates to methodological issues. Input-output 
data for one historical year is the basis to project economic structure into the future. 
Although we capture some dynamics in sector composition of the economy, such as a 
shift to service sectors typically observed in the development stages of a country, this 
approach may introduce some rigidities (e.g. the breakthrough of totally new sectors or 
inter-sectoral interactions). Second, climate policy may unlock technological advances 
by providing finance streams and by shifting long-term strategic investments in the 
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private sector. Ambitious climate action endogenously affects technological progress, a 
feature not captured by the macroeconomic modelling presented in this report. 
Furthermore, potentially important technologies such as biomass energy with CCS and 
electric vehicles are not well represented in the version of the JRC-GEM-E3 model used 
here. In addition, to what extent the falling cost of batteries may facilitate the 
electrification of the energy system on a large scale is yet to be explored. A third aspect 
that is important for long-run analyses relates to behavioural change. The assumption 
that future generations behave in the same way as past generations, especially when 
enjoying increasing income, might prove to be conservative if better information and 
greater awareness leads to changes in diet, transport use, housing choices and price-
responsiveness. Fourth, the cost of climate change mitigation will depend on the specifics 
of the policy implementation. Insofar as current energy use and corresponding 
emissions arise from distorting policies such as energy subsidies, there could be scope for 
policy measures enhancing economic growth and reducing greenhouse gas emissions 
simultaneously (Coady et al., 2017). Auctioning tradeable emission permits or levying 
carbon taxes raises revenues for the government budget, which can be used to foster 
economic development, for instance by reducing other (possibly more distortionary and 
inefficient) taxes. Furthermore, market failures may give rise to an 'energy efficiency 
gap', indicating that even some energy-saving projects with a positive payoff are 
currently not undertaken due to a variety of barriers. The abovementioned options are 
currently not included in the macroeconomic modelling but could change the cost 
estimate significantly. On the other hand side, reaching emission reduction targets via 
sector-specific regulation or policies would be more costly than with the assumed 
economy-wide cap-and-trade system (Aldy et al., 2010). A final point relates to the 
related work of the scientific community. 
It is only fair to acknowledge that the assessment of climate change mitigation costs is a 
research field continuously in progress, as any other scientific area. Figure 82 below 
present the results presented in this report compared to numerical simulations included 
in the IPCC's Fifth Assessment Report database (IIASA, 2015). Placing our results in the 
range of estimates included by the IPCC provides some validation, perspective and 
context to our work.  
Figure 82: The scientific community estimates of mitigation cost 
 
Note: All results shown are global. GECO 2017 results represent the year 2030 and exclude 
LULUCF emission reductions and corresponding macroeconomic cost. 
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6.3 Benefits of improved air quality 
Climate policies lead to lower emissions and concentrations of air pollutants (see Section 
5). Better air quality brings several benefits, of which three main categories are 
considered here: avoided premature mortality, avoided morbidity (illness costs and 
labour days lost) and increased agricultural productivity.  
To what extent the transition in the energy system will lead to reductions in air pollution 
will depend on how pollution-intensive activities are in the first place. The differences 
between a FROZ scenario, with air quality controls fixed at 2010 levels, and a PROG 
scenario, in which the stringency of air pollution policies increase over time, are 
discussed in Section 5.1.1. Because of a lack of information on the costs of air pollution 
policies in the PROG scenario, the remainder of the report focuses on the co-benefits 
under the assumption of FROZ air quality technologies. 
In the calculation of health benefits, we do not distinguish between emissions by source, 
although research indicates that particulate matter deriving from coal combustion is more 
harmful than from other sources (Thurston et al., 2016). 
The impacts of reduced PM2.5 and ozone concentrations on a global level are presented 
below. Currently, the results do not include direct health impacts of NO2; only indirect 
effects via the formation of secondary PM2.5 and ozone are taken into account. 
6.3.1 Global co-benefits 
A greenhouse gas trajectory that is consistent with limiting global average temperature 
change to below 2°C can reduce ‘equivalent attributable deaths’ ( 72) (referred here 
simply as avoided premature deaths) by nearly 1.5 million cases annually compared 
to the Reference scenario in the year 2050 (Figure 83 panel A). Already in 2030 under 
climate action as presented in the INDCs, avoided premature mortality reaches nearly 
100,000 excess equivalent deaths. The calculation is based on non-linear exposure-
response functions for PM2.5 and log-linear functions for ozone as in the Global Burden of 
Disease study (GBD, 2015). Mortality causes considered here are ischaemic heart 
disease, cerebrovascular disease (strokes), lung cancer and lower respiratory infections 
for PM2.5, and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease for both PM2.5 and ozone. 
In terms of morbidity, better air quality implies a reduction of more than half a million 
equivalent hospital admissions in the INDC scenario in 2030, and of more than 7 million 
in the B2°C scenario in 2050, as compared to the Reference scenario. The results 
presented in Figure 83 (panel B) cover hospital admissions cardiovascular and respiratory 
illnesses from exposure to PM2.5 (in the general population) and ozone exposure (for 
people aged above 64). In addition, improved air quality also leads to fewer incidences of 
bronchitis and asthma (children), chronic bronchitis and loss of work days (adults), and 
reduced number of restricted activity days (across all ages) when ill-health causes 
someone to change his/her otherwise normal daily routine. The estimated impact on the 
abovementioned morbidity indicators are calculated by using mortality-to-morbidity 
multipliers (Annex 4). 
Lower concentrations of ozone contribute to better plant growth, improving total 
agricultural productivity by approximately 0.9% and 2.0% globally in 2050 in the 
INDC and B2°C scenario respectively, compared to the Reference scenario. The effect on 
productivity in Figure 83 (panel C) is expressed for the total agricultural sector, including 
livestock and crops for which there is no evidence of the impact of ozone on growth. 
                                           
(72) It is wrong to claim (in the majority of cases) that any individual has died from air pollution alone.  Air 
pollution will act with various other stresses on the body (poor diet, lack of exercise, smoking behaviour, 
etc.) that accumulate as we age and influence life expectancy.  Following COMEAP (2010), we interpret 
estimates of air pollution deaths as ‘equivalent attributable deaths’: the total number of people whose 
death is linked to air pollution exposure is likely higher than indicated, but the typical loss of life 
expectancy for each affected individual attributable to air pollution is likely in the order of months rather 
than years. 
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Therefore, the aggregate numbers conceal potentially large effects for certain crops, 
regions or farms. The relative yield losses are derived from crop-specific exposure-
response function using the three-monthly growing season mean of daytime ozone. The 
crop-specific exposure-response functions for wheat, maize, rice and soy are based on 
Van Dingenen et al. (2009), while other crops are classified into high, medium and low 
ozone sensitivity based on Mills et al. (2009). Crops covered represent around 40% of 
the value of the agricultural sector on a global level (2009-2013). 
Figure 83: Global co-benefits due to improvements of air quality as a consequence of climate 
policy: a) Avoided premature mortality; b) avoided morbidity expressed as hospital admissions; 
and c) improved total agricultural productivity. 
 
 
 
Note: Figures obtained using air pollutant emissions under the assumption of "FROZ" air pollution 
policy (see Section 5.1.1). 
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6.3.2 Avoided premature mortality: breakdown by region and pollutant 
Figure 84 zooms in on a number of key regions with respect to the avoided mortality 
impact. The results show that China and India are countries with high avoided mortality 
co-benefits in the B2°C scenario. 
Figure 84: Yearly avoided premature mortality per region due to lower concentrations of PM2.5 and 
ozone as a consequence of climate policies 
a) as a consequence of INDC climate policies 
 
b) as a consequence of B2°C climate policies 
 
Note: Figures obtained using air pollutant emissions under the assumption of "FROZ" air pollution 
policy (see Section 5.1.1). 
The literature assessing the health impacts of air pollution is constantly evolving. 
Substantial uncertainty remains in the size and channels of impacts. This section sheds 
some light on the ongoing discussions in the field and provides some context to the 
central scenarios presented in other sections. 
Figure 85 presents the avoided premature mortality results for different pollutants and 
various exposure-response functions. For PM2.5, the central scenarios presented in other 
sections of this report are based on the non-linear exposure-response functions of the 
Global Burden of Disease Project (Annex 4). Alternatively, a linear relation between PM2.5 
concentration and mortality could be considered: based on the log-linear relative risk 
curves in the study of Health Effects Institute (HEI; see Krewski et al., 2009), the 
avoided premature mortality in the B2°C scenario reaches more than 4 million equivalent 
deaths in 2050. 
The results presented in previous sections only include NO2 impacts indirectly, as NO2 is a 
precursor for ozone and secondary particulate matter. However, there is recent evidence 
in the epidemiological literature of a direct health effect of NO2 on long-term mortality, 
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although there is still significant uncertainty of the potential magnitude of the health 
impact. To reveal both the potential importance and the uncertainty of NO2 as a direct 
source of air pollution related co-benefits, Figure 85 shows avoided premature mortality 
due to lower NO2 concentrations using exposure-response functions from the Committee 
on the Medical Effects of Air Pollutants (COMEAP, 2015). Results indicate that avoided 
premature mortality cases due to NO2 reductions can range from roughly 400,000 to 
nearly 1.5 million in the B2°C scenario in 2050 (shaded area indicates 95% confidence 
interval). 
Other channels that are not considered in this study include: the potential causal link 
between air pollution and Alzheimer (73), worker productivity (Zivin and Neidell, 2012; 
Chang et al., 2016), diabetes (Puett et al., 2011; Hansen et al., 2016; He et al., 2017), 
road safety (Sager, 2016), buildings, acidification, eutrophication and ecosystems. 
Figure 85: Avoided premature mortality cases for different pollutants and exposure-response 
functions 
 
Note: Figures obtained using air pollutant emissions under the assumption of "FROZ" air pollution 
policy (see Section 5.1.1). 
6.3.3 Avoided illness 
Air pollution affects the heart, the lungs and the brain. A body of literature provides 
evidence for the health impacts of air pollution, while the scientific community continues 
to discuss the strength of various pollutant-health pairings and to explore additional 
channels through which air quality relates to human health. For this report, in line with 
Hunt et al. (2016), we include the following impact categories for morbidity: 
 Respiratory and cardiovascular hospital admissions due to PM2.5 and, in case of 
the elderly population, ozone; 
 Restricted activity days and work loss days for PM2.5, and minor restricted activity 
days for ozone; 
 Acute bronchitis incidences and asthma symptom days for children, and chronic 
bronchitis for adults due to PM2.5. 
Although currently not included in the central scenario results presented elsewhere in this 
report, the direct impact of reduced NO2 concentrations on bronchitis (children) and 
respiratory hospital admissions have been calculated and are shown below. There is 
evidence that links NO2 to respiratory problems independent of other pollutants, but 
disentangling the effects of PM2.5 and NO2 is statistically challenging because they 
typically co-exist. Indirectly, NO2 contributes to the health impacts as it is a precursor for 
                                           
(73) See "The polluted brain. Evidence builds that dirty air causes Alzheimer’s, dementia", Science (January 26th 
2017), http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2017/01/brain-pollution-evidence-builds-dirty-air-causes-
alzheimer-s-dementia  
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PM2.5 and ozone. In addition, Figure 86 includes estimates of the direct implications of 
NO2 concentrations for illness.  
Climate policies that limit global warming to below 2°C imply a reduction of air pollution-
related illnesses by 15-40% in 2050 (Figure 86). For the INDC scenario, morbidity 
indicators are reduced by 1-5% in 2030 and 6-15% in 2050. The global results shown in 
Figure 86 vary by pollutant, but apply to all abovementioned pollutant-specific illness 
categories, irrespective whether the illness metric is expressed as days, incidences or 
hospital admissions. 
Figure 86: Air quality impacts on morbidity, global average 
 
Note: Figures obtained using air pollutant emissions under the assumption of "FROZ" air pollution 
policy (Section 5.1.1). 
6.3.4 Crop productivity  
Ground-level ozone is absorbed by leaves, damaging plant metabolism (reduced CO2 
assimilation rates) and hindering plant growth. As a result, high concentrations of 
ground-level ozone harm agricultural crop yields and reduce farmers' income. Whether or 
not tropospheric ozone affects forests' capacity of sequestering and storing CO2 is a topic 
for ongoing debate (Fuhrer et al., 2016); this feedback channel is not considered here.  
By reducing emissions of ozone precursors NOx, NMVOCs and CO, climate policies raise 
agricultural yields (Figure 87). The INDCs imply a productivity increase between 0.3% 
(rice) and 1.1% (soy) in 2030, which further increases to 1.1% and 3.1% in 2050. Crop 
productivity increases roughly double in the B2°C scenario compared to the INDC 
scenario. Soybean and wheat are typically more sensitive to ozone concentration, which 
is reflected by the results presented in Figure 87. Maize and rice are relatively less 
affected by ozone. Geographic patterns of production and climate action also play a role. 
For instance, China and the United States are important producers of maize globally. 
Substantial reductions in ozone concentrations in these countries in the INDC scenario 
lead to significant improvements of maize yield globally. In the B2°C scenario, strong 
ozone reductions in India and China give more weight to yield improvements for 
important crops in these countries, notably rice. 
Translating changes in ground-level ozone concentrations to yield impacts is done 
through exposure-response functions. These crop-specific functions relate ozone 
exposure to yield and are mainly based on Van Dingenen et al. (2009) for wheat, maize, 
rice and soy. Three generic classes of exposure-response functions were estimated for 
high, medium and low sensitivity crops. Based on the meta-analysis of Mills et al. (2009), 
another 25 crops were allocated to these generic categories. Crop productivity impacts 
have been aggregated across regions using five-year average (2009-2013) gross 
production values from FAOSTAT. 
We emphasize that the impact of climate change on crop productivity is not included in 
this study.  Research by Lobell et al. (2011) indicates that maize and wheat production 
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has already declined due to climate trends over the period 1980-2008, whereas Zampieri 
et al. (2017) note that heat and water stress are important factors explaining wheat yield 
variability. Estimating the size of the CO2 fertilization effect remains an important avenue 
for future research. 
Figure 87: Ozone impacts on productivity for key crops, global average 
 
Note: Figures obtained using air pollutant emissions under the assumption of "FROZ" air pollution 
policy (Section 5.1.1). 
6.4 Macro-economic impacts of avoided air pollution 
To assess the macro-economic impacts of lower concentrations of PM2.5 and ozone (
74), 
we include three market impacts (work lost days, agricultural productivity and healthcare 
expenditures) and one non-market impact (mortality). The abovementioned market 
impacts are introduced in the JRC-GEM-E3 model:  
 The changes in work lost days are implemented in the model by adjusting the 
available labour supply.  
 Agricultural productivity in each of the scenarios is reflected by the total factor 
productivity in the agricultural sector.  
 The reduction in healthcare expenditures is modelled by changing the minimum 
(also labelled ‘subsistence’ or ‘obliged’) consumption levels for healthcare, such 
that more income is available for consumption of other goods. 
Avoided premature deaths are valued economically outside of the JRC-GEM-E3 model, 
using the statistical value of life (VSL), also known as the value of a prevented fatality 
(VPF), which is not a measure of the intrinsic value of a person’s life, but rather 
represents society's collective willingness to pay for a small reduction in the annual risk 
of death for an anonymous individual exposed to air pollution. 
The benefits of air pollution co-benefits of climate policy reach more than 2% of globally 
aggregated GDP in the B2°C scenario in 2050. Substantial differences are found across 
regions, with values reaching as much as 5% for China (INDC and B2°C) and India 
(B2°C). 
Of all co-benefits considered, avoided premature mortality is the most significant one, as 
illustrated by the results in Figure 88. These results use the non-linear exposure-
response functions (as in the Global Burden of Disease project, GBD 2015) and assume 
that air quality policies are frozen at 2010 levels. The economic valuation of mortality 
depends on income, reflecting differences in society's willingness and capability to pay for 
the loss of a life. Ideally, national or regional studies should be used to value economic 
benefits for a reduction in ambient air pollution. In the absence of such data, however, 
                                           
(74) Only indirect NO2 effects are included (PM2.5 and ozone formation). 
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the central scenario assumes a VSL of 5 million US $ for the USA in 2005 (75), while the 
value of statistical life for other regions and years is calculated in line with the “benefit-
transfer” methodology proposed by OECD (2012) according to the following equation 
(year t, region i, income I, income elasticity α=0.8): 
𝑉𝑆𝐿𝑖
𝑡 = 𝑉𝑆𝐿𝑈𝑆𝐴
2005 ∗ (
𝐼𝑖
𝑡
𝐼𝑈𝑆𝐴
2005)
𝛼
 
The adjustment takes into account differences in income levels between regions, all other 
socioeconomic conditions are assumed to be similar (ceteris paribus). Here, I is the GDP 
per capita (at PPP prices), and α is an income elasticity factor, which is a measure of the 
change in price for a marginal increase in income. Cost adjustment over time (income 
growth effect) is included, such that the valuation of mortality evolves in line with per 
capita income. Furthermore, the future co-benefits presented in this report are 
undiscounted. 
Figure 88: Macro-economic impact of lower air pollution concentration levels as a consequence of 
climate policy, World and selected countries 
 
Note: Figures obtained using air pollutant emissions under the assumption of "FROZ" air pollution 
policy (Section 5.1.1) and linear PM2.5 exposure-response function. 
                                           
(75) References and sensitivity included at the end of this section. 
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Among the market impacts, the benefits on the labour supply and agricultural markets 
dominate over the avoided healthcare costs (Figure 89). Avoided work days lost appear 
to be relatively more important in high-income countries, while some low-income regions 
with a sizeable agricultural sector (India, Brazil) experience larger benefits due to 
improved agricultural productivity. The reduction in healthcare expenditures, which 
induces a shift in expenditure from healthcare towards other goods and services, has a 
relatively small impact on GDP. 
Figure 89: Macro-economic market impacts of lower air pollution concentration levels as a 
consequence of climate policy, World and selected countries 
 
Note: Figures obtained using air pollutant emissions under the assumption of "FROZ" air pollution 
policy (Section 5.1.1) and linear PM2.5 exposure-response function. 
Table 16 below presents some sensitivity analyses for the largest effect, i.e. avoided 
premature mortality co-benefits. Using a range of base VSLBase values (for USA 2005, in 
million US $ 2005) and a range of income elasticities (α) based on relevant literature, the 
tables show the sensitivity of the valuation of avoided premature mortality as a share of 
globally aggregated GDP. The values for VSLBase include 2.5 (West et al., 2013; low), 4 
(OECD, 2016; IMF, 2014), 5 (this report), 6 (Thompson et al., 2014), 7 (Shindell et al., 
2016) and 7.5 million US $ 2005 (West et al., 2013; high). The income elasticity values 
include 0.4 (Shindell et al., 2016), 0.5 (West et al., 2013), 0.8 (OECD, 2016; IMF, 2014 
and this report), 0.9 and 1 (both OECD, 2016). This report uses rather conservative 
central values.  
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Table 16: Value of avoided premature mortality, expressed as percent of global GDP 
a) INDC 2030 
VSLBase \ α 0.4 0.5 
0.8 
GECO 2017 0.9 1 
2.5 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.10 
4 0.21 0.20 0.17 0.16 0.16 
5 GECO 2017 0.26 0.25 0.21 0.20 0.19 
6 0.32 0.30 0.26 0.24 0.23 
7 0.37 0.35 0.30 0.28 0.27 
7.5 0.40 0.37 0.32 0.31 0.29 
b) B2°C 2030 
VSLBase \ α 0.4 0.5 
0.8 
GECO 2017 0.9 1 
2.5 0.41 0.37 0.29 0.27 0.26 
4 0.65 0.60 0.47 0.44 0.41 
5 GECO 2017 0.81 0.75 0.59 0.55 0.51 
6 0.97 0.90 0.71 0.66 0.61 
7 1.14 1.05 0.82 0.77 0.71 
7.5 1.22 1.12 0.88 0.82 0.77 
c) B2°C 2050 
VSLBase \ α 0.4 0.5 
0.8 
GECO 2017 0.9 1 
2.5 1.24 1.20 1.10 1.07 1.04 
4 1.99 1.92 1.76 1.71 1.67 
5 GECO 2017 2.48 2.40 2.20 2.14 2.09 
6 2.98 2.88 2.64 2.57 2.51 
7 3.48 3.36 3.07 3.00 2.92 
7.5 3.73 3.60 3.29 3.21 3.13 
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6.5 Combining GHG mitigation cost with air quality co-benefits 
This section brings together the macro-economic cost of climate change mitigation and 
the health co-benefits via improved air quality. The benefits of avoided climate impacts 
are not quantified here, but the next section discusses some of the relevant literature. 
Figure 90 presents the main results for the INDC and the B2°C scenarios in 2030. 
Regarding the mitigation costs, the same caveats as presented in Section 6.2 apply (see 
Box: Interpreting the costs of mitigation). The list of co-benefits included is not 
exhaustive and excludes potential channels of clean air benefits, notably the direct health 
effects of lowered NO2 concentrations. 
On a global level, the cost of climate change mitigation is more than compensated by air 
pollution co-benefits in 2030, both in the INDC and in the B2°C scenario. Results for 
different regions show substantial variation both in terms of mitigation costs and in co-
benefits. Various factors contribute to this heterogeneity. The bottom-up nature of the 
INDC policies entails the absence of effort harmonization across regions. 
Correspondingly, regions with more ambitious GHG reduction targets will experience both 
higher mitigation costs and larger local co-benefits. Figure 90 shows the mitigation cost 
compared to the Reference, which includes current policies. For regions where the 
currently implemented climate and energy policies are already ambitious, such as the EU, 
a comparison between the INDC and the Reference therefore shows only limited 
additional mitigation costs, although the effort undertaken is substantial. Furthermore, 
the cost and the potential scope of various mitigation options depend on region-specific 
characteristics. In Brazil, for instance, avoiding deforestation is a crucial instrument in 
climate policy, but the feedbacks of land-use changes to local air pollutants are not 
included in this study.  
Both mitigation costs and air quality co-benefits are not restricted to domestic policies. 
Climate policies undertaken in other regions can give rise to domestic costs or benefits 
via international trade in two ways. First, the relative ambition level of a country's 
climate policy, and the means of implementation, may affect the competitive position of 
export-oriented industries. Second, the structural economic changes implied by ambitious 
climate policies may affect export markets: countries that produce clean technologies 
may benefit from growing global demand, while shrinking international markets may 
imply a challenging transition for fossil fuel exporting countries. 
In terms of additional co-benefits of local air pollutants, a region gains from ambitious 
climate policies in neighbouring regions: although air pollutants are local, the distance 
between source and receptor may be large enough to cross jurisdictional borders, 
especially for ozone but also for PM2.5. Although this was not singled out in this study, 
transboundary circulation of air pollutants was included in the modelling. Other research 
shows that the premature mortality associated with transboundary transport of PM2.5 can 
reach over 10% of all mortality cases related to PM2.5 (Zhang et al. 2017). 
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Figure 90: Comparison of mitigation cost and air quality co-benefits in 2030 
 
Note: Cost and co-benefits related to land use, land-use change and forestry are not included in 
this figure. 
Direct comparisons of the costs and benefits of climate policy have been difficult to 
implement due to the mismatch between the timing of the costs (now) and the moment 
to harvest the benefits (one-two generations ahead). The analysis presented here is not 
a direct cost-benefit analysis of climate policy, but rather widens the scope to include the 
co-benefits of the transformation of the energy system on air quality. Including the air 
pollution co-benefits, immediate, important impacts such as lower mortality can be 
factored in, delivering robust evidence of substantial synergies between climate policy 
and air quality for a wide set of regions in the world. In addition to other co-benefits, 
such as hedging against oil price fluctuations (Rozenberg et al., 2010, Maisonnave et al., 
2012), incentivizing a healthier diet (Springmann et al., 2017) and spurring innovation 
(Jaffe et al., 2005), the climate policy-induced improvements in air quality and 
associated health benefits further strengthen the economic case for the ongoing global 
energy transition (see also IEA/IRENA, 2017). 
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6.6 The cost of inaction 
Arguably the main trigger behind climate change mitigation policies is the damage that 
arises due to anthropogenic global warming. The economic and social impact of changing 
climatic conditions is not studied in this report, but its importance must be stressed, 
since it is the main rational for climate mitigation policy action, in addition to the co-
benefits assessed in this report.  
A growing literature is assessing these impacts from a top-down perspective and 
increasingly from bottom-up analyses zooming on specific sectors and/or regions.  
Although it can vary across regions and coverage, impact cost estimates for end of the 
century range from 2% to 20%, hence in the order of magnitude or beyond the climate 
mitigation cost (to which must be added the co-benefits, i.e. the avoided cost of reduced 
air pollution). 
Recent studies that encompass a wide range of impacts include: 
 Sectoral economic analyses: Ciscar et al. (2014) for the EU (2% by 2080); Hsiang 
et al. (2017) for the US (1.2% per °C by late 21st century); 
 Global economic analyses: OECD (2015) (2-10% by 2100); Burke et al. (2015) 
(23% by 2100); 
 Other type of analyses, on heat-related deaths: Mora et al. (2017) (share of the 
population exposed to climatic conditions exceeding deadly threshold for at least 
20 days a year: from 30% today to 74% by 2100) and Forzieri et al. (2017) 
(point out that heat-related mortality in Europe could rise to more than 150,000 
by the end of the century). 
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Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, 
Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe) 
Glossary 
Agriculture sector includes the energy consumed in agriculture, forestry and fishing. It 
covers the exploitation of vegetal and animal natural resources (growing of crops, raising 
and breeding of animals, harvesting of timber and other plants). 
Electric processes & appliances: energy demand for end-uses where electricity is 
necessary. Covers electric industrial processes, white and grey appliances, lighting, space 
cooling. Does not include electricity demand for space heating and cooking. 
Energy for Power Generation covers energy for electricity and heat production. It 
covers fuel use in electricity plants, heat plants and combined heat and power (CHP) 
plants. Self-consumption is included. 
Final Energy Demand is the sum of energy consumption by the different end-use 
sectors. It is broken down into the energy demand in the following sectors: Agriculture; 
Industry; Transport; Residential; and Services. It excludes international marine and 
aviation bunkers, except at world level where they are included in the transport sector. It 
can also be broken down into the energy demand in the following end-uses: Heat uses; 
Electric processes & appliances; Mobility; and Non-energy uses. 
Heat uses: energy demand for end-uses for the production of low- and high-
temperature heat. Covers thermal industrial processes and space heating. 
Industry sector includes manufacturing industry, construction and mining; it does not 
include energy transformation activities; it includes non-energy uses of energy fuels. It 
consists of the following sub-sectors: 
• Iron and Steel industry (includes blast furnaces and coke final consumption); 
• Non-Metallic Minerals; 
• Chemicals (consumption for energy uses of chemicals and petrochemicals 
industry);  
• Other Industry (energy uses in other manufacturing industry, construction and 
mining); 
• Non-Energy Uses (non-energy uses of energy fuels in rubber and plastics and 
chemical feedstocks production).  
The energy used for transport by industry is not included here but reported under 
transport. 
 111 
Mobility: energy demand for mobility end-uses. Coincides with the energy demand of 
the Transport sector. 
Non-energy uses: non-energy end-uses of energy fuels in rubber and plastics and 
chemical feedstocks production. Consumed along with the energy uses of fuels in the 
Chemicals sector in Industry. 
Other Energy Transformation & Losses is the energy own use and losses of the 
energy transformation industry not shown elsewhere, such as energy for fossil fuel and 
uranium extraction, refining, transport and distribution (including gasworks); coal-, gas- 
and biomass-to-liquids production; hydrogen production; coke ovens. Also includes 
transfers and statistical differences. Losses include losses in energy distribution, 
transmission and transport. 
Primary Energy Demand represents the total energy demand, including net imports. It 
is the sum of energy demand for power generation, other energy transformation sector & 
losses and total final demand. 
Residential sector includes all household energy uses. 
Services sector includes commercial energy uses (office buildings, hotels, shopping 
centres, IT centres, …), and public services energy uses (public street lighting). 
Transport sector includes all fuels (oil, gas, biomass, coal, hydrogen, electricity) used 
for transport, for all passenger and freight transport, irrespective of the economic sector 
within which the activity occurs. It covers domestic aviation, road, rail, waterways, and 
domestic navigation. Road transport includes light goods vehicles, heavy goods vehicles, 
light duty vehicles and passenger carrying vehicles for public and private transport. 
Country and regional balances refer to domestic consumption; international air and 
maritime bunkers are included only in the world total balance. It does not include 
pipeline transport of energy goods and related losses. 
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Units 
Energy 
EJ Exajoule    1000 000 000 000 000 000 J 
 
toe tonne of oil equivalent 
ktoe thousand tonnes of oil equivalent 1000 toe 
Mtoe million tonnes of oil equivalent 1000 000 toe 
Gtoe giga tonnes of oil equivalent  1000 000 000 toe 
 
Mbl/d million barrels per day  1000 000 bl/d 
Tbl tera barrels    1000 000 000 000 bl 
 
Gt giga metric tonnes   1000 000 000 t 
Mt million metric tonnes   1000 000 t 
 
Electricity 
GW gigawatts    1000 000 000 W 
TWh terawatt-hours   1000 000 000 000 Wh 
 
Prices 
$/bbl $ per barrel of oil 
$/boe $ per barrel of oil equivalent 
 
Emissions and related 
tCO2  tonne CO2 
tCO2e  tonne CO2-equivalent 
MtCO2e million tonnes of CO2e 1000 000 tCO2e 
GtCO2e giga tonnes of CO2e  1000 000 000 tCO2e 
ppm  particulates per million 
μm  micrometre (1x10-6 metre) 
μgm-3  microgram (1x10-6 gram) per cubic metre 
 
Monetary units 
k$  thousand dollars   1000 $ 
M$ million $    1000 000 $ 
bn$ billion $    1000 000 000 $ 
tn$ trillion $    1000  000 000 000 $ 
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Annex 1 Description of the energy/GHG model POLES-JRC  
 
For a fuller description of the model, see Keramidas and Kitous (2017b) and 
http://ec.europa.eu/jrc/poles.  
 
Model 
POLES-JRC is a world energy-economy partial equilibrium simulation model of the energy 
sector, with complete modelling from upstream production through to final user demand. 
It follows a year-by-year recursive modelling, with endogenous international energy 
prices and lagged adjustments of supply and demand by world region, which allows for 
describing full development pathways to 2050 (see general scheme in Figure 91).  
The model provides full energy and emission balances for 66 countries or regions 
worldwide (including detailed OECD and G20 countries), 14 fuel supply branches and 15 
final demand sectors. 
This exercise used the EC POLES-JRC 2017 version. Differences with other exercises done 
with the POLES-JRC model by EC JRC, or with exercises by other entities using the POLES 
model, can come from different i/ model version, ii/ historical data sets, iii/ 
parameterisation, iv/ policies considered. 
 
Figure 91: POLES-JRC model general scheme 
 
  
Modelling Model outputs Model inputs 
Technology 1 
(costs, efficiency…) 
Macro assumptions 
(GDP, Pop, …) 
Carbon constraints 
(tax, cap on emissions…) 
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(subsidies, efficiency…) 
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66 energy demand regions 
Energy service needs (mobility, 
surfaces, heating needs…) 
Energy demand 
Energy transformation 
Energy supply 
Inter-fuel/tehnology competition 
Regional Energy Balance 
Primary energy production 
Power generation and other 
transformations 
Final energy demand by 
sector 
Energy-related land use 
66 regional balances 
International markets 
Oil (88 producers – 1 mkt) 
Gas (88 producers – 14 import 
mkts) 
Coal (81 producers – 15 import 
mkts) 
Biomass (66 producers – 1 mkt) 
Trade 
Technology learning 
International prices 
GHG emissions 
Air pollutants emissions 
End-user prices 
Energy supply investments 
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Final demand 
The final demand evolves with activity drivers, energy prices and technological progress. 
The following sectors are represented: 
- industry: chemistry (energy uses and non-energy uses are differentiated), non-metallic 
minerals, steel, other industry; 
- buildings: residential, services (specific electricity uses are differentiated, different 
types of buildings are considered); 
- transport (goods and passengers are differentiated): road (motorcycles, cars, light and 
heavy trucks – different engine types are considered), rail, inland water, international 
maritime, air domestic and international; 
- agriculture. 
Power system 
The power system describes capacity planning of new plants and operation of existing 
plants. 
The planning considers the existing structure of the power mix (vintage per technology 
type), the expected evolution of the load demand, the production cost of new 
technologies, and resource potential for renewables. 
The operation matches electricity demand considering the installed capacities, the 
variable production costs per technology type, the resource availability for renewables. 
The electricity demand curve is built from the sectoral distribution over typical days. 
Electricity price by sector depend on the evolution of the power mix, of the load curve 
and of the energy taxes. 
Other transformation  
The model also describes other energy transformations sectors: liquid biofuel (BTL), coal-
to-liquid (CTL), gas-to-liquid (GTL), hydrogen (H2). 
Oil supply 
Oil discoveries, reserves and production are simulated for producing countries and 
different fuel types. 
The market is structured along the market power of the different countries: non-OPEC, 
OPEC, Gulf.  
International oil price depend on the evolution the oil stocks in the short term, and on 
the production cost and spare capacity in the Gulf in the longer run. 
Gas supply 
Gas discoveries, reserves and production are simulated for individual producers and 
different resource. They supply regional markets through inland pipeline, offshore 
pipelines or LNG. 
Gas price depends on the transport cost, the regional R/P ratio, the evolution of oil price 
and the development of LNG (integration of the different regional markets). 
Coal supply 
Coal production is simulated for individual producers. They supply regional markets. Coal 
delivery price for each route depends on the production cost and the transport cost.  
Biomass supply 
The model differentiates various types of primary biomass: energy crops, short rotation 
crop (lignocellulosic) and wood (lignocellulosic). They are described through a potential 
and a production cost curve – information on lignocellulosic biomass (short rotation 
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coppices, wood) is derived from look-up tables provided by the specialist model 
GLOBIOM-G4M (Global Biosphere Management Model). Biomass can be traded, either in 
solid form or as liquid biofuel. 
Wind, solar and other renewables 
They are associated to potentials and supply curves per country. 
GHG emissions 
CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion are derived directly from the projected energy 
balance. Other GHGs from energy and industry are simulated using activity drivers 
identified in the model (e.g. sectoral value added, mobility per type of vehicles, fuel 
production, fuel consumption..) and abatement cost curves. GHG from agriculture and 
LULUCF are derived from GLOBIOM-G4M lookup tables. 
Countries and regions 
The model decomposes the world energy system into 66 regional entities: 54 individual 
countries and 12 residual regions (Figure 92, Table 17 and Table 18), to which 
international bunkers (air and maritime) are added. 
Figure 92: POLES-JRC model regional detail map (energy balances) 
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Table 17: List of 54 individual countries represented in POLES-JRC (energy balances) 
Non-EU individual 
countries 
EU28 Member States 
Argentina Austria 
Australia Belgium 
Brazil Bulgaria 
Canada Croatia 
Chile Cyprus 
China Czech Republic 
Egypt Denmark 
Iceland Estonia 
India Finland 
Indonesia France 
Iran Germany 
Japan Greece 
Malaysia Hungary 
Mexico Ireland 
New Zealand Italy 
Norway Latvia 
Russia Lithuania 
Saudi Arabia Luxembourg 
South Africa Malta 
South Korea Netherlands 
Switzerland Poland 
Thailand Portugal 
Turkey Romania 
Ukraine Slovak Republic 
United States Slovenia 
Vietnam Spain 
 Sweden 
 United Kingdom 
Note: Hong-Kong and Macau are included in China 
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Table 18: Country mapping for the 12 regions in POLES-JRC (energy balances) 
Rest Central America Rest Balkans 
Rest Sub-Saharan Africa 
(continued) 
Rest South Asia 
Bahamas Albania Burkina Faso Afghanistan 
Barbados Bosnia-Herzegovina Burundi Bangladesh 
Belize Kosovo Cameroon Bhutan 
Bermuda Macedonia Cape Verde Maldives 
Costa Rica Moldova Central African Republic Nepal 
Cuba Montenegro Chad Pakistan 
Dominica Serbia Comoros Seychelles 
Dominican Republic Rest CIS Congo Sri Lanka 
El Salvador Armenia Congo DR Rest South East Asia 
Grenada Azerbaijan Cote d'Ivoire Brunei 
Guatemala Belarus Djibouti Cambodia 
Haiti Georgia Equatorial Guinea Lao PDR 
Honduras Kazakhstan Eritrea Mongolia 
Jamaica Kyrgyz Rep. Ethiopia Myanmar 
Nicaragua Tajikistan Gabon North Korea 
NL Antilles and Aruba Turkmenistan Gambia Philippines 
Panama Uzbekistan Ghana Singapore 
Sao Tome and Principe Mediterranean Middle East Guinea Taiwan 
St Lucia Israel Guinea-Bissau Rest Pacific 
St Vincent & Grenadines Jordan Kenya Fiji Islands 
Trinidad and Tobago Lebanon Lesotho Kiribati 
Rest South America Syria Liberia Papua New Guinea 
Bolivia Rest of Persian Gulf Madagascar Samoa (Western) 
Colombia Bahrain Malawi Solomon Islands 
Ecuador Iraq Mali Tonga 
Guyana Kuwait Mauritania Vanuatu 
Paraguay Oman Mauritius   
Peru Qatar Mozambique   
Suriname United Arab Emirates Namibia   
Uruguay Yemen Niger   
Venezuela Morocco & Tunisia Nigeria   
  Morocco Rwanda   
  Tunisia Senegal   
  Algeria & Libya Sierra Leone   
  Algeria Somalia   
  Libya Sudan   
  Rest Sub-Saharan Africa Swaziland   
  Angola Tanzania   
  Benin Togo   
  Botswana Uganda   
   Zambia   
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Data sources 
 
Table 19: POLES-JRC model historical data and projections 
Series  Historical data GECO Projections 
Population UN, Eurostat UN (medium fertility) 
GDP, growth World Bank EC, IMF, OECD  
Other 
activity 
drivers 
Value added World Bank 
POLES-JRC model 
Mobility, vehicles, 
households, tons of 
steel, … 
Sectoral databases 
Energy 
resources 
Oil, gas, coal BGR, USGS, WEC, sectoral information 
Uranium NEA 
Biomass GLOBIOM model 
Hydro Enerdata 
Wind, solar NREL, DLR 
Energy 
balances 
Reserves, production BP, Enerdata 
Demand by sector 
and fuel, 
transformation 
(including. power), 
losses 
Enerdata, IEA 
Power plants Platts  
Energy 
prices 
International prices, 
prices to consumer 
Enerdata, IEA POLES-JRC model 
GHG 
emissions 
Energy CO2 Derived from POLES-JRC energy balances POLES-JRC model 
Other GHG Annex 1 UNFCCC 
POLES-JRC model, 
GLOBIOM model 
Other GHG Non-
Annex 1 (excl. 
LULUCF) 
EDGAR 
POLES-JRC model, 
GLOBIOM model 
LULUCF Non-Annex 1 National inventories, FAO 
POLES-JRC model, 
GLOBIOM model 
Air pollutants emissions 
GAINS model, EDGAR, IPCC, national 
sources 
GAINS model, national 
sources 
Technology costs 
POLES-JRC learning curves based on literature, including but not 
limited to:  EC JRC, WEC, IEA, TECHPOL database* 
*: developed in several European research projects: SAPIENT, SAPIENTIA, CASCADE MINTS  
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Annex 2 Description of the economic model JRC-GEM-E3  
 
The GEM-E3 model, a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model, is used to assess 
the direct and indirect impacts of mitigation efforts until the year 2030. The GEM-E3 
model is a multi-sector, multi-region model that includes the interactions between the 
energy system, the economy and the environment. It is built on sound microeconomic 
foundations and integrates multiple data sources such as trade statistics, input-output 
data and information on emissions of greenhouse gasses. Furthermore, existing tax 
structures and unemployment mechanisms are incorporated. The version of the model 
used here is global (13 regions, see Table 20) and covers all industry sectors, 
disaggregated into 31 sectors, of which 10 electricity generating technology sectors. 
 
In a general equilibrium framework, results regarding impacts of imposed policies are 
presented comparatively with the Reference projections of the economy, thus in terms of 
percentage differences from the Reference scenario. The GEM-E3 Reference is 
constructed on the basis of a variety of data sources. First, the future path of GDP is 
based on projections done by the OECD (Dellink et al., 2014) for all regions in the world. 
Second, population projections are taken from the UN (2015). Third, the input-output 
tables and the data on bilateral trade flows are derived from the GTAP 8 database. Fourth, 
the emission levels of greenhouse gasses (totals and by sector) and the shares of 
electricity generation technologies are harmonised with the Baseline in the POLES model. 
For the EU, the Baseline is consistent with the 2013 reference of the PRIMES model. 
Importantly, for the EU this Baseline already includes substantial policy measures. In 
particular, Europe complies with the "20-20-20 Package" and is in line with the "EU 
Energy, Transport and GHG emission trends to 2050; update 2013" (EC, 2013). For the 
other regions, policy measures that are already put in place are included, in line with 
section 2. Additional data sources include labour statistics from ILO and energy statistics 
from IEA. 
 
The GEM-E3 model is a recursive dynamic CGE model representing multiple regions, 
sectors and agents. The interactions between three types of agents are included: 
households, firms and governments. Household behaviour derives from the maximisation 
of a Stone-Geary (Linear Expenditure System) utility function. Unemployment is 
modelled via a wage curve mechanism. Firms maximise profits subject to sector-specific 
nested constant elasticity of substitution production technologies. The behaviour of 
governments is exogenous, and government budget balance relative to GDP is assumed 
to be at the level of the Reference in all scenarios.  
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Table 20: Regional aggregation in the JRC-GEM-E3 model 
Region Code 
European Union EU28 
USA   USA 
China   CHN 
India IND 
Russia RUS 
Brazil BRA 
Canada CAN 
Japan JPN 
Australia AUS 
North Africa and Middle East NAM 
Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova UBM 
Rest of Europe (Switzerland, Norway, Albania, Iceland, Bosnia, 
Serbia, Turkey…) RET 
Rest of the world   ROW 
Source: GEM-E3 model 
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Annex 3 Description of the source-receptor model TM5-FASST 
 
In general, air quality source-receptor models (AQ-SRM) link emissions of pollutants in a 
given source region with downwind impacts, implicitly using underlying knowledge of 
meteorology and atmospheric chemistry and physics processes. The source region is any 
point or area from which emissions are considered; the receptor is any point or area at 
which the pollutant concentration and impact is to be evaluated. Primary pollutants do 
not undergo chemical transformation during their atmospheric lifetime and are only 
affected by dry and wet removal from the atmosphere (e.g. elemental carbon, mineral 
dust). Secondary pollutants are formed from reactions of primary emissions, e.g. NO2 
forms nitrate aerosol but also leads to the formation of ozone; emitted SO2 is 
transformed into sulphate aerosols. An AQ-SRM will need to include a functional 
relationship between each precursor and each relevant pollutant or pollutants metric, for 
each source region and each receptor region.  
TM5-FASST has been designed as a reduced-form SRM: the relation between the 
emissions of compound i from source x and resulting concentration (or burden) of 
pollutant j (where j = i in case of a primary component) at receptor y is expressed by a 
simple functional relation that mimics the underlying meteorological and chemical 
processes. In the current version TM5-FASST the function is a linear relation expressing 
the change in pollutant concentration in the receptor region upon a change in precursor 
emissions in the source region with the generic form 𝑑𝐶𝑦 = 𝑆𝑅𝐶 × 𝑑𝐸𝑥  where 𝑑𝐶𝑦  = the 
change in the pollutant concentration compared to a reference concentration in receptor 
region y, 𝑑𝐸𝑥 = the change in precursor emission compared to a reference emission in 
source region x, and SRC the source-receptor coefficient for the specific compound and 
source-receptor pair.  The source-receptor (SR) coefficients are implemented as matrices 
with dimension [nx,ny] with nx and ny the number of source and receptor regions 
respectively. A single SR matrix is available for each precursor and for each resulting 
component from that precursor. Table 1 gives an overview of all precursor – pollutant 
links that have been included.  
For TM5-FASST we defined 56 source regions, as shown in Figure 1. The choice of 
regions has been made to obtain an optimal match with integrated assessment models 
such as IMAGE, MESSAGE (Riahi et al., 2007), GAINS  (Höglund-Isaksson and Mechler, 
2005) as well as the POLES model (Russ et al., 2007; Van Aardenne et al., 2007). Most 
European countries are defined as individual source regions, except for the smallest 
countries, which have been aggregated. In the current version, the US, China and India 
are treated as a single emission regions, i.e. without break-down in states or provinces. 
Although most integrated assessment models cover Africa, South America, Russia and 
South-East Asia as a single socio-economic entity, it was decided to sub-divide these 
regions, to account for climatological difference in these vast continents. Apart from the 
56 regions, source-receptor coefficients were calculated between global international 
shipping and aviation as sources, and the global grid as receptor, hence nx = 58. The set 
of receptor regions can range from the 1°x1° native resolution of the TM5 model output, 
to customized aggregated receptor regions. A common aggregation is the one identical to 
the 56 continental source regions. For the current work we make use of the highest 
available spatial resolution, i.e. global 1°x1° gridmaps. 
The SR matrices, describing the concentration response in each receptor grid upon a 
change in emissions in each source region, have been derived from a set of runs with the 
full chemical transport model TM5-CTM by applying 20% emission perturbations for each 
of the 56 defined source regions (plus shipping and aviation), for all relevant precursor 
components, in comparison to a set of unperturbed simulations, hereafter denoted as 
‘base simulations’. TM5-CTM explicitly solves the mass balance equations of the species 
using detailed meteorological fields and sophisticated physical and chemical process 
schemes at 1°x1° resolution within customizable zoom areas, which are 2-way nested via 
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an intermediate 3°x2° and global 6°x4° base resolution (Krol et al., 2005) . The global 
continents are covered with the 1°x1° resolution by defining 13 1°x1° master zoom 
areas for which the base runs are performed separately, and which are pasted into one 
global 1°x1° resolution base field. This is the so-called native resolution at which base 
simulation and perturbation fields are available.   
As base run emissions we use the community generated representative pathway 
concentration (RCP) emissions for the year 2000 prepared for IPCC 5th Assessment 
(Lamarque et al., 2010). The meteorological fields are from the European Centre for 
Medium-Range Weather Forecast (ECMWF) operational forecast (OD), representative for 
the year 2001.  
For each receptor point y (i.e. each model vertical level 1°x1° grid cell), the change in 
concentration of component i in receptor y resulting from a 20% perturbation of emitted 
precursor j in source region x, is expressed by a unique SR coefficient 𝐴𝑖𝑗[𝑥, 𝑦]:  
𝐴𝑖𝑗[𝑥, 𝑦] =
∆𝐶𝑗(𝑦)
∆𝐸𝑖(𝑥)
 with ∆𝐸𝑖(𝑥)=0.2𝐸𝑖,𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒(𝑥)  (1) 
The total concentration of component j in receptor region y, resulting from arbitrary 
emissions of all ni precursors i at all nx source regions x, is obtained as a perturbation on 
the base-run concentration, by summing up all the respective SR coefficients scaled with 
the actual emission perturbation: 
𝐶𝑗(𝒚) = 𝐶𝑗,𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒(𝒚) + ∑ ∑ 𝐴𝑖𝑗[𝑥, 𝑦] ∙𝒏𝒊𝒏𝒙 [𝐸𝑖(𝑥) − 𝐸𝑖,𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒(𝑥)] (2) 
Pollutants include particulate matter components (SO4, NO3, NH4, BC, particulate organic 
matter – POM), trace gases (SO2, NO, NO2, NH3, O3, CO), and deposition fluxes of BC, N 
and S species. In the case of j=ozone, the ni precursors in equation (2) would comprise 
[NOx, NMVOC, CO, CH4]. The set of linear equations (2) with associated source-receptor 
matrices (1) for all components and all source and receptor regions thus emulates the 
‘full’ TM5-CTM, and constitutes the ‘kernel’ of TM5-FASST_V0.  
Emissions of sea-salt and mineral dust are included in the base simulation using emission 
schemes from Dentener et al. (2006), but they are not affected in the perturbation runs 
where we consider only perturbations of anthropogenic components. Although for most 
health and ecosystem impacts only the surface level fields are required, base run and 
perturbed pollutants concentrations were calculated and stored for the 25 vertical levels 
of the model as monthly means, and some air-quality relevant parameters as 
hourly/daily fields. For the present version of TM5-FASST the monthly perturbations are 
aggregated to annual emission-concentration SR matrices. Surface ozone (and NO2) 
fields were stored at hourly intervals allowing for the calculation of specific vegetation 
and health related ozone metrics, often based on thresholds of hourly ozone 
concentrations, or concentrations during daytime. The hourly ozone surface fields were 
converted into specific ozone metrics responses to annual emissions, including 
accumulated hourly ozone above a threshold of 40 ppbV during a 3 months crop growing 
season (AOT40), 3-monthly mean of 7 hr or 12 hr daytime ozone during crop growing 
season (M7, M12), maximum 6-monthly running average of daily maximum hourly ozone 
(M6M), the sum of daily maximal 8hr ozone mean concentrations above 35ppbV 
(SOMO35).  
BC and POM emissions are assumed not to interact with other pollutants, in particular 
their atmospheric lifetime is assumed not to be affected by mixing with other soluble 
species like ammonium salts. Secondary biogenic POM (SOA) was included following the 
AEROCOM recommendation (Dentener et al., 2006; Kanakidou et al., 2005) which 
parameterized SOA formation from natural VOC emissions as a fixed fraction of the 
primary emissions. SOA from anthropogenic emission was not explicitly included in the 
current simulations. This is a topic for future developments of the model.  
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Health impact metrics 
TM5-FASST provides output of annual mean PM2.5 and ozone health metrics (3-monthly 
and 6-monthly mean of daily maximum hourly ozone (M3M, M6M), and the sum of the 
maximal 8-hourly mean above 35 ppbV (SOMO35)), as well as annual mean NOx and SO2 
concentrations at grid resolution of 1°x1°, including customizable exposure threshold. 
The population-weighted pollutant exposure metrics grid maps, in combination with 
consistent population grid maps are thus available for human health impact assessment.  
Crop impacts 
TM5-FASST provides gridded crop ozone exposure metrics (averaged or accumulated 
over the crop growing season) which can be overlaid with crop production grid maps to 
evaluate cop relative yield losses for 4 major crops (wheat, rice, maize, soybean). The 
methodology used is described in detail by Van Dingenen et al. (2009), however gridded 
crop data (growing season and crop production grid maps) have been updated using 
Global Agro-Ecological Zones data set  (IIASA and FAO, 2012).  
Mapping POLES-JRC regions to TM5-FASST source regions 
As described above, FASST takes as input annual emissions from each of 56 continental 
source regions + shipping and aviation (Figure 93). For this study, input emissions were 
generally prepared at a higher regional aggregation (although for Europe individual 
country data were provided), therefore the POLES regional aggregation had to be 
remapped the predefined FASST regions. Individual country level POLES emissions are 
first estimated per sector by multiplying the POLES regional emission with a country and 
sector-specific weight factor 𝜆𝑖, the latter calculated from available RCP gridded emissions 
for the corresponding year:  
EM_CNTRYi =  i EM_REGPOLES 
with  𝜆𝑖 =
𝐸𝑀_𝑅𝐶𝑃𝑖
∑ 𝐸𝑀_𝑅𝐶𝑃𝑗𝑗
  
and  ∑ 𝜆𝑗𝑗 = 1 
and subsequently re-aggregated to the FASST regions.   
Figure 93: 56 continental source regions of the TM5-FASST model 
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Annex 4 Air pollution health impacts methodology 
 
Health impacts are calculated using an "impact pathway" analysis, which explicitly traces 
the fate of pollutants from the moment they are released into the environment, followed 
by atmospheric dispersion, and removal by deposition and chemical transformation 
(Figure 94). Vulnerable population subgroups, such as the sick, children and the elderly, 
who are exposed to atmospheric contaminants via inhalation and/or ingestion pathways 
are at a higher risk of suffering from adverse health symptoms, ranging from mild 
discomfort to more serious life-threatening conditions. Quantified health benefits of 
reduced emissions include avoided cases of illness (health morbidity), and saved 
premature deaths. Health effects include bronchitis and asthma attacks in children, 
chronic bronchitis and work lost days (WLD) in adults, and other illnesses that affect a 
person's normal daily routine (restricted activity days, RAD), or worse yet may require 
hospitalization (HA) because of cardio-pulmonary system complications. 
Figure 94: Methodology framework for assessing health co-benefits of air quality and 
climate policies (Impact pathways analysis). 
 
 
Physical benefits are calculated using epidemiological associations (relative risks, RR) 
linking ambient air concentration to specific adverse health outcomes in the general 
public. The relative risk is defined as the ratio of health events in a risk group that is 
exposed to air pollution and a control group that is unexposed. RR of unity signifies no 
difference between the two populations. The exposure response functions of the Global 
Burden of Disease Study 2015 (GBD 2015) for PM2.5 and ozone are illustrated in Figure 
95 for various cause-specific mortality outcomes. The excess mortality is calculated using 
a population attributable fraction (PAF = 1−1/RR), which measures the attributable share 
of the total burden of disease that is ascribed to ambient air pollution. Multiplying PAF by 
the baseline mortality rate (values are cause-, age-, and country-dependent) yields the 
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premature deaths from air pollution. Air pollution attributable cases of illness are 
estimated using morbidity-to-mortality multiplier factors (Table 21). 
Figure 95: Exposure response functions of the Global Burden of Disease (GBD) Study 
2015 for PM and ozone related mortality calculations. 
 
IHD = Ischaemic Heart Disease; COPD = Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease; LC = Lung 
Cancer; LRI = Lower Respiratory Infections 
Source: Own reconstruction based on personal communication with Dr. Richard Burnett from 
Health Canada (Ottawa, Ontario, Canada) and information from Institute for Health Metrics and 
Evaluation, IHME (http://ghdx.healthdata.org/gbd-2015). 
 
Table 21: Morbidity-to-mortality multiplier factors for calculating cases of illness related 
to ambient air pollution (morbidity = multiplier factor × Total cause-specific deaths). 
Illness 
PM2.5 
(Non-
Linear) 
PM2.5 
(Linear 
model) 
Ozone 
Bronchitis, children [6 to 12 years] 4.82 3.04  
Asthma Symptom Days, children [5 to 19 years] 50.9 32.1  
Chronic bronchitis, adults [older than 27 years] 1.43 0.90  
Work Lost Days, workers [15 to 64 years] 547 345  
Hospital admissions [aged 64+ for ozone] 1.13 0.71 22.48 
Minor Restricted Activity Days   23,215 
Restricted Activity Days 1,967 1,240  
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Annex 5 Detailed energy and climate policies 
 
The following tables provide a full list of the policies considered in the GECO2017 
scenarios (see also section 2 for a discussion on how these policies were implemented). 
The INDC scenario includes the policies already included in the Reference scenario; the 
B2°C scenario includes all policies included in the INDC and Reference scenarios. 
The objectives of all these policies were reached, except in the following cases (noted in 
red italic in the tables below) where they are either superseded by more recent policies 
or not in track with more recent evolution of the countries' energy system and related 
emissions: 
- 2020 emissions (all scenarios): 
o Norway, Switzerland (emissions result from the same carbon price as for 
EU28 ETS sectors, reflecting the single EU ETS market) 
o Canada (2020 objective superseded by more recent policy) 
o Mexico (conditional) 
o South Korea (2020 objective superseded by more recent policy) 
o Kazakhstan 
- 2025-2030 emissions (INDC and B2°C scenarios): 
o Iceland, Norway, Switzerland (emissions result from the same carbon price 
as for EU28 ETS sectors, reflecting the single EU ETS market) 
o Morocco & Tunisia (conditional INDC policies very constraining in terms of 
the effort necessary to reach the target; the policy effort was capped by 
using the highest carbon value applied in any other country / region by 
2030) 
- Energy (all scenarios): 
o Several 2020 policies on renewables in transport: EU28, USA, Argentina, 
China, Indonesia, Thailand, Ukraine, South Africa 
o South Korea  (share of renewables 2020-2035) 
o China (share of non-fossil 2020 reached in INDC, not Reference; share of 
gas 2020 not reached) 
o Malaysia (share of renewables 2020) 
o Thailand (share of renewables 2036) 
o Russia (share of renewables 2020, nearly reached) 
o Turkey (energy efficiency 2020, nearly reached; nuclear capacities 2030: 
slower development than planned) 
o South Africa (CCS from coal-to-liquids: slower development than planned) 
o Several targets for countries not modelled individually were considered but 
not necessarily reached (Ecuador, Papua New Guinea, Bangladesh, Jordan, 
Algeria, Cameroon) 
- Other: 
o Several targets expressed for the LULUCF sector not related to emissions 
were considered but not modelled (Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Japan, 
Cambodia, China, India, Vietnam) 
 
An Excel version of these tables along with further detail is available in the GECO 
website, see: www.ec.europa.eu/jrc/geco. 
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Table 22: GHG policies in and around 2020 in the Reference scenario 
UN Party 
GHG 
coverage 
Sectoral 
coverage 
Metric Base year 
Target 
year 
Objective Source 
Europe                
EU28 All GHGs All excl. 
LULUCF 
Emissions 1990 2020 -20% EU 2020 Climate and Energy Package (European Commission, 
2008) 
EU28 All GHGs ETS sectors Emissions 2005 2020 -21% EU 2020 Climate and Energy Package (European Commission, 
2008) 
+ 2021-2050 cap linear reduction factor of -1.74%/year 
EU28 HFCs All Emissions 2012 2019-2036 -10% to -85% 
over time 
Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol 
Norway All GHGs All Emissions 1990 2020 -30% National Communication 6 (UNFCCC, 2014) 
Switzerland All GHGs All Emissions 1990 2020 -20% National Communication 6 (UNFCCC, 2014) 
North America             
Canada All GHGs All Emissions 2005 2020 -17% Copenhagen Accord (UNFCCC, 2009) 
Canada CO2 Power 
sector 
Emissions 2015 2015 420 gCO2/kWh 
for new power 
plants 
CO2 standard for new power plants (2012) 
Mexico All GHGs All Emissions 2020 
(BAU) 
2020 -30% Copenhagen Accord (UNFCCC, 2009); National Communication 
4 (UNFCCC, 2009) 
USA All GHGs All Intensity 
of GDP 
2005 2020 -17% Climate Action Report (US Department of State, 2014) / 
National Communication 6 (UNFCCC, 2014) 
Central & South America            
Brazil All GHGs All Emissions 2020 
(BAU) 
2020 -36.1% to -
38.9% 
Copenhagen Accord (UNFCCC, 2009); National Communication 
2 (UNFCCC, 2010) 
Chile All GHGs All Emissions 2020 
(BAU) 
2020 -20% Copenhagen Accord (UNFCCC, 2009) 
Pacific              
Australia All GHGs All Emissions 2000 2020 -5% 
(conditional: up 
to -25%) 
National Communication 6 (UNFCCC, 2013) 
Japan All GHGs All Emissions 2005 2020 -3.8% Ministry of the Environment (COP19, 2013) 
New 
Zealand 
All GHGs All Emissions 1990 2020 -5% 
(conditional:  
-10% to -20%) 
Copenhagen Accord (UNFCCC, 2009); National Communication 
6 (UNFCCC, 2013) 
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South 
Korea 
All GHGs All excl. 
LULUCF 
Emissions 2020 
(BAU) 
2020 -30% Copenhagen Accord (UNFCCC, 2009); National Communication 
3 (UNFCCC, 2012); Green Grown Act (2016) 
Asia              
China CO2 All excl. 
LULUCF 
Intensity 
of GDP 
2005 2020 -40% to -45% Copenhagen Accord (UNFCCC, 2009) 
India GHG All excl. 
agriculture 
Intensity 
of GDP 
2005 2020 -20% to -25% Copenhagen Accord (UNFCCC, 2009) 
Indonesia CO2 Energy, 
LULUCF 
Emissions 2020 
(BAU) 
2020 -26% Copenhagen Accord (UNFCCC, 2009); National Communication 
2 (UNFCCC, 2012) 
Malaysia All GHGs All Intensity 
of GDP 
2005 2020 -40% National Communication 2 (UNFCCC, 2011) 
Thailand All GHGs Energy, 
transport 
Emissions 2020 
(BAU) 
2020 -7% to -20% Copenhagen Accord (UNFCCC, 2009); Development trajectory 
(ADBI, 2012) 
CIS              
Kazakhstan All GHGs All Emissions 1990 2020 -15% Copenhagen Accord (UNFCCC, 2009) 
Russia All GHGs All Emissions 1990 2020 -15% to -25% Copenhagen Accord (UNFCCC, 2009) 
Ukraine All GHGs All Emissions 1990 2020 -20% 
(conditional: -
30%) 
Copenhagen Accord (UNFCCC, 2009) 
Africa              
South 
Africa 
All GHGs All Emissions 2020 
(BAU) 
2020 -34% Copenhagen Accord (UNFCCC, 2009); National Communication 
2 (UNFCCC, 2011) 
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Table 23: Energy policies in and around 2020 in the Reference scenario 
UN Party Technology Metric Target year Objective Source 
Europe            
EU28 Renewables Share in gross final 
demand 
2020 20% European Commission , DG Energy 
EU28 Renewable fuels Share in transport 
demand 
2020 10% European Commission , DG Energy 
EU28 Private vehicles emissions Emissions, in g/km 2021 95 European Commission , DG Energy 
EU28 Energy demand % reduction vs. BAU 2020 -20% (primary: 1.5 Gtoe, 
final: 1.1 Gtoe) 
European Commission , DG Energy 
Switzerland Renewables Share in primary demand 2020 24% Energy Strategy 2050 
North America 
  
        
Canada Private vehicles emissions Emissions, in g/km 2025 88 Canadian Environmental Protection Act 
Mexico Non-fossil + cogeneration Share in power capacities 2018 34.6% National Development Plan 2014-2018 
Mexico  Capacity targets 2018 Nuclear: 1.4 GW 
Renewables: 23.3 GW 
National Development Plan 2014-2018 
Mexico Non-fossil Share in power 
production 
2024 35% Energy Transition Law 2015 
USA Wind, Solar, Geothermal Power production 2020 vs. 
2012 
Doubling White House 
USA Private vehicles emissions Consumption, miles/gal 2020 54.5 US EPA 
USA Renewables Production target 2022 Renewable fuel blended 
in transport: 36 billion 
gallons 
Renewable fuel standard (2015) 
Central & South America 
  
        
Argentina Renewables Share in power 
production 
2025 25% RenovAr, 2016 
Argentina Renewables Share in transport 
demand 
2016 12% Biofuels Law (2016) 
Brazil Renewables Share in power 
production 
2020 16% National Plan on Climate Change (2008) 
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Brazil  Capacity targets 2024 Biomass: 18 GW 
Hydro: 117 GW + small 
hydro 8 GW 
Nuclear: 3 GW 
Solar: 7 GW 
Wind: 24 GW 
Decenal Energy Expansion Plan (2024) 
Chile Renewables Share in power capacities 2025 20% (excl. hydro) (12% 
in 2020, 18% in 2024) 
Non-Conventional Renewable Energy 
Law (2013) 
Chile Energy demand % reduction vs. BAU 2020 -12% Energy Efficiency Action Plan (2012) 
Pacific          
Australia Renewables Share in power 
production 
2020 23.5% Australian Government, Department of 
Environment 
Japan Renewables Share in power 
production 
2030 24% (13.5% by 2020); 
21% for nuclear 
Basic Energy Plan (2014) 
Japan Renewables Capacity targets 2020 Biomass: 5.5 GW 
Solar: 28 GW 
Wind: 6 GW 
Ministry of Economics, Trade and 
Industry 
Japan Private vehicles emissions Consumption, km/l 2020 20.3 (from 16.8 in 2015) Top Runner Programme (1999) 
New Zealand Renewables Share in power 
production 
2025 90% New Zealand Energy Efficiency and 
Conservation Strategy 2011-2016 
S.Korea Renewables Share in primary demand 2035 11% (5% by 2020, 9.7% 
by 2030) 
4th Basic Plan on New and Renewable 
Energies (2014) 
S.Korea Renewables Share in power 
production 
2035 13.4% (10% by 2024, 
11.7% by 2029) 
7th Basic Plan for Long-term Electricity 
Supply and Demand (2014) 
S.Korea Private vehicles emissions Emissions, in g/km 2020 97 (from 140 in 2015) Fuel efficiency standard (2005) 
Asia          
China Non-fossil Share in primary demand 2020 15% Copenhagen Accord (UNFCCC, 2009) 
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China Renewables Capacity targets 2020 Hydro: 380 GW 
Nuclear : 58 GW 
Solar: 110 GW 
Wind: 210 GW 
Biomass: 30 GW 
Energy Development Strategy Action 
Plan (2014-2020) 
China Total energy Cap 2020 5.0 Gtce 13th Five Year Plan (2016-2020) 
China Coal Cap 2020 4.2 Gtce Energy Development Strategy Action 
Plan (2014-2020) 
China Gas Share in primary energy 2020 10% Energy Development Strategy Action 
Plan (2014-2020) 
China Renewables Production target 2020 Liquid biofuels: 12 Mt Energy Development Strategy Action 
Plan (2014-2020) 
India Renewables Capacity targets 
Additional vs. 2010 
2022 Biomass: +10 GW 
Solar: +100 GW 
Wind: +60 GW 
India's Union Budget 2015-2016 
Indonesia Renewables Share in power 
production 
2019 19% Energy and Mineral Resources Ministry 
Indonesia Renewables Share in transport 
demand 
2025 15% Biofuel targets (2013) 
Malaysia Renewables Share in power capacities 2020 10% National Renewable Energy Policy and 
Action Plan (2010) 
Malaysia  Capacity targets 2020 Biomass: 0.8 GW 
Hydro (small): 0.5 GW 
Solar PV: 0.2 GW 
National Renewable Energy Policy and 
Action Plan (2010) 
Thailand Renewables Share in primary demand 2036 30% Alternative Energy Development Plan 
(2015-36) (2015) 
Thailand Renewables Share in power 
production 
2036 20% Power Development Plan (2015-36) 
(2015) 
Thailand Renewables Share in transport 
demand 
2036 35% Alternative Energy Development Plan 
(2015-36) (2015) 
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Thailand Energy demand % reduction of energy 
intensity vs 2010 
2036 -30% Energy Efficiency Plan (2015-36) (2015) 
Vietnam Renewables Share in primary demand 2020 5% National Energy Development Strategy 
2020 (2013) 
Vietnam Renewables Share in power 
production 
2020 4.5% Power Development Plan 2011-2020 
(2013) 
CIS          
Russia Renewables Share in power 
production 
2020 2.5% (excl. large hydro) Renewable energy targets (2013) 
Ukraine Renewables Share in final 
consumption 
2020 11% National Action Plan for Renewable 
Energy (2014) 
Ukraine Renewables Share in transport 
demand 
2020 10% (5% by 2014-2015; 
7% by 2016) 
Law on Alternative Liquid and Gaseous 
Fuels (2012) 
Ukraine Renewables Capacity targets 2020 Biomass: 1 GW 
Hydro: 5.4 GW 
Solar: 2.3 GW 
Wind: 2.3 GW 
National Action Plan for Renewable 
Energy (2014) 
Middle East          
Turkey Energy demand % reduction of energy 
intensity vs 2008 
2023 -20% Energy Efficiency Law (2012) 
Turkey Renewables Share in gross final 
energy consumption 
2023 20.5% National Renewable Energy Action Plan 
(2014) 
Turkey  Capacity targets 2023 Hydro: 34 GW 
Solar: 5 GW 
Wind: 20 GW 
Biomass: 1 GW 
Geothermal: 1 GW 
National Renewable Energy Action Plan 
(2014) 
Turkey Renewables Share in power 
production 
2023 30% Energy Strategy Plan 2010-2014 (2011) 
Saudi Arabia Renewables Capacity targets 2023 9.5 GW Vision 2030 (2016) 
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Africa          
Egypt Renewables Share in power 
production 
2020 20% Egypt Regional Center for Renewable 
Energy and Efficency 
South Africa Renewables Capacity targets 2030 Solar: 9.4 GW 
Wind: 8.5 GW 
Integrated Resource Plan (2010, updated 
2013) 
South Africa Renewables Share in transport 
demand 
2007 2%-10% for bio-ethanol; 
>5% for biodiesel 
Biofuels Industrial Strategy (2007) 
  
 140 
Table 24: Additional GHG policies in 2025-2030 in the INDC scenario 
Source: INDCs, unless otherwise noted 
UN Party 
GHG 
coverage 
Sectoral coverage Metric Base year 
Target 
year 
Target 
BAU emissions at 
Target year (Mt) 
All HFCs All sectors Emissions Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol: trajectory to -85% of 
BAU depending on country group 
Europe               
Albania CO2 Energy, industrial processes Emissions 2030 
(BAU) 
2030 -11.5% 5.9 
EU28 All GHGs All sectors Emissions 1990 2030 -40%  
EU28 All GHGs ETS sectors Emissions 2005 2030 -43% - European Commission , DG Energy 
+ 2021-2050 cap linear reduction factor of 
-2.2%/year 
Iceland All GHGs All sectors Emissions 1990 2030 -40%  
Macedonia 
(FYROM) 
CO2 FF combustion Emissions 2030 
(BAU) 
2030 -36% 17.7 
Norway All GHGs All sectors (LULUCF net-net) Emissions 1990 2030 -40%   
Serbia All GHGs All sectors Emissions 1990 2030 -9.8%  
Switzerland All GHGs All sectors Emissions 1990 2030 -50%  
North America               
Canada All GHGs All sectors (LULUCF net-net) Emissions 2005 2030 -30%  
Mexico All GHGs All sectors Emissions 2030 
(BAU) 
2030 -36% 973 
USA All GHGs All sectors (LULUCF net-net) Emissions 2005 2025 -28%  
USA CO2 Power sector Emissions 2005 2030 -32% - Clean Power Plan (2014) 
USA CH4 Oil and gas production Emissions 2012 2025 -45% - Climate Action Plan: Strategy to 
Reduce Methane Emissions (2016) 
Central & South 
America 
              
Argentina All GHGs All sectors Emissions 2030 
(BAU) 
2030 -30% 670 
Brazil All GHGs All sectors Emissions 2005 2025 -37%  
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Chile All GHGs All sectors excl. LULUCF Intensity of 
GDP 
2007 2030 -45%  
Colombia All GHGs All sectors Emissions 2030 
(BAU) 
2030 -30% 335 
Costa Rica All GHGs All sectors Emissions 2012 2030 -25%  
Dominican 
Republic 
CO2, CH4, 
N2O 
All sectors Emissions 2010 2030 -25%  
Ecuador CO2, CH4, 
N2O 
Energy Emissions 2025 
(BAU) 
2025 -45.8% n/a 
Grenada CO2, CH4 Electricity, Transport, Waste, Forestry Emissions 2010 2025 -30%  
Peru CO2, CH4, 
N2O 
All sectors Emissions 2030 
(BAU) 
2030 -30% 298 
Venezuela CO2 Energy Emissions 2030 
(BAU) 
2030 -20% 340 
Pacific               
Australia All GHGs All sectors Emissions 2005 2030 -28%  
Japan All GHGs All sectors excl. sinks Emissions 2013 2030 -26%  
Korea (Republic) All GHGs All sectors excl. LULUCF Emissions 2030 
(BAU) 
2030 -37% 851 
Marshall Islands CO2, CH4, 
N2O 
All sectors Emissions 2010 2025 -32%  
New Zealand All GHGs All sectors (LULUCF net-net) Emissions 2005 2030 -30%  
Asia               
Afghanistan CO2, CH4, 
N2O 
All sectors Emissions 2030 
(BAU) 
2030 -13.6% 48.9 
Bangladesh All GHGs Power, transport and industry Emissions 2030 
(BAU) 
2030 -15% 234 
Cambodia CO2, CH4, 
N2O 
Energy Emissions 2030 
(BAU) 
2030 -27% 11.6 
China CO2 Energy Intensity of 
GDP 
2005 2030 -65%  
China CO2 All sectors Emissions  2030 Peak around 2030 
India All GHGs All sectors Intensity of 
GDP 
2005 2030 -35%  
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Indonesia All GHGs All sectors Emissions 2030 
(BAU) 
2030 -41% 2881 
Malaysia CO2, CH4, 
N2O 
All sectors Intensity of 
GDP 
2005 2030 -45%  
Philippines All GHGs All sectors Emissions 2030 
(BAU) 
2030 -70% n/a 
Singapore All GHGs All sectors Intensity of 
GDP 
2005 2030 -36%  
Thailand All GHGs All sectors excl. LULUCF Emissions 2030 
(BAU) 
2030 -25% 555 
Vietnam All GHGs All sectors Emissions 2030 
(BAU) 
2030 -25% 787 
CIS               
Azerbaijan All GHGs Energy, agriculture, waste, LULUCF Emissions 1990 2030 -35%  
Belarus All GHGs All sectors excl. LULUCF Emissions 1990 2030 -28%   
Kazakhstan All GHGs All sectors Emissions 1990 2030 -25%  
Moldova All GHGs All sectors Emissions 1990 2030 -67%  
Russian 
Federation 
All GHGs All sectors Emissions 1990 2030 -30%  
Tajikistan CO2, CH4, 
N2O 
All sectors Emissions 1990 2030 -35%  
Ukraine All GHGs All sectors excl. LULUCF Emissions 1990 2030 -40%   
Middle East               
Iran All GHGs All sectors Emissions 2030 
(BAU) 
2030 -12% n/a 
Iraq CO2, CH4, 
N2O 
 Emissions 2035 
(BAU) 
2035 -15% 305 
Israel All GHGs All sectors excl. LULUCF Emissions 2030 
(BAU) 
2030 -22.6% 106 
Lebanon CO2, CH4, 
N2O 
All sectors Emissions 2030 
(BAU) 
2030 -30% 43.6 
Saudi Arabia All GHGs All sectors excl. LULUCF Emissions 2030 
(BAU) 
2030 -130 MtCO2e n/a 
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Turkey All GHGs All sectors Emissions 2030 
(BAU) 
2030 -21% 1175 
Africa               
Algeria CO2, CH4, 
N2O 
All sectors Emissions 2030 
(BAU) 
2030 -22% n/a 
Burkina Faso CO2, CH4, 
N2O 
All sectors Emissions 2030 
(BAU) 
2030 -18.2% 118 
Cameroon CO2, CH4, 
N2O 
Energy, agriculture, forestry, waste (no 
LULUCF) 
Emissions 2035 
(BAU) 
2035 -32% 104 
Central African 
Republic 
CO2, CH4, 
N2O 
All sectors Emissions 2030 
(BAU) 
2030 -5% 110 
Congo (Dem. 
Rep.) 
CO2, CH4, 
N2O 
Energy, agriculture, forestry (no 
LULUCF) 
Emissions 2030 
(BAU) 
2030 -17% 430 
Côte d'Ivoire All GHGs All sectors excl. LULUCF Emissions 2030 
(BAU) 
2030 -36% 34 
Equatorial Guinea CO2, CH4, 
N2O 
All sectors Emissions 2010 2030 -20%  
Ethiopia CO2, CH4, 
N2O 
All sectors Emissions 2030 
(BAU) 
2030 -64% 400 
Gambia All GHGs All sectors excl. LULUCF Emissions 2010 2030 -45.4%  
Ghana All GHGs All sectors Emissions 2030 
(BAU) 
2030 -45% 74 
Guinea All GHGs Energy, agriculture Emissions 2030 
(BAU) 
2030 -13% 53 
Kenya CO2, CH4, 
N2O 
All sectors Emissions 2030 
(BAU) 
2030 -30% 143 
Madagascar CO2, CH4, 
N2O 
All sectors (net of sinks) Emissions 2030 
(BAU) 
2030 -14% 214 
Morocco CO2, CH4, 
N2O 
All sectors Emissions 2030 
(BAU) 
2030 42% 170 
Niger CO2, CH4, 
N2O 
All sectors Emissions 2030 
(BAU) 
2030 -34.6% 96 
Nigeria CO2, CH4, 
N2O 
All sectors Emissions 2030 
(BAU) 
2030 -45% 850 
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Sao Tome and 
Principe 
CO2, CH4, 
NOx 
All sectors Emissions 2030 
(BAU) 
2030 -24% 240 
South Africa All GHGs All sectors Emissions  2030 2020-2035: plateau at 398-614 MtCO2e 
Tanzania All GHGs All sectors (gross emissions) Emissions 2030 
(BAU) 
2030 -20% 146 
Tunisia All GHGs All sectors Intensity of 
GDP 
2010 2030 -41%  
Zambia CO2, CH4, 
N2O 
Energy, Agriculture, Waste, LULUCF Emissions 2030 
(BAU) 
2010 -47% 80 
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Table 25: Additional energy policies in 2025-2030 in the INDC scenario 
Source: INDCs, unless otherwise noted 
UN Party 
Technology / Sector Metric Target 
year 
Objective 
 Europe         
EU28 Renewables Share in gross final demand 2030 27% - European Commission , DG Energy 
 Central & South 
America 
        
Brazil Renewables Share in of liquid biofuels 2030 18% 
Brazil Renewables Share in primary energy 2030 45% 
Brazil Renewables excl. hydro Share in primary energy 2030 28-33% 
Brazil Renewables excl. hydro Share in power production 2030 23% 
 Pacific         
Japan Nuclear Share in power production 2030 20-22% 
Japan Renewables Share in power production 2030 22-24% 
 Asia         
China Non-fossil fuels Share in primary energy 2030 20% 
India Non-fossil fuels Share in new power capacity 2030 40% 
Indonesia Renewables Share in primary energy 2025 23% 
 Middle East         
Turkey Renewables Capacity 2030 Wind: 16 GW 
Solar: 10 GW 
Turkey Nuclear Capacity 2030 Commissioning of a nuclear power plant 
 Africa         
South Africa Coal-to-liquids CO2 captured and stored 2050 23 Mt CO2 
South Africa Plug-in vehicles Share in vehicles 2030 20% 
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service: 
- by freephone: 00 800 6 7 8 9 10 11 (certain operators may charge for these calls), 
- at the following standard number: +32 22999696, or 
- by electronic mail via: http://europa.eu/contact 
FINDING INFORMATION ABOUT THE EU 
Online 
Information about the European Union in all the official languages of the EU is available on the Europa 
website at: http://europa.eu 
EU publications 
You can download or order free and priced EU publications from EU Bookshop at: 
http://bookshop.europa.eu. Multiple copies of free publications may be obtained by contacting Europe 
Direct or your local information centre (see http://europa.eu/contact). 
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